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SPACE, TIME AND THE ARTIST:
THE PHILOSOPHY AND AESTHETICS OF WYNDHAM LEWIS
Sumary of Ph.D. Thesis - P.3. Bracewell
My study, in Part I of this thesis, of Wyndham Lewis's philosophical
principles outlined in Time and Western Man (1927), reveals a mode of
thought which is inspired and determined by beliefs about visual art
and its metaphysical significance. The ultimate rejection of the
philosophies of Bergson, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and the
'Space-Timeists' such as Spengler, Whitehead and Alexander, in pursuit
of a 'philosophy of the eye' was, I argue, fashioned according to
aesthetic objections. 'Time-values' are challenged by 'space-values',
ideally expressible for Lewis in the static, spatial medium of visual
art.
The aesthetics of Vorticism, discussed in Part II, was formalized in
the two Blast journals (1914-15), and provides the key to an
understanding of Lewis's later philosophy in its negation of
Bergsonist-related doctrines. His aversion to chronologism' had
emerged in various ways well before the public launch of Vorticism and
had subsequently achieved a subtle, effective coherence in the 'logic
of contradictions' which directed the theoretical strategies of Blast.
But In modernism Lewis recognized 'empty' abstraction and thus the
taint of the time-cult itself. As a method of working, abstraction
was not abandoned, but was directed away from the sensational and
emotional in the service of intellect and rational thought.
In order to clarify the interdependence of art and philosophy in
Lewis's thought, I propose two schematic models. The first
characterizes Lewis's philosophical principles and posits the concept
of the vortex as Lewis's noumenon. The second superimposes the
aesthetic values and form of the vortex symbol itself as a prior
justification of the philosophical schema: each 'model' is clearly
incomplete without cognizance of the other. Since, for Lewis, the
essential character of Vorticism was first expressed in art practice,
the findings of this thesis support Lewis's own retrospective view
(1956), that Vorticism was a 'new philosophy' in visual form.
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INTRODUCTION
In the work, Time and Western Man 1 , Wyndham Lewis expounds his
philosophical principles and beliefs, in response to what he regarded
as the particularly virulent and culturally damaging
'time-philosophy', derived popularly from the ideas of the French
philosopher Henri Bergson and his adherents. This work by Lewis is
accepted In this thesis as central to the understanding of the whole
of his oeuvre in the visual arts, criticism, aesthetics, creative
literature, satire, political and polemical writings, in its statement
of the basic philosophical assumptions and propositions which
motivated and challenged him.
However, my study is focused on what I believe to be a fundamental
relation: that is, the context of Lewis's philosophy and its aesthetic
base from the point of view of the visual artist. In the preface to
Book I, Lewis clearly states his position and Interests as an artist
and hence declares at the outset his purpose, which is to mount a
criticism of the 'Time-view' 'from the position of the plastic or the
visual intelligence' 2 . Lewis's philosophical views are 'mobilized'
therefore, 'in the service of the things of vision' and the expressed
Intention of the work is not to cast his 'mere artist's eye, like an
impertinent bird's, into the awful machinery of Relativity' 3, not to
consider the causes in detail, but more legitimately, as a
non-scientist, to evaluate the effects of a philosophy thus
constructed, upon social life and the arts. Hence Lewis lays stress
on his strengths as an 'outsider', and clearly outlines the extent of
2his 'occupational' interests, coninenting from the basis of a wider
ground than the coimnitted scientist or specialist philosopher.
In this thesis, I wish to argue that not only is the understanding of
Lewis's philosophical views vital to any study which seeks to
offer an analysis of the writings of Lewis on aesthetics and art
criticism, but that the place of the plastic Intelligence' In his
thought is such that beliefs about art and its practice and Lewis's
search for a coherent aesthetics were crucially influential factors in
shaping and directing the tenor of his philesophical development and
hence his position of opposition to the 'time-philosophy' and its
variants in Time and Western Man. Indeed, it is argued that a full
understanding of Lewis's philosophical principles depends ultimately
on a parallel reading of his aesthetics. Hence Lewis's philosophy as
articulated in Time and Western Man is seen as dependent, or
contingent upon, the characteristic notions shaped and determined in
respect of his prior role as practising artist and theorist. In
addition, his view of visual art is such that it alone amongst the
arts possesses the necessary spatial and flux-resisting qualities to
provide the necessary impetus for renewal of the truly creative
capacity that is of universal - and not ephemeral or relative - value.
In thus identifying aspects of Lewis's writings as 'art criticism',
'aesthetics' and 'philosophy', it is necessary to draw attention to
the particular applications intended within the specific context of
this thesis, and to acknowledge their limits. Lewis's personal
aversion to the term 'aesthetic' is well noted, where it is used to
refer to the professed emotive response to formal elements of art such
3as those documented in the writings of Roger Fry and Clive Bell; such
an emotion for Lewis would be the hallmark of the 'aesthete', the
'dilettante', the type of art critic whom he felt should be opposed
and exposed as the parasite of the art world. In discussing
'aesthetics' with regard to Lewis therefore, definitions which are
involved with questions of 'beauty' and 'taste must be largely laid
aside in favour of those which indicate general phi osophical theories
or conceptions about the nature of art, the description and
explanation of Its forms, subject matter and Intention, and how Lewis
sees the relationship of art with thought and prevalent
socio-political condItions
Where 'aesthetics' becomes for Lewis the generalized term which serves
to signify the formulation of general concepts, 'art criticism' is
intended to identify and characterize the application of such ideas in
response to individual artists and movements, and specific Issues in
relation to the practices and concerns of the art market in Europe and
Its organization in England. It will be claimed in this thesis that,
even whilst Lewis Is thus occupied with specifics, he Is always
mindful of their relevance in cultural terms to his broad
philosophical perspective. The encyclopaedic breadth of Lewis's
concerns is never random in purpose, despite surface appearances, and
as I suggest, the nature of his style and range of interests is more
fully understood as a systematic undertaking and articulation of
connecting principles when the fundamental links between Lewis's
aesthetics and philosophy are affirmed.
Mainstream philosophical circles have never accepted Lewis Into the
4fold, and Time and Western Man has largely been ignored or disregarded
as a work of philosophy 5 . His self-assigned place, the 'place of
honour', has always been on the outside 6 , and lack of recognition by
'establishments' whether artistic or philosophical, whilst undoubtedly
rankling with Lewis, did not divert him from the purpose in hand. It
is clear that reviewers7 found It more appropriate to examine the
book's general critical and cultural principles than Its philosophy,
either in a specific literary or artistic context. To one couaentator
however, Lewis's interdisciplinary ground was not problematical In
defining the import of his philosophical thesis; he wrote
To Mr. Wyndhaa Lewis the vice we suffer from is that we
close our eyes and open our ears, that we discard space and
embrace time, and so, Instead of standing still and
contemplating, we are for ever moving on and exulting in the
empty form of progress. This couinendation of space-forms at
the expense of music is not just the prejudice of a painter
and draughtsman; Mr. Wyndham Lewis is using the example of
his craft to embody a philosophic principle. ...Some critics
have been unable to make head or tail of the book.. 8 but
surely the philosophy Implied in It is not obscure.
From his earliest formative encounters with the ideas and writings of
European thinkers during his period of travel 1902-1908, to the end of
his life, Lewis was deeply concerned with the areas of philosophical
investigation that either supported or challenged his aesthetics
intellectually. Abuse was piled high on the 'professional
philosopher' In the essay, 'Physics of the Not-Self' whose 'scruples'
to Lewis 'branded him a liar from the start' . This Is demonstrably
ore a product of over-magnified irony than an authentic critical
assessment; Lewis took his philosophy and that of others whom he
respected extremely seriously, athough this gravity was often masked
by a pointed, eccentric style and means of expression. What this
5essay does emphasize however, If such an emphasis should be needed, is
the central Importance for Lewis of the intellect in perception and
the ordering of knowledge, the critical intelligence wherein lies
man's potentiality towards rationality and philosophical
contemplation, temporarily freed from the vagaries of the flux andthe
unconscious, sense experience and irrational intultionism.
Intellectual justification for the means of expression formulated in
practical terms was essential to him, but It also brought problems of
coherence and logical consistency. Lewis quotes Socrates' dictum of
the Phaedo in support of the claim that 'philosophy gives freedo, from
the obscenities of existence'
...(it) endeavours to free the soul by showing that the
view of things by means of the eyes is full of depression, as
also is that through the ears and the other senses,
persuading an abandonment of these so far as It is not
absolutely necessary to use them, and to believe nothing else
he hears.., for that a thing of this kind... Is sensible and
visible, but what she herself perceives Is Intelligible and
Invisible. 10
For Lewis, this is the invitation to 'plunge into the 'soul, the
opposite of the plunge into life suggested by Bergson'. The paradox
that Lewis is concerned to recognize and yet reconcile with his own
position as a plastic artist concerns the isolation of the 'eye' from
the other senses, In direct contradiction to Plato's exhortation. For
Lewis, since the eye, which is 'mechanical' and useless without the
organizing principle of the intelligence, functioning In order to
record sense-impressions which, as I explore in Chapter 4, are
integral to any kind of artistic activity, his position has to allow
for a meeting of 'intellect' and 'mechanism' across the flux. In
developing and maintaining the concept of a visually-specific fusion
6of the physical and mental worlds, Lewis's agreement with Plato's
position as expressed here soon evaporates.
Thus far, too, it is indicated just how closely Lewis had leaned
towards and learned from Bergson's theories, necessitating a thorough
repudiation in order to distinguish degrees of emphasis. Both Bergson
and Lewis would agree on the nature of the paradox to be addressed:
that is the simultaneous, necessarily complementary and yet opposing
character of the values of intelligence and instinct . Differences
In the approach to this paradox and, In addition, a profound
acknowledgement of the nature and effects of the Instinctive domain
have to be articulated for Lewis in order to maintain the ultimate
supremacy of the rational and critical intellect; the formulation of a
Vorticist aesthetic provided him with the ideal opportunity to give a
theoretical and visual hard-edge to those distinctions in a 'logic of
contradictions' as discussed In Chapter 6. Time and Western Man
accordingly attempted to outline the philosophical objections to the
Bergsonian interpretation of the intelligence-instinct dichotomy. The
refutation of a particular interpretation of reality was at stake, and
it was all the more acute for Lewis the artist to establish an
intellectual defence against a view which consigned art to the chaotic
flux. Stability and definition, however they are perceived, could not
flourish within such a philosophical world-view.
As opening discursive concepts, Lewis found the relationship of
mind-matter and the nature of perception to be uppermost In
formulating his own view of a reality that would accord with his
aesthetic inclinations and artistic practice. Such a framework would
7need to encompass and be consistent with a theory and practice of art
that concerned Itself with external appearances mediated by the
specific Interests of graphic visual means; line, plastic design,
outlines, form and the analytical process by which the intelligence
would hope to transform those externals Into visual Interpretations
consistent with an articulated view of reality.
If Lewis's position as a practising artist disqualified him from fully
embracing the extent of a Platonic idealism, he made a virtue of his
sympathy with its general approach to 'nature' and the 'natural', and
the crucial stress on the importance of rationality and the critical
intelligence. He had found much to admire especially in the 'gimcrack
world of facades' in Berkeley, regarding it, nevertheless, as 'one of
the best of all possible philosophic worlds' 12 . Any reservations
about the applicability of such ideas, and with the early Plato's
denigration of the value of sense-perception are due to an artist's
intimate relationship with those precise areas of experience that are
peripheral to a thorough-going idealism.
Time and Western Man puts forward what Lewis explicitly calls a
'philosophy of the eye' 13 , elevating the operation of vision
essentially In concert with the intellect, and not isolated from It,
although a different function is stressed. Berkeley is thus pressed
into service as providing a model of an 'extremist philosophy for
surface creatures' whereby Lewis extracts the essence of
philosophically conceived mental perception processes to accord with
his own - artist's - view of a semi-idealist world of Intellect that
nevertheless admits to its ranks the sense of vision. Hence we find
8the seat of a reallst' core within the basis of Lewis's philosophy as
a vital - but not 'vitalist' - organizing principle14.
The outline structure and organization of this thesis Is therefore
conceived in two main parts. Part I analyses relevant aspects of Book
II of Time and Western Man, Lewis's detailed development and analysis
of the 'time-philosophy', from Bergson's systematization of it to
contemporary 'space-timeists', and in view of the 'awful machinery of
Relativity' the exposure takes place, of the cult which had begun with
Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, had reached systematic explication in
Bergson, and popularization in Spengler. Both Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche were regarded by Lewis as inveterate allies of Bergson, and
were ultimately rejected as such by him, although it is clear that the
influence of these thinkers on the development of Lewis's ideas is
evident and highly relevant, since the rejection of basic metaphysical
precepts did not preclude openness to their views on aesthetics.
A recognition of the complexity of Lewis's philosophical position, and
the oppositional tensions which were pursued and maintained is an
important dimension of this study. Accordingly, his strong attraction
for varieties of philosophical idealism and the attendant problems for
the artist who must acknowledge and celebrate the physicality of
objects is therefore a potentially self-contradictory position, and
requires exegesis. Since Lewis's expressed views amount to a virtual
'philosophy of the eye', the nature of his standpoint as developed in
his book is considered In this light, opening up the enquiry in Part
II of my thesis to the proposition that the origins of such a
philosophy are to be found in Lewis's beliefs about aesthetics and the
9role of the artist, beliefs which in turn were determined by the
practice of art itself.
Book I of Time and Western Man, • The Revolutionary Simpleton', was
included by Lewis as a preliminary characterization of the effects in
cultural terms of the Bergsonian philosophy. In this piece, he draws
the reader's attention to aspects of art and social life which have
succumbed to the philosophical virus; the notion of the 'romantic',
herd-like adherence to fashion and low-culture, mass art 'movements',
the Russian ballet, and cults of the child and the primitive. All
such manifestations, for Lewis, demonstrate the pervasive and damaging
nature of a mass interpretation, in diluted format, of the time-cult.
That literature Is seen as more deeply compromised than visual art -
although art is endangered - is clear from Lewis's detailed analysis
of the writings of Gertrude Stein, Ezra Pound and James Joyce.
'The Revolutionary Simpleton' thus provides a framework for the
material discussed in Part II of this thesis. Lewis's attitudes
towards the much-vaunted concepts of 'Romanticism' and 'Classicism',
are Important in this context, and in Chapter 5, I examine the nature
and extent of Lewis own professed 'romanticism' and how and to what
extent personal and philosophical extrication was apparently
accomplished by Lewis, expressed In the dichotomies 'art' and 'life'
accompanied by the attendant philosophical Issues which might be
similarly represented in the debates of 'instinct' and 'intelligence',
the 'mechanical' and the 'rational'. The limits of such oppositions
are most often acknowledged by Lewis, but are occasionally not
explicitly articulated, for specific reasons In connection with the
10
thesis he wishes to propound. Lewis's attitude to the 'romantic' has
a close bearing on the wider thesis I seek to develop, and is clearly
crucial to the formulation of particular theoretical strategies that
Lewis developed to the full In relation to the aesthetics of
Yorticism. Thus It is necessary to enter Into a prior analysis of
Lewis's own adherence to the 'romantic' and the reasons for needing to
define limits for himself within the romantic tendency, and yet remain
'outside' it.
If Lewis was concerned to expose and critically examine the cultural,
intellectual and social malaise that steimned from the Bergsonlan
'time-philosophy', we must note that the ardent assimilation of
Bergson's theories by the young 'Romanticized' Lewis in Paris was
matched no less by the rejection of this 'fashionable' philosophy.
This rejection was, I argue, conceived primarily on aesthetic grounds,
firstly in the context of Lewis's arrival on the English art scene,
his dealings with Roger Fry and the 'Blooasberries', and reaching Its
most public and visual form In the theory and practice of the
Vorticist movement. It must be stressed that Lewis considered himself
to be a 'professional', an intellectual 'heavyweight', but nonetheless
his priorities were those of a practising artist. He was therefore
not in the business of Kantlan systematization, but of 'making art
possible' in a society seemingly bent on its destruction and
trivialization. Hence Time and Western Man should be understood as
the philosophical contribution to that end, which always remained
supreme for Lewis, and which should be read in conjunction with
reference to Lewis's writings on art and aesthetics, and their context
in the English art world.
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My characterization of Lewis's Apollonian romanticism Is useful in the
task of posing a contrasting model with complementary forms In the
aesthete and the traditionalist, who looked to the past for
inspiration with true time-cult enthusiasm. The particular insularity
of English art stenined largely for Lewis from the legacy of
Victorlanism and its sentimental romanticism, a blind attachment to
tradition and the dilettantism which threatened to stifle any truly
innovative initiative in art. The intellectual legacy bequeathed
prominently by Carlyle and Arnold achieved aesthetic confirmation in
the promotion of craft values in art by Morris and Ruskin and in the
Arts and Crafts Movement, and achieved contemporary allegiance in the
shape of the highly influential art critic Roger Fry. Since many of
Lewis's ideas about the nature and importance of the visual arts were
formulated in response to the specific conditions under which English
art was conceived and marketed, his relations with the English art
establishment and Bloomsbury, symbolically represented in Lewis's view
by the Royal Academy and Fry, are examined as crucial to an
understanding of Lewis's developing aesthetic and art criticism, and
in pinpointing the first systematic stirrings of resistance to the
time-philosophy and its attendant cultural, social and artistic
manifestations that he clearly identified within that context.
The Idea of the vortex, which I identify as a guiding principle of
Lewis's philosophy, was already fully worked out in terms of art
practice and theory before the First World War. An engagement with
the bracing example of Futurism, and the equally dynamic propagandist
activities of its spokesman, Marinetti, had inspired Lewis to take
action. In theoretical terms, Lewis's close contact with the
12
philosopher I.E. Hulme was seen to be influential on the developing
aesthetics of Vorticism. The importance of this influence is fully
acknowledged, but It Is argued that the vehement disengagement of
Lewis's Vorticism with Futurist Ideas, Marinetti and vitalism in
general, and with Hulme's Bergsonist aesthetics, surfaced as a result
of an independent artistic impetus that recognized Bergsons
philosophy - in all its intellectual and popular forms - as its mortal
enemy.
The two issues of Blast 15 , in which Lewis published his first
important writings on art, set out to clarify the position of
Vorticism in relation to other contemporary art movements. In doing
so, Lewis presented the nub of his case against Bergson. Cubism,
which was for Lewis a form of 'congealed dynamism or 'cubed-over'
Impressionism was allied closely to the activities of Fry and the
'chronologism' identified in a line of direct descent from the late
Victorians. Futurism was distilled Bergsonism: it could thus not be
art, but encompassed Bergson's 'anti-art' in ostensible artistic form.
In developing his ideas on aesthetics, Lewis claimed a priority for
practice, and had regarded Vorticist art as a philosophy in visual
guise 16, formulated long before its explicit literary expression in
Time and Western Man. The provocative presentation and idiosyncratic
content of Blast masks a series of determined theoretical and
intellectual strategies, and Lewis's lifelong attraction for the logic
which emerges from the play and coherence of opposing dualities is
seen most clearly in conjunction with his art practice. In examples
of Vorticist work, and especially in an analysis of visually
contrasting effects, the philosophical dimensions of the Vorticist
13
image can be unravelled.
The last chapter of this thesis surveys the range and scope of Lewis's
writings on art and aesthetics after the first war in the context of
his intellectual struggles with Bergsonism. Vorticism remained a
central focus to the end of Lewis's career, but it became increasingly
obvious to Lewis that the movement itself was inevitably tainted at
root with 'timeism'. The uncompromising modernist obsession with
'abstraction' 'for its own sake' and an attitude of mind which
elevated the irrational above the rational, and emotion and instinct
above intellect, expressed for Lewis only too clearly the extent of an
Intellectual malaise which owed its allegiance to the claims of 'art
for art's sake' in Victorian England, and to Bergson's popularization
in Europe. In effect, Lewis, in extending a fervent interest in
abstraction in his Vorticist work, and in attacking chronologism on
obvious fronts, failed to realise in the heady days of rebellion that
his activities were effectively leading art further towards the abyss
of non-existence envisaged in Bergson.
A vigorous attack on the followers of 'empty abstraction' and
'primitivism' and the celebration of the 'Irrational' in art was
therefore an intellectual necessity for Lewis, begun iuinediately after
the war, and was pursued single-mindedly throughout the 1920s and
l930s.	 The Caliph's Design of 1919 17 represents an inznediate attempt
to put the house of modernism in order, and Lewis accordingly
distinguishes between 'rationalist' and 'primitive' predilections.
Alert to manifestations of 'chronologism' in popular culture, the
l920s see Lewis occupied with 'blasting' the 'apes' and 'tyros'
14
system of art in England, consisting of a two-tier arrangement whereby
the cultured dilettante 'apes' pretend to be artists and experts who
assume the position of superiority and knowledge over the 'tyronic'
masses. The Apes of God 18, Lewis's massive satirical novel, was
published at the end of a decade in which he had hoped to 'frighten'
the residual influence of Victorlanism away.
In the 1930s, the collection, Wyndham Lewis the Artist. From 'Blast'
to Burlington House t9
 confirms the importance of Vorticism for Lewis,
reprinting the early writings on art drawn from the two editions of
Blast, The Caliph's Design, and other essays published up to 1939.
This book Is important to the task of Identifying the nature of
Lewis's response to certain attitudes and approaches to art current at
the time, and demonstrates how, from a position which had taken the
image as a visual philosophical idea, he had now increasingly sought
philosophical antidotes to the acute practical problems facing the
creative artist. Attention is focused on Lewis's views on 'pure'
formalism, Surrealism, and 'fashion-crazed' art critics,
topics which in various ways demonstrated conclusively for him the
prevalence of the peculiarly destructive impulse associated with
timeism, and a general tendency towards the setting loose of
'intuition' at the expense of intellect. The Institutionalization of
this version of modernism that Lewis had resisted for over forty years
was complete by the time he published the The Demon of Progress In the
Arts in 1954
	 Misunderstood and mis-read by contemporary critics
such as Clement Greenberg and Herbert Read, this short book shows
clearly the mutual dependence and coherence of Lewis's Ideas on
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aesthetics and philosophy examined in this thesis. For him, where the
image comes to mean nothing, and Is enshrined as such, the pervasive
influence of chronologist dogma is thus proven.
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PART I
PHILOSOPHY: TIME AND WESTERN MAN
CHAPTER 1
BERGSON: THE PROCESS OF DESPATIALIZATION
When Lewis 'began to get a philosophy' early in his career1
 , European
influences were paramount. He had studied contemporary French
political writings, including those of Georges Sorel, Julien Benda,
Charles P4guy and Jacques Maritain, and had read widely in German and
Russian literature, philosophy and criticism. Ideas and discourse had
fascinated Lewis, from his youth to the end of his life, and there is
ample evidence that thinkers as diverse as Nietzsche, Schopenhauer,
Kant, Leibniz, Spinoza, Croce, Hegel, Worringer and Santayana
were influential in respect of his own development and
subsequent work. Lewis's self education may have seemed a haphazard
and unsystematic affair, but it is this background which provided a
rich, if eclectic basis for the formation of his aesthetics and
philosophy.
It is the influence of Nietzsche and of Schopenhauer that Lewis
readily admits of importance in his early years; these were thinkers
who were, he felt, 'more iniediately accessible to a Western mind than
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the other Germans,whose barbarous jargon was a great barrier...' 2 , and
although he is not named In this context, Kant was found equally
accessible3 and continued to exert a powerful and active influence on
aspects of Lewis's thought after both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer had
been denounced as precursors of the time-philosophy.
Lewis stressed that he had never read Hegel, for the above reason,
and had found him to be among the most obscure of German philosophers,
but he nevertheless had explicitly acknowledged the Inspiration of a
Hegelian dialectical method in the meditation on systems of government
In The Art of Being Ruled4 . Although such a method is not employed in
Time and Western Man, it is evident that the dialectical process,
which aims to preserve the rational propositions of theses by
cancelling out the irrational, and progressing accordingly towards
synthesis, would have been attractive to Lewis, especially in view of
the stress on the superiority of the workings of the intellect in the
engagement with Bergsonism.
The deterministic implications of Hegel's 'political backwash' were
exceedingly distasteful to Lewis5 , but in matters of aesthetics,
Hegel's view that thought culminates in art, religion and philosophy -
that it is not just a sensuous means of expressing or evoking
feelings, but a fundamental way of apprehending reality - must have
been applauded. The view that art may operate in such a way is
expressed variously and with different forms of emphasis by prominent
philosophical minds, but It remains an important feature of many
diverse systems, most notably in Schopenhauer, and including
Nietzsche, Kant, and Bergson. For Hegel, art
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...only achieves its highest task when it has taken Its place in
the same sphere with religion and philosophy, and has become
simply a mode of revealing ...
	 the Divine Nature,('Das
GOttliche) the deepest interests of humanity, and the most
comprehensive truths of the mind. It is in works of art that
nations have deposited the profoundest intuitions and ideas of
their hearts; and fine art is frequently the key - with many
nations there is no other - to the understanding of their wisdom
and of their religion. 6
In Time and Western Man, Lewis argues for an elevated status for art,
in the idealistic spirit suggested by Hegel If not in manner, but one
essential difference between them lies in the definition of
priorities; Hegel is a philosopher turning a searching light upon art
as a medium for knowledge, whereas Lewis remains always the creative
artist turning his light on philosophical discourse with a view of
assessing its relevance to clearly defined aesthetic beliefs.
The formative influence on Lewis's thought of Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche as conceded by Lewis, readily apparent in the style and
content of Time and Western Man, is considered in detail in the next
chapter. In the case of Henri Bergson, Lewis is less forthcoming in
acknowledging a crucially important intellectual mentor, for the
naturally good reason that Bergson's philosophy represented the
central lynch-pin of the metaphysics so roundly denounced by him. The
pervasiveness of the 'militant vitalism' that 'took the form of a
reaction against civilised values' 7 was rather hastily cast off,
although some points of contact were harder to refute.
Lewis had first seriously embarked on a study of philosophy during his
period of travel in Europe, arid had attended Bergson's lectures at the
College de France, sharing the philosophical studies of friends at the
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Ecole Normale. 'Bergson' he wrote to a friend,
was an excellent lecturer, dry and impersonal. I began by
embracing his evolutionary system. From that I passed to
Renouvier and thus to Kant. When one is young on fait des
bêtises, quoi! 8
Given the self-acknowledged openness and folly of youth, it is still
apparent that important aspects of Lewis's aesthetics are reminiscent
of Bergson's ideas on art. That such a formative influence might be
identified, even whilst Lewis's reaction to 'chronological' thought
takes precedence, is a measure of the complexities of Lewis's
position, and the delicate balance which he attempts to maintain
between competing systems of ideas, aided by a liberally conceived
semi-Hegelian style of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.
For all that Lewis's case in Time and Western Man revolves around the
challenge to Bergson's philosophy, there Is no detailed or sustained
analysis of specifically Bergsonian concepts until the last major
chapter of the book. Certainly, Bergson's name is heavily drawn upon
throughout as a source from which Alexander, Whitehead and Spengler
proceed to develop as 'Space-Timeists', but whilst their work is
quoted and identified, Lewis often leaves passages and statements from
Bergson unacknowledged. Much of the material is indeed drawn from
Creative Evolution 9, but on the whole Lewis chooses to analyse the
time philosophy at second remove, through the work of more
recently-published theorists. This Is consistent with a method that
attempts to uncover a contemporary 'malaise', but It Is perhaps
surprising to find such an obviously oblique approach In Lewis, whose
candour does not often go unremarked. Lewis's early and enthusiastic
acquaintance with Bergson's influential and popular time-philosophy
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cannot be sufficiently understated 	 in a work which is designed to
discredit those ideas at source. For Lewis then, Bergson nevertheless
remained a formative Influence whose philosophy continued to exert
pressure on his thinking, notably in the area of aesthetics, even If
the end result consisted wholly of a sustained attack on its basic
propositions. This point has to be understood in the context of the
debate with Bergson on the 'process of despatialization' that Lewis
recognized and challenged in Bergson's philosophy, and in the notion
of a 'visionary' role for the creative artist with which Lewis was
explicitly in agreement.
'Time', for Bergson, stands as the fundamental reference point of his
philosophy, and it is his characterization of time and its relation to
self and the physical world that occupies Lewis. Bergson challenged
the supporters of a scientific determinism which offered a spatialized
understanding of time, and argued that the idea of time as a dimension
misrepresents reality. The more we divide time up into fragmented
instants, the more our self-awareness is distorted. In Creative
Evolution, which was a widely read and popular work, and which was
largely responsible for spawning a cult following, (including the
young Lewis), Bergson accepted evolutionism as a base point from which
the Darwinian theory of progress of species was interpreted as the
continuous operation of an élan vital, or life-force. Bergson's
criticism of biological evolutionism revolved around its failure to
account for the uniqueness and continuous processes of life, the
generation of new life forms; evolution is seen as essentially
creative and dynamic in character, not mechanistic as suggested in
Darwin. In his characterization of this life-process, Bergson
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identified distinct types of evolutionary development. One of these
operates according to the impulses of instinct characteristic of
insect life, and the other accounts for the evolution of intelligence
in man. Both types, for Bergson, were generated by the elan vital, a
mysterious element which is the fundamental impetus of life.
The distinction that Bergson makes between the concept and the
experience of time encompasses the spatial within its categorization.
Our normal understanding of time, according to the measurements of
physical science, represents the fragmented and separable units of
time measured by clocks. For Bergson, this system of measurement is
an inappropriate imposition since it is not essentially temporal in
character, but spatial. It might be subjected to the kinds of
analysis and investigation applied to the concept of space, and is
designated as 'homogeneous time.., the medium in which conscious
states form discrete series. This time is nothing but space, and pure
duration is something different' 10 . This ordinary, homogeneous time
is merely a convention devised by the human intellect, and must be
understood as such, subordinated to the intuitive insights of 'real
time'.
'Real time', which is by contrast consists of 'heterogeneous' moments,
will be known and experienced as 'true' or 'pure' duration (dure),
apprehended by intuition; the operations of instinct and intellect are
combined in that experience, and are not separable. Duration is not
merely the means by which one instant succeeds another, for if this
were the case, we should experience nothing but a 'continuous present'
and be aware of no past, nor would we be able to anticipate the
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projection of experience to come: duration stresses the open flow of
time; it
is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws Into the
future and which swells as it advances. And as the past grows
without ceasing, so also there is no limit to its
preservatlon...it follows us at every instant; all that we have
felt, thought and willed from our earliest infancy is there,
leaning over the present which is about to join it, pressing
against the portals of consciousness that would fain leave it
outside.
So for Bergson, the act of 'knowing' is dualistic. One strand is the
Intellectual, spatializing process, representing the 'portals of
consciousness' the seeing of things in the world as static, solidified
and mechanistic, and which attained its highest point of
sophistication in positivist science. It functions most effectively
in practical terms, In the way It facilitates decision-making, and can
enable us to act in the physical, spatial world, but it cannot
apprehend the 'real' since duration and flux, which are 'ineffable'
may only be understood in terms of intuitive, sympathetic means. Thus
intuitive knowledge reveals unconscious feeling and emotion, and
reaches into the heart of the thing contemplated; it allows human
beings to have inner knowledge of other selves and matter. Bergson's
view of matter entails the incorporation of dead spirit in an organic
whole, and therefore elevates objects accordingly to the status
traditionally reserved for the 'subject', or the individual
personality. Matter, being extinct spirit, is patently an obstacle
for live and creative spirit, but it can also be the means by which
spirit expresses, and thereby knows itself. Each subject is a
'personal' impetus which participates organically in the 'general'
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impetus, for as spiritual beings we consist of creative change. Man
is not a stable entity experiencing a process of change which operates
outside him, not an essence subjected to the vagaries of movement
through time, since the true self' is the movement through time
itself. We exist most truly and dynamically as change, and we are
most aware of our essential selves when we live by intuition,
identifying with the alan vital. This life-force', by analogy, would
seem to act very much like a priest is said to do, as an intermediary
between God and man: It places us in touch with the absolute.
through
Art Is a vehlcleAwhich, by means of free expression and creativity,
the life force may be invoked, although music, which is temporal, is a
higher form than plastic art, which operates largely in the spatial
dimension. The philosopher, by contrast, may only work indirectly
towards the understanding of la dure, mobile duration or the
absolute, since his activity necessarily involves the exercise of the
spatializing dimension of intellect, but he too, Bergson stresses,
should draw upon intuition freely in conjunction with analytical
procedures.
Hence the outcome of this initial understanding of Bergson is thus
summarized; duration is the means by which the Darwinian thesis is
transformed into a despatialized, dynamic theory of being and
becoming, the alan vital being identified as the inexpressible
spiritual and creative energy, the ultimate reality of the universe.
Both space and time are temporal in character, under which concept
they subsist; both instinct and intellect are combined in duration,
under the aegis of a perpetual flow of time, encompassing matter and
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spirit in an organic whole. The personality or 'self' does not exist
as a stable concept, and any suggestion that it might seem so is the
result of spatial illusionism, since the true self may only be known
by intuition, by entering the inner regions of the unconscious and
giving self up to the flow, the interpenetration and interfusion of
heterogeneous elements of awareness. The inadequacy of intellect or
'consciousness' as a vehicle for apprehending experience is therefore
outlined, and explicitly anticipated in the theory of 'real time', as
duration is the notion of our experience of material bodies as
characterized and determined by the perpetual flux of action and
motion. The thrust of Bergson's work thus constitutes a detailed
exploration of the notion of duration as the key to an understanding
of the 'inner reality' of life; mind, matter, time itself.
Thus far, on each count of Bergson's theory Lewis strongly
demurred. From the naming of space as temporally defined, he claims
misrepresentation and construes active mischief on the part of the
philosopher whose optimism in constructing a time-world was, for
Lewis, an act of intellectual fraud which radiated insincerity and
opportunism. Bergson's 'despatialization process' offended beliefs
that were vigorously held and maintained by Lewis. The subjection of
spatial qualities to the hegemony of time was anathema to him.
Concepts such as thought, consciousness and intellect were held to
take spatial form, functioning to operate primarily with the inert and
the static; to abstract, separate and eliminate data with which they
have to deal, and which for Bergson were accordingly inferior,
'characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life'12.
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Creativity for Bergson resided conversely as a function of the
instinctive domain, moulded on the very form of life, drawing upon the
deepest recesses of intuition and the unconscious in order to find Its
highest expression. So for Bergson, the intellect is a necessary but
essentially uncreative element, treating and analysing the phenomena
of the external world and 'things' in a mechanical fashion, but
instinct is unbounded, operates organically, and without limitation;
in this way the evolutionary process is perpetuated: as a living,
acting, moving organism.
For the painter and 'classical intellect', the values associated with
the spatial were fundamentally crucial in the process of comprehending
'life', and must be accorded a correspondingly high status, in direct
contradiction to the view taken by Bergson. The radical differences
between the standards and ideals of the 'relativist flux-philosopher'
and his opponents were no more clearly apparent for Lewis than in the
comparison with the plastic or graphic artist who was concerned to
honour the forms and techniques of his medium' 3 and the dual source of
creativity - both intellectual and instinctive - that Lewis believed
to be operational in the process of producing art works. His furious
defence of the spatial is best clarified with recourse to the concerns
of the plastic artist, who would celebrate the forms, lines, outlines,
surfaces and external appearances of things and attempt to maintain
the objective hardness of material objects, not having them dissolve
into the flux, where art may not be distinguishable in such terms -
thereby ceasing to exist as a separate and distinct activity, a means
of formulating a spatial reality. Bergson's world - and his view of
reality - therefore reveals itself as devoid of distinct objects, an
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...interpenetrating world of direct sensation...not our
hated geometric world, of one space. It is a mental, as it
were an interior world, oflpitating movement visually
indistinct, electrical; not all arranged on the principles of
surfaces and lines; and it is without a 'void' at all...The
exterior world is where 'Space' is, or the mere conception
'external,' which is the prime 'spatial' one, is enough: to
that concept Bergson, as Alexander, is extremely and
temperamentally hostIle. 14
The hostility of Bergson to 'pagan, spatializing instincts' is
for Lewis encapsulated in the hostility towards rational thought of
antecedent
the relativist, the model for whichAlS derived from the 'ancients',
their
classical Greek thinkers andAemphases on the power and value of the
intellect. In sympathy with Aristotelian and Thomist precedents,
Lewis is able to draw upon ideas which provide a philosophical
justification for his aesthetic stress on the externals, the 'outside'
of things, and to which he can appeal for support. His philosophy, he
asserted, 'will be as much a spatial-philosophy as Bergson's is a
time-philosophy... If the painter's heaven of exterior forms is what
above all delights you, then the philosophy of Time, with its declared
enmity for "spatializing TM mankind, will...please you as little as it
does me'15.
The crux of Bergson's philosophy depends on the acceptance of a belief
in the ultimate, supreme reality as consisting of 'time', to which all
forms of life, intelligence and matter, are subject. This is clearly
for Lewis a philosophy which undermines the notion of self and the
individual in a universe determined by temporality, and is not
acceptable if the overwhelming reality is believed to be that of self,
and of individual consciousness. Bergson, in substituting time for
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the unconscious, roundly propels the inner recesses of the mind into a
public domain where all is accessible, and nothing Is exclusive to the
self, if indeed that concept may be maintained in a temporal universe;
the individual is 'dwarfed' in the face of this 'colossal aggregate' 16
that elevates matter to 'dead mind'. This levelling process retains'
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no place for the spatial, classical intellect, nor would tolerate the
suggestion of unique creative personalities, since creativity Itself
is wrest ed from the individual and distributed universally, at the
behest of the alan vital. All is alive, all is mental, and nothing
that professes stability can have any profound value without
subjection to the temporality of Bergson's world.
Lewis's opposition to Bergson's philosophy is crystallized by his
outrage at the virtual abolition of the individual as a unique,
creative being. This reaction could never be found couched in
stronger terms than from a practising artist whose ideas and beliefs
about the uniqueness of his medium and mode of expression is thereby
placed under threat. But it is also precisely at this juncture where
we find a fundamental measure of agreement with Bergson on the
function of art as a means by which reality may be explored and
revealed. The difference hinges, as Lewis is very well aware, on what
is meant, of course, by 'reality'. Bergson, Lewis notes, believes
that it is art that relieves the 'oppression of the crushing weight of
the 'stabid' world; breaks it up and uncovers the Intense reality'. He
adds, 'that is M. Bergson's account of art, and it would also in
effect be mine' 17 . Lewis agrees that the creative process of making
works of art may operate by instinct, being brought about by intuitive
insights, and that an ample element of mysticism, or even a kind of
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hypnotic trance may be invoked as a result. The artist, he agrees, at
the highest levels, functions as a visionary:
If you say that creative art is a spell, a talisman, an
incantation - that it is magic, in short, there, too, I believe
you would be correctly describing it. That the artist uses and
manipulates a supernatural power seems very likely.18
The 'supernatural power' that Lewis speculates about is by no means an
equivalent for an impersonal force on the lines of Bergson's
time-universe; it does not encourage 'mystical', or 'specifically
religious experience' 9 which would lead towards the reinstatement of
a dark, benighted primitivism. Rather, the power that art may invoke
is analogous to the 'civilized substitute for magic' that the
man-of-science provides; Lewis notes that an age which produces a
flowering in the arts is apt also to foster scientific advances, and
that to an extent art and science have that in coanon. He warns
however, that to mix them up as the time-philosophers do opens up the
danger of regression, to the superstition-ridden primitive magical
practices in which both art and science have their roots. Clearly,
this is a reference to the primitivism from which classical thought
and rationalism provided a respite; to entertain any contemporary
suggestion of reinstating primitive forces and superstitions via
Bergson is to betray that civilised world.
On the level of the individual personality, what Lewis certainly
cannot countenance is Bergson's claim that in addition, art's function
is to 'send to sleep TM the resistance of the active personality'20.
Not only do the plastic arts differ from others in terms of their
inherent spatial qualities, which in order to function true to their
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medium should not be subsumed in temporality, or placed lower in a
hierarchy of the arts of which music is the highest expression, they
are not produced by a wholly intuitive process, but depend on the
operation of intellect in the organization and analysis of the spatial
objects which are transformed into art. Most particularly, the
personality of the creative artist is at stake in the appeal to
restore stability and identity to the self. 'Surely' writes Lewis,
'the essence of a personality, or of an TM individual consciousness is
that it should be stable'; how can this be so if, as Bergson suggests,
'its resistances are overcome, and if It is sent to sleep TM ' or
'reduced to TM a condition of perfect doc1lity N ?. A view that values
the critical intelligence for its uniqueness and independence is
incompatible with these propositions. Above all, Lewis looks from
here into a bleak time-future where no art is produced under those
conditions, only the scribblings of children and subdued lunatics22.
His conclusion is inevitably that 'no visual artist would have ever
imagined...such a world as the bergsonian, relativist world'; and even
if he had, would have 'turned in horror' from it23.
The world of motion described by Bergson then, would have its artistic
expression most properly represented by music, which is non-static and
exists through time. It does not go unnoticed by a writer who finds
his own illustrations for his philosophical discourse in visual art,
that Bergson indulges in constant musical analogy which stresses the
organic and chronologic nature of music. The elements, or notes of a
piece are individually without meaning; it is only when they are
combined in a unified whole that the parts assume significance, and
when the whole becomes greater than the sum of parts. It would have
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been instantly apparent to Lewis that this analogy approximates to the
Bergsonian devalued view of the personality as entity, which may
achieve fulfilment as such only in the relation to the wider context -
Time and the operations of la dure, and not in terms of a self-ness.
The irreconcilable division between the relativist flux-philosopher
and the plastic artist is demonstrated most compellingly for Lewis by
those practitioners who embraced aspects of Bergson's ideas and
attempted to express them in an essentially static medium. Rodin, the
'impressionist sculptor is hailed as the 'plastic counterpart of
Bergson',
(his sculpture contemporary with the doctrine of alan vital, and
looking as though it had been done expressly to iHustrate it),
...is to-day so remote from all the interests of contemporary
artistic expression that it is impossible to be more completely
forgotten... To artists he means to-day nothing whatever; but
not so with philosophers, looking for illustrations for their
space-time flux. 24
Rodin is drawn upon by Samuel Alexander in Space Time and Deity25 and
is therefore perhaps to be considered as innocent of theoretical
'transgression', but not so the Futurists, who expressly claimed
Bergson's philosophy as their own, attempting to construct an art
movement according to their understanding of his philosophical
principles. Futurism and the Vorticist response is discussed in
detail in Chapter 6, but for present purposes, in the context of
Lewis's central objections to the fragmentation of self by Bergson, it
provides an illustration of the threatening consequences for the
philosophical view of self and art that Lewis saw in the way the image
of a living thing was opposed to its source.
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Since the 'counters' deployed by Bergson's time-philosophy consist of
the general tendency towards IN life, N TM dynamism," Mprogress,N
utime Ns26 , the response of Futurist artists was a betrayal, amounting
to the trading of what is fundamental to art for the sensuous pleasure
yielded by elements of a cult philosophy. Futurist art, for Lewis,
was to contemplate, in essence, no art at all; not only did he give a
low rating to the skills of the artists as individuals 27, but their
activities sacrificed the very spatiality and stability, outline and
clarity upon which plastic expression depends. Art had become 'life',
part of the organic flux within which no delineation is valid; indeed,
the painted image was placed in direct competition with its subject,
to the extent that, in keeping with vitalist enthusiasms, the loser
had to be seen to be the static, dead image. Lewis uses one
characteristically extremist jape of Marinetti's, the 'milanese
showman', to illustrate his point: the Futurist artists, his
'painting, carving, propaganding ballet or circus' were set the task
of creating moving statues
that could open and shut their eyes, and even move their limbs
and trunks about, or wag their heads. The step from that to a
living creature is a small one; and rivalry between the statue
and the living puppet could be guaranteed to become rapidly
acute. 28
Lewis identifies the necessary distinguishing characteristics which
needed to be stressed in art for the Futurists in following Bergson.
These included motion, movement, dynamism, interpenetration, all of
which were essentially alien to the plastic and graphic arts. Such
aims were simply not viable unless the static medium was abandoned,
and with it would go the qualities which were seen to be unique and
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fundamental to the practice of visual art. Art would be subsumed in
'life' as defined In Bergson, replaced by the time-specific foria of
music or its chronological literary equivalent. The individual
personality would equally be subject to the demands of the greater
whole, the puppet-master Time determining the experience and actions
of his living marionettes.
Uniqueness and the nature of creativity for Lewis were the
crucially-related points at issue in formulating his case against
Bergson and the process of 'despatialization'. It is no accident, nor
should we overlook the point, that this too, was Bergson's starting
point in his interpretation of the Darwinian thesis of evolution.
Lewis claims that the consequences of this process in action would be
that the concepts of 'uniqueness' and 'creativity' will be undermined
and disseminated by the time-cult, to the extent that their
distinguishing characteristics - the qualities that are usually
understood as constituting uniqueness, or creativeness - will be
eroded to the point of non-existence. Through Bergson, the
eradication, on a significant level, of the notion of exclusivity,
results in the automatic attribution of previously highly-valued
qualities to 'Everyman' in the levelling-down of both object and
subject to the flux. The theoretical justification for this lies in
the identification of 'uniqueness' with the operation of instinct, and
'creativity' with Time, or la dure.
The direct contradiction which follows is by now consistently
articulated; that the concept of uniqueness depends on the operation
of intellect, not instinct, which in its organizing and analytical
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capacity, is able to make distinctions between the unique and the
coninonpiace, without which the term has no meaning. Time, for Lewis,
cannot be the ultimate source of creativity, not least because,
although instinct may play an important part in the process, structure
and stability must be imposed in order to achieve a level of
significance, and this is found in the individual intellect, the
personality, the entity which draws upon its intuitive recesses, but
spatially organizes the insight thus gained. The corollary is that in
the Space-Time continuum, thought takes spatial form and experience
takes the Time-form, and that a critical intelligence, not a mystical
and impersonal life-force, is for Lewis, the guiding principle in the
creative process.
In this, as throughout, Lewis draws upon a large measure of what he
terms 'couinonsense', in that we each feel we are independent, rational
beings, with private thoughts, feelings and emotions, acting alone,
but this view has been traditionally claimed as a feature of certain
strands in philosophical thought to which Bergson's work is often
opposed. I leave it to following chapters to assess the more precise
nature of Lewis's mature philosophical position, tracing back to the
initial aesthetic sources of his rejection of Bergson and chronologism
in Part II of this thesis. Here I am concerned primarily with
outlining the major aspects of Bergson's thesis which occupied Lewis,
and indicating the iriinediate basis of his objections as articulated in
Time and Western Man.
The impetus which demands the analysis of alternatives, discarding the
demonstrably irrational within a new synthesis of ideas characterizes
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the outcome, if not the outline form, of Lewiss philosophical
development. Whilst agreeing with Tomlin 29 on the largely
unsystematic - but certainly not incoherent - character of Lewis's
case in Time and Western Man, I would suggest that the lack of a
'rigidly trained philosophical mind' 30 meant that no barrier stood in
the way of an undertaking which essentially substitutes an aesthetics
as the centre of metaphysical enquiry. On this basis, we begin to
understand not only why Bergson's chronological system should be
challenged, but offers an outline explanation of how that realization
might have been formulated and confirmed for Lewis. If, under the
aegis of the time-philosophy, art cannot emerge from the 'flux of
life', it cannot either assert the dependence on intellect so
necessary for Lewis, who could never place at the back of his mind the
growing fears for art's progress and indeed ultimate survival in a
world that actively encourages trivialization, the hegemony of
fashions, '-isms', mystic and mass cults, sameness, collectivity,
amateurism, 'psychologism' and all its indulgent manifestations. All
these were aspects of the temporalizing, determinist and relativist
tendencies identified by Lewis as endemic to chronological thinking
popularized by Bergson. Hence the metaphysical basis of the
phenomenon must be questioned and examined in the interests of visual
art as representative of an entire culture.
The 'intellectual fraud' of Bergson 3 ' is therefore to be revealed in a
view of reality that stresses the necessity of undermining the
universality of the time-mind; Lewis does not, nor could he, bring
into question the relationship of duration and flux, but asks whether
that is afl there is 32. The answer, obviously, is emphatically 'no'.
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The search for 'what there is' is equated with the access offered and
insights supplied by art, against what for Lewis 'is vilely misnamed
HrealityIIl33 that is, the 'feverish emotionality' and intuitionism
prevalent in a culture dominated by the time-mind. His quest for a
philosophical definition of reality was to be undeniably influenced by
the view that he, a visual artist, could endorse34 . Questions of
philosophy and aesthetics were also firmly allied to the implications
that sprang from the contextual, social, political and economic
conditions which all artists have to face, and so accordingly Lewis's
thinking was always anchored to a deep spirit of pragmatism, jointly
in the service of his 'profession' and equally in deference to the
methods of rational enquiry. 'I suppose no one would deny' he wrote,
that for the greatest achievements of the intellect, whether
in art or in science, tranquillity and a stable order of
things is required; ... And if you say... that people should
not be philosophers, men-of-science, or artists - that they
should give up all those vain things, and plunge into the
centre of the flux of life - live and not think; that all
that sort of life of the intellect has nothing to do with the
social revolution. In that last contention, at least, you
would be demonstrably wrong. 35
It would thus be wrong, too, to charge Lewis with the simplistic
separation of intuition and intellect, the arch-formalistic divorce of
art from its conditions of production and context. He came strongly
to believe that it is only when security and stability in both a
physical and intellectual sense is achieved that art may truly become
free and creative. I take this belief to be central to the analysis
of the manner and purpose of Lewis's engagement with Bergson and his
followers, and the attendant philosophical and cultural ramifications.
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Lewis needed to extract from the eclecticism of his European
philosophical education a view of reality that aligned with beliefs
about sthingss and the world of the painter; a philosophical autonomy,
if such were possible, from the flux. Clear but flexible - but
certainly not mutually exclusive - distinctions were required, between
art, life, mind, matter, - giving scope to the power of the creative
artist to posit new 'realisms' by virtue of a transforming perception,
and an eye/mind analogue dominated by rationalism as a guiding
principle.
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CHAPTER 2
PRECURSORS: SCHOPENHAUER AND NIETZSCHE
1.2.1 Schopenhauer: A Philosophy of the Intestines
If Bergson's philosophy was an isolatable and unique approach to
metaphysics, Lewis's argument as developed in Time and Western Man
could not have been long sustained: his approach hinges on the
pervasiveness of Bergsonism in the analysis of science and culture,
and the variety of its manifestations. At no time does Lewis mount a
detailed critique of Bergson's philosophy. it is taken, or rather its
vulgarization is taken, as the notorious centrepiece, the soft
underbelly of the time-mind, the base principles of which, Lewis
persuades us, are present in much contemporary thought, but can also
be traced back in the history of philosophy. The benchmark for
Lewiss investigation lies in his analysis of contemporary writings in
the philosophy of science, but he stresses no less the traditions from
which these ideas were drawn. If Bergson was the 'soft underbelly',
Schopenhauer was the intellectually rigorous armour-plating of the
'Time-god' whose manifestations of Bergsonian origin are thus equated
with another deity, 'the god of positive science'. For Lewis, fully
cognizant of Schopenhauer's atheism, they are identical:
The name changes, only, from a hypostasized Will to an
hypostasized Time; it is introduced now with ecstatic rejoicings
and new decorations... 1
Lewis's attitude towards Schopenhauerian philosophy, ultimately tied
to the doctrines of intuitionism, mechanistic determinism and
T ITY
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positivism and the ascendency of the unconscious 'Will' over the
intellect and rational thought, is of a more respectful character than
his approach to Bergson. His admiration for Schopenhauer, arising
from a detailed study of his philosophical principles and aesthetics,
impressed Lewis with his 'sincerity' that necessitated a deep
pessimism in the contemplation of the fate of man. Bergson, by
contrast, 'was not sincere, hence his optimism'. Lewis's conclusion,
that Schopenhauer, and not Bergson 'is therefore a better guide to the
true nature of this deity' 2 is of particular interest in this context,
since it is in relation to Schopenhauer's philosophy that we find
perhaps some of the most profound influences on Lewis's thought, and
yet it is also the catalyst for an equally strong reaction by Lewis
against fundamental aspects of it.
In connection with Bergson's ideas, a central concern of Lewis's has
been noted: his championship of individualism and the intellect in the
face of attempts to devalue the personality as entity, and the
substitution of mechanistic theories which would herald its
disintegration. Hence the discussion of Schopenhauer's philosophy in
Time and Western Man is an attempt to locate it, in conjunction with
other, identifiable 'time-philosophies' in relation to the scientific
impetus that is obeyed and furthered in the provision of systematic
metaphysical grounds. The 'god of positive science' is one that gains
in stature by the dimunition of the individual as an independent,
self-conscious unity, and which requires a levelling-down process in
order to maintain the superiority of object over subject, unconscious
over the conscious mind, time over space, and a host of characteristic
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dichotomies and oppositions that pepper the debate. For Lewis,
Schopenhauer in 1818 was already a philosopher faithful to the
teachings of physical science and perpetuated accordingly a certain
conception of the human personality in response to its a priori
subjection to 'Will', the underlying reality which governs and
determines destinies from the cradle to the grave.
It is necessary to outline Schopenhauer's concept of the Will and
Lewis's understanding of it, in order to continue to expand its
meaning as a term which has major importance in the characterization
of Lewis's philosophy and aesthetics, and in the analysis of 'Time'
and the challenge to Bergsonism. I would suggest that there are thus
two main areas of concern which can be identified in pursuing this
line of enquiry. The first is Lewis's ultimate and decisive rejection
of Schopenhauer in Time and Western Man as the first 'timeist', in
company with Bergson and his followers. Secondly, many of
Schopenhauer's ideas on aesthetics, central to the metaphysical system
that Lewis attacked, have been isolated, transformed and incorporated
into his own thinking about the nature and function of art,
particularly in relation to Vorticism and Its defiance of vitalist
tactics. The nature of Schopenhauer's profound influence in the
formulation of Lewis's philosophical principles must be outlined at
the outset, in order to establish the ground for the claim that these
principles were fundamentally derived from an aesthetics, and not a
metaphysics initiated from either Schopenhauer or Bergson.
One key concept which enables us to make sense of and explain the
contradictory strategies that Lewis seemed to follow, in accepting a
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partial lead from Bergson, and a greater measure of guidance from
Schopenhauer, whilst having nothing to do with their 'psychological'
versions of metaphysics, is the notion of creativity and the processes
undergone by the artist in conceiving and executing a work. For
Lewis, as noted in the discussion of Bergson, the initial creative
conception is an intuitive process, but its realization and
concretization necessarily employs the services of intellect and
rational thought in conjunction with intuition. The criteria which
Lewis identified as governing creativity are those which also exert
pressure on philosophical procedures, and which to Lewis would justify
his repudiation of Schopenhauer's metaphysics whilst allowing for the
influence of his ideas on aesthetics to surface, and to be
appreciatively acknowledged. Indeed, Lewis's acceptance of the
Bergsonian notion of creativity as an act of the human will - of
intuition - is very likely to stem from a detailed acquaintance with
Schopenhauer"s philosophy, couched in a format and with an emphasis
which accorded more closely to Lewis's own ideas on both aesthetics
and metaphysics.
In general terms, it is not difficult to see why Lewis should be
attracted to Schopenhauer's work; there are parallels which could be
drawn in relation to character, temper and literary style - and as a
philosopher, there is no doubt as to why Lewis preferred
Schopenhauer's honest pessimism to Bergson's insincere optimism.
E.W.F. Tomlin notes the 'lucidity' of thought and expression, the
'extreme diffidence' of much of Lewis's work, 'a sense of disillusion,
and at the saiue time a veneration for timeless values - sometimes
subsumed under aesthetic categories' which are characteristic traits
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also of Schopenhauer's writings. For Tomlin, Lewis's thesis in Time
and Western Man may well have gathered its initial impetus in response
to a Schopenhauerian thought:
'Time 1 ... 'is that by virtue of which everything becomes
nothingness in our hands and loses all real value.' That
after all is Lewis's thesis in a nutshell. 3
Both Lewis and Schopenhauer shared a 'veneration for timeless values'
and would have agreed on the ominous effects of 'Time', which
ininediately aligns them together against the Bergsonlan view of
duration as a positive life-force. Schopenhauer's view of reality,
whilst affirming the ascendency of a generic species of an elan vital,
develops in striking contrast to Bergson's optimism, a desperately
negative interpretation at its core. 	 Proceeding carefully from the
basis and critique of Kant's work, and accepting the notion that we
cannot understand phenomena apart from space and time, Schopenhauer
concluded that Kant's formulation of the idea of 'Dings an sich', or
1 things-in-themselves' was indeed a primary categorization, but
whereas Kant's notion took an essentially rationalist
characterization, for Schopenhauer, it on the contrary denoted a
blind, irrational, cosmic force, defying intelligence and rational
analysis, a primeval entity that underlay all phenomenal existence.
So reality for Schopenhauer consists of the duality between the Will,
which represents this blind irrational force, and which corresponds to
the true essence of the world, and the Will's objectification, which
is what we know as our phenomenal existence and is only comprehensible
with the aid of constructs of our intellect. Schopenhauer's seminal
work, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (translated as The World as
Will and Representation4), stresses clearly the nature of our
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experience:
'The world is my representation: this is a truth valid with
reference to every living and knowing being, although man
alone can bring it into reflective, abstract consciousness.
If he really does so, philosophical discernment has dawned on
him. It then becomes clear.., that he does not know a sun
and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that
feels an earth; that the world around him is there only as
representation, in other words, only In reference to another
thing, namely that which represents, and this is himself. 5
Therefore, all experience is subject dependent, and is filtered
through the faculties, our sensory and mental apparatus. This being
so, Schopenhauer argued, then we must have reference to time and space
in order for those experiences to appear differentiated and distinct
from one another.
Schopenhauer set out, from the basis of Kant's notion of
'things-in-themselves', to determine the relation between the noumenal
and phenomenal worlds, or the true reality underlying the world of
appearances. Having accepted the idea of the world as indeed a
representation, an objectification of that which consists of the true
essence of reality, he proceeded to challenge the Kantian tradition of
the noumenal world by proposing that Kant had overlooked a vital
aspect of experience of which we have unique knowledge: our bodies,
our physical and mental selves of which we have iiiinediate, non-sensory
knowledge from the inside. This, he argued, gives us a clue to the
nature of the noumenal world, of the 'dings an sich' which we cannot
reach through ordinary, sensory experience, but which is revealed as
Will through its operations in and on the physical body, independently
of representations and the operations of consciousness and intellect.
In direct contrast to Kant, Schopenhauer, thus anticipating Freud,
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identified a hint of the real nature of the noumenon within ourselves,
the unconscious, irrational desires that lie beneath our external
actions. 'Things-in-themselves' - the reality behind appearances -
gave way, for Schopenhauer, to rather the thin1-in-itself, for in
proposing the Will as operating independently of intellect and
rationality, of differentiations of time, space and causality, there
can be no such differentiation. Where the Will manifests itself in
every one of us, it follows that it consists of one nature, a whole,
complete entity, independent of time and space-specific notions of
multiplicity. Hence if our underlying reality consists of one
element, and if it is shared by us, then we are in that sense all
'one'. Lying outside the principium individuationis which is time and
space, the will is free from plurality, 'although its phenomena in
time and space are innumerable' 6 . Schopenhauer thus dissociates the
will from its phenomena, from conceptualization, spatialization and
the effects of chronology, which characterize the phenomenal world;
what we know as a result of these operations cannot approach the
noumenon:
Only when all this has become quite clear to us through the
following consideration of phenomena and of the different
manifestations of the will, can we fully understand the meaning
of the Kantian doctrine that time, space, and causality do not
belong to the thing-in-itself, but are only the forms of our
knowing. 7
There are perhaps two main points to be made here in relation to the
views of Bergson and of Lewis. Bergson's insistence on the reality of
'Time' is included by Schopenhauer within phenomenal existence and is
thus acquired knowledge. Lewis's own stress on the power of intellect
and the 'outside' of things is similarly bound to conflict radically
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with Schopenhauer's view that we may never reach the 'inner nature of
things', that is the will, from without8 . Yet it is not the
differences between Bergson and Schopenhauer that concern Lewis, but
the ways in which they both insist on the 'inside t , the 'intestines',
the psychological and intuitional as the key to reality. It matters
little to him whether time is 'phenomenal' for Schopenhauer or
'noumenal' for Bergson, since his purpose is primarily to reinstate
philosophy on the path that, in Schopenhauer's words, 'all
philosophers before me have followed' 9 . That Lewis should wish to
pursue this so avidly in the philosophical arena is clearly stated and
maintained. He believed that an artist cannot function without a
knowledge and appreciation of shape, outline, clarification, and
differences of an external character. These are indeed gleaned by
sensory perception, but organized by the intellect. Since perception
and the role of rational thought is crucial to the plastic artist,
Lewis's serious professional concerns for the future of the visual
arts necessitated a vigorous defence in philosophical terms. The
basis for such a defence was found surprisingly, from within
Schopenhauer.
Schopenhauer's conclusions, that the will, our true reality,
representing blindness, irrationality, devoid of cause, purpose,
changeability, an enormous, amorphous chain of restless desires and
drives, present in human and inert matter - expressing a continual
struggle of higher forms against lower, an aimless insatiable striving
at the end of which stands death - invites no other attitude but that
of dark pessimism about our existence and eventual fate. He saw no
respite, except finally in the rejection of reality, the denial of the
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will encompassed in non-existence; his adherence to the Buddhist
notion of Nirvana informed his meditations on the possibility of
will-lessness, which could not be contemplated apart from a complete
abnegation of conscious and unconscious desires and passions,
sunuoning the seeker to value non-being more highly than being.
Genuine liberation would come only from the breaking through of the
bounds of individuality imposed by the ego; hence the saint is to be
venerated on his way to the denial of the will to live, and true
asceticism is the only goal. The notion of genius is akin, for
Schopenhauer, to that of sainthood, and offers another path to relief.
The first two books of The World as Will and Representation present
the will in an affirmative mode, whereas the last two, dealing with
aesthetics and ethics, offer a means to surpass the stark picture that
is outlined. The arts offer man a will-less respite in the activity
of aesthetic contemplation, In which the play of the passions cease,
desires are temporarily cast aside, and knowledge is hence delivered
from its subservience to the will. This 'pure' knowledge, for
Schopenhauer, is akin to apprehension of the Platonic system of forms
that transcends the will, the Platonic Idea as 'persistent form of
this whole species of things'. The artist of genius, knowing only the
Idea and not reality,
clearly repeated in his work only the Idea, separated it out
from reality, and omitted all disturbing contingencies. The
artist lets us peer into the world through his eyes. That he has
these eyes, that he knows the essential in things which lies
outside all relations, is the gift of genius and is inborn; but
that he is able to lend us this gift, to let us see with his
eyes, is acquired, and is the technical side of art. 10
The eye, Schopenhauer claims, is 'innocent' in the sense that it has
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no direct connection with the will, and therefore the sensations it
brings us give rise to the purest kinds of knowledge. Light, for
example, and the pleasure derived from it, is one of the most perfect
kinds of knowledge from perception. This is corruptible by perception
which arises from the understanding or the intellect which, in
Schopenhauer's terms, 'lies in the relation of the object to the
will .11
Lewis's reading of the Schopenhauerian case in Time and Western Man is
a very different one from his readings in connection with art
criticism and aesthetics. Schopenhauer's concept of 'will' is
explicitly aligned with the alan vital, duration, life-force - the
Time-god of science, Alexander and Whitehead. A philosophy of the
intestines, Lewis calls it; Schopenhauer's will sometimes 'sounds like
a blind animal bundling about inside him'' 2 and the hostility to the
processes of conscious thought manifest in the emphasis on the
unconscious makes him no better than Bergson. That the eye - for the
most part, less an 'innocent' than a 'stupid' or 'stolid' organ for
Lewis - might be corrupted by the intellect, is unthinkable. The
contradiction in Schopenhauer's thought that must have been most
telling for Lewis is the duality of the will as the underlying reality
which controls our existence, and the possibility of contact with the
Platonic Idea through art which we are able to contemplate and
comprehend aside from that reality. If the first is 'true' reality,
then what of the second, the world as 'Idea', representing fixed,
eternal patterns, the underlying, unchangeable forms of all phenomena?
Idea as the objectification of reality is arranged by Schopenhauer
into a hierarchy of definite 'grades' from matter to man, with regard
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to the fullness and clarity with which they manifest the will. These
grades are the inMuutable forms, the plurality of particulars which are
conceivable through space, time and causality, unlike the operations
of the will, and in addition, do not have multiplicity, nor are they
subject to mutability, but transcend the principle of sufficient
reason which governs perceptual science.
Schopenhauer would appear to occupy at one and the same time, the
edifice of traditional Platonism, but persists, to Lewis's chagrin, in
exalting the flux as a superior principle. There is no doubt that
this problem - and its ironies - was not lost on Lewis. His reasons
for the rejection of Schopenhauer's metaphysics in Time and Western
Man are those of a practising visual artist, in defence of
rationality, the organizing principle of the intellect and the
importance of the visual sense as a vital factor in the creative
process, and is accordingly valuable aninunition in the war with
Bergson and chronologism. Yet Schopenhauer's emphasis on Platonism
with respect to art and aesthetics opens a dialogue with Lewis's own
adherence to classical philosophy, and which, I suggest, led him to a
basic formulation of the beginnings of an aesthetic metaphysics
incorporating the basis of Schopenhauer's world-view, but radically
restructured in a way which substitutes art and creativity for the
flux: a reversal of Schopenhauer's pessimism for a qualified
theoretical optimism. The evidence for this view is to be found in
Lewis's conception of the vortex and his writings upon art, ideas
which were never far removed from considerations of the possible
philosophical implications that would appear to follow from certain
aesthetic beliefs.
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In the Essay on the Objective of Plastic Art in Our Time, the debt to
Schopenhauer is acknowledged; metaphysics, Lewis announces, is 'in a
chronic state of flux and chaos' 13, and fearing a similar situation in
the fine arts, he sets out to outline his views and to suggest paths
of progress. Anticipating the reader's conclusion that he is
'treading the road to the platonic heaven', the German adherent is
immediately invoked:
You may know Schopenhauer's eloquent and resounding words,
where, in his forcible fashion, he is speaking of what art
accomplishes. 'It therefore pauses at this particular thing: the
course of time stops: the relations vanish for it: only the
essential, the idea, is its object.'14
'That', Lewis continues, 'might be a splendid description of what the
great work of plastic art achieves'. Time is stopped, a sort of
immortality descends, a coldness, immobility that is the province of
art. The object, in Schopenhauer's words, is plucked 'out of the
stream of the world's course, and has it isolated before it'. The
still centre which results, that typified in the aesthetics of
Vorticism, negates the philosophical flux by the application of
rationality and the intellect to the intuitionism of creativity.
If, as Lewis agrees, with Schopenhauer and Bergson, 	 the act of
creation 'is always an act of the human will, like poisoning your
business rival, or setting your cap at somebody' 15 , then that act of
will, in order to become a work of art, immobile and timeless,
requires the mediating organizing power of intellect in order to
transform raw, gut-inspired intuition to the level of permanency and
immutability promised by Schopenhauer's Platonism. Hence Lewis's
solid conviction that Bergson, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were wrong
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in exalting music to the pinnacle of the hierarchy in the arts, since
it exists only in time, is ephemeral and exalts the irrationalism and
emotionalism of will. This for him would have seemed especially
erroneous given Schopenhauer's characterization of the power of the
plastic arts, which would appear to defeat or at least offer succour
from the flux. If we consider comparative formulations of Lewis's and
Schopenhauer's world-views, or characterizations of reality, the
points of contact and difference are instructive.
The reality of will is already accepted by Lewis; it is of course, the
source of artistic creativity and also its scourge where intellect is
incapable or unable to transcend its demands. But where Lewis cannot
agree with Schopenhauer is th3 animism it projects; the will, far from
being confined to the human species, is present, not only in animals,
but in inert matter, 'in stones, tables and chairs, anything which
exists in short, and which can be affected by mechanical laws' 16 . The
implication which clearly emerges is that, if the will is shared by
humans, animals and inert matter, then the source of creativity must
be present, too; why then do not stones, animals and chairs seek a
human equivalent to art? The answer for Bergson is that, by means of
their 'life' or 'animism', their existence, they do; life becomes art;
art is life; hence art is subsumed under the heading, 'life'.
Schopenhauer's view creates initial confusion, and is bound to the
notions of consciousness and unconsciousness, but, as Lewis reflects,
he offers no clear-cut interpretations of the doctrine;
An imperfect, animal-like god, tries and tries - for something,
for no assignable reason: and he comes out into
self-consciousness in men... Yet our 'consciousness' ... is a
less perfect thing than his less conscious instinct. But a bee
has this marvellous instinct to the full; and yet we regard
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ourselves as an improvement on the bee... In that we are
evidently wrong. For, judged by the standard of this god, the
bee is more god-like. 17
Do we then assume, asks Lewis, that our 'consciousness' is no more
than a little bit of dead, or rotting will? That it is the 'deadest,
and not the livest, part of the universe'? A valuation of man's
consciousness, that places instinct above it, and operates a pantheism
dominated by a will-god, as Schopenhauer's philosophy suggests, cannot
be acceptable or admissable when part of the 'rotting will', as it is
so characterized, may be capable of genius and of producing art that
operates independently of will through conscious operation of
intellect. Logically, to Lewis, the relative superiority of instinct
and intellect must be, and is, reversed, and for him it is a
conclusion which arises irrevocably on two main counts.
Schopenhauer's system, although admirable on aesthetic grounds, cannot
be reconciled with its metaphysics; and all the 'characteristic
semi-animistic, mystical-unconscious, present-day perplexities'
emphasized in Schopenhauer 18
 are identifiable in no uncertain manner
in Bergson's philosophy and the time-cult.
The Lewisian version of will, powerfully articulated by Schopenhauer,
is equated with the notion of mechanism; it is an artist's formulation
that proceeds, not from the insides of things, but from their external
features, behaviour, and the social habits and tactics that betray its
manifestations. It produces, for example,
Charlie Chaplin, the League of Nations, wireless, feminism,
Rockefeller; it causes, daily, millions of women to drift in
front of, and swarm inside, gigantic clothes-shops in every great
capital, buying silk underclothing, cloche-hats, perfumes,
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vanishing cream, vanity-bags and furs; it causes the Prince of
Wales to become one day a Druid, and the next a Boy-Scout; it
enables Dempsey to hit Firpo on the nose, or Gene Tunney to
strike Dempsey in the eye, and the sun to be eclipsed;... 19
This 'aimless' and 'nonsensical' will finds its adherents ready to
respond to the reflex actions demanded of them; these are largely
unthinking and herd-like reactions, needing no intercession from the
intellect, nor is this desirable, otherwise the mechanism is stunted,
rendered inoperable. The mechanical, the automaton, Lewis found,
exists in us all, constantly as a reminder of our animal natures. The
body's mechanism may be outwardly observed in others, and its actions
judged; the oneness of being that for Schopenhauer is implied in the
will, and that to a certain extent is accepted by Lewis in the outward
manifestations of herd behaviour, is nevertheless ultimately negated
in the physicality of the body. Schopenhauer reckoned, Lewis
concludes, 'without his stomach, legs, organs of generation, heart and
liver' 20 . Instead of indicating inner knowledge of a 'private' will,
attached to a universal, 'great pan-will' 21 , it provides concrete
evidence of the way in which we are pinned down 'to one unchangeable
personality, from the cradle to the grave' 22 . Potentially, for Lewis,
the intellectual affirmation of this physical fact mitigates against
the automatism of the will; without the self-conscious operation of
man's consciousness, he gives himself up to instinct, mechanism and
the stream of material life. This, Lewis claims, should have been
Schopenhauer's conclusion, but at the crucial moment, he was found
wanting; instead of a champion of rationalism and the platonic heaven,
Schoperthauer saw only degradation, despair and resignation, temporarily
'brightened somewhat by string-quartets'23.
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Rebelling against the blind executioner, Lewis has recourse, not to
string quartets, but the permanence, coldness and immobility of
plastic art, which provided him with both a metaphorical and practical
impetus for his ideas, and enabled him to formulate an account which
would offer a solution to the Schopenhauerian paradox. The will - or
the mechanism of our animal natures - must be held in check, Lewis
felt, by our ability to think and feel as rational beings; in its
highest form, the activity of intuition guided by intellect results in
artistic genius, so close to Schopenhauer's view, and yet so far from
it in essence. Schopenhauer's idea that aesthetic contemplation
enables respite is extended by Lewis to include the creative process
itself, and the balance that is achieved in works of art. If the
still centre of the vortex, the crystallization of art, is the
culmination of the process, the origins of art are in the flux itself,
life, nature, the unconscious, plucked out of the stream and
ininortalised, held in perpetuity. The word, 'abstracted' is
substituted by Lewis where Schopenhauer translates as 'plucked'24.
The work of art, in becoming such, although abstracted from an organic
principle 25 and which may not be isolated from it, would become a
different type of thing in its potential apotheosis, 'conveyed to us
as an object of contemplation' 26, to be paid for in principle in
terms of death, or at least with coldness or ininobility 27. It is
important to realise that for Lewis, this apotheosis is never
complete; the perfect work of art, following the dictates of the
platonic ideal, cannot exist with its roots in the human will; to
contemplate this would certainly be to contemplate its extinction. It
is, he insists,
that particular thing, still, that it was in the stream.
57
For the distance it has traversed in the process of
abstraction is insignificant if compared with the distances
involved were it to reach an ultimate abstraction. 28
The game involved in producing art, the balance which must be struck
in the re-ordering of both emotion and intellect, is in 'seeing
how near you can get' 
29 
without the danger of extinction, or
neutralisation either as matter - which, in Lewis's description is not
animate, but inert in the same way that attained perfection in art
would be - or as mechanism (will). In art, Lewis suggests, we are
playing at being matter. We are 'entering the forms of the mighty
phenomena around us, and seeing how near we can get to being a river
or a star, without actually becoming that' 30 . Art, unlike science,
,31
may be everywhere at its goal
	 , but that does not imply stagnation,
nor perfection. Science discards its outmoded theories when new ones
appear to surpass them, but the achievements of artists endure. If,
as Lewis suggests, we posit a realist or restricted view of the scope
and nature of the human mind - and he does point this out as a
reasonable assumption, rooted in an acceptance of the will and man's
material and intuitional nature - then art will always be
its ultimate necessity: it is what the philosopher comes to
out of the discomforture of his system; what, for the man in
the Street, cannot with impunity be divorced from the
attitudes and very form of his religious belief; and it is
the ideal check on the mechanical encroachments of science. 32
Not a philosopher, Lewis begins from the opposite standpoint, as a
practising artist and critic, and his plundering of Schopenhauerian
aesthetics and metaphysics has the practical aim of de-marginalizing
his own profession, and also seeks the analytical and systematic basis
essential to an intellectual recognition of art as man's 'ultimate
necessity'.
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I.2.ii Nietzsche: Diabolism and an Aesthetic Justification of
MetaphysiCs
Some of the most influential and challenging ideas with which Lewis
was to engage in the formulation of his aesthetics and in his
philosophical meditations were derived from an early study of
Nietzsche's writings. In particular, there is the thesis stated so
vividly in Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy33 that characterizes
artistic creation as the result of a fusion of order and ecstasy, the
rational and irrational, a duality polarized in the complementary
opposites of Apollo and Dionysus. This accords in some measure to
Lewis's own views about the origins and progress of the creative
spirit, and is in a general sense everywhere present in Lewis's
attraction for, and exploitation of, pairs of contradictory
oppositions in the expression of his ideas.
Familiar strategies and attitudes adopted by Nietzsche are
recognisable when reading Lewis, echoes which are too distinct to be
accidental. Lewis, like Nietzsche, followed his investigations in a
largely unsystematic manner, unlike Schopenhauer and his master, Kant,
and also shared with him a breadth of concern and a willingness to
enter the arena of any discipline which had bearing on current
concerns. Both deplored banality, cloying sentiment, and mediocrity
in any form which was regarded as a kind of 'death'. Distinctions
between the minority, of superior intellect and sensibility, alive to
the highest expressions of art, and the herd, or the crowd, dead and
mechanical, who blindly follow current fashions, subject to mass
persuasion and gratification, were as much a part of Lewis's strategy
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as Nietzsche's 34. The surgeon's knife of satire called for by
Nietzsche was applied with consunnate skill by Lewis, forming in
addition one of the cornerstones of Lewisian aesthetics, and
Nietzschean critiques of philosophy and its practitioners 35 vividly
recall the content of the 'Physics of the Not-Self' and the energetic
ranging of polemical resources by Lewis against the fashionable
metaphysic of chronologism.
The extent of what I categorize as Lewis's 'Apollonian Romanticism' is
discussed in relation to cultural and art-critical contexts in Chapter
5. However, in view of my purpose in this section, which is to
examine the specifically philosophical relevance to Lewis of
Nietzsche's ideas and their pertinence to the case presented in Time
and Western Man, it is necessary to initiate a selective discussion,
since the relevance of Nietzsche's work to Lewis transcends the
boundaries of particular ideas and notions on art, philosophy,
politics and social theory and moves into the areas of style, attitude
and personality. I wish to concentrate, therefore, on the main
reasons why Nietzsche was named by Lewis as an arch-proponent of the
time-cult, accused of exhibiting the same underlying tendencies
towards the primacy of the unconscious and the irrational that
characterized Bergson's and Schopenhauer's philosophy.
It is noted that the Nietzschean variation and optimistic reversal of
the 'will', inspired by Schopenhauer's formulation, has certain
affiliations with Lewis's use and understanding of the term, although
important differences divide them. These philosophical differences,
as I suggested in relation to Schopenhauer's influence on Lewis, would
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appear to again stem paradoxically from a measure of agreement on the
nature and importance of art between Lewis and Nietzsche. It is
precisely because of that agreement that Lewis found it impossible to
accept what he called the 'turgid satanism', 'moral inversion' and
'diabolism' 36
 of Nietzsche's will to power. The Nietszchean emphasis
on the Dionysian elevated music characteristically as the highest
value of creative expression at the expense of Apollonian rationality,
form and intellectual restraint, embodied in, and by, the plastic
arts. The stress of 'time-philosophers' on the ascendancy of musical
forms of expression became a recurrent theme for Lewis in developing
his thesis. As with Schopenhauer and Bergson, philosophical ideas
that had direct bearing on the arts - and in particular, the plastic
arts - were found to be more congenial in Lewis's view, and were
selectively drawn upon when they offered means of explanation and
analysis which centralized these concerns. If the attendant
metaphysical grounds and systems of belief were held to conflict with
Lewis's views on aesthetics, or his strongly felt convictions about
the importance of the plastic arts and their relevance in
philosophical speculation, they were roundly censured.
The 'crisis of metaphysics' which culminates for Nietzsche in the
equation of metaphysics, morality, religion and science with various
forms of 'lies', necessary however, in order to exist37 , opened up a
challenge which demanded an equally forceful response from those who
would attempt a re-interpretation and re-statement of philosophical
and aesthetic values specifically denigrated in Nietzsche's work. To
Lewis however, although temperamentally and philosophically attuned to
many aspects of Nietzsche's enterprise, much of which, of course, was
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submerged in Time and Western Man, he was an extremist, the 'high-
priest of self-conscious "faustianism"' 38 that opposes Classical
rationalism, and whose Darwinian thundering and screaming precludes an
acceptance of the main substance of his ideas. Nietzsche, Lewis
observed,
had very little in his composition of the health, balance,
measure, and fine sense of the antique world.., towards which he
turned so often: he had much more of the frantic, intolerant
fanaticism of a genevan reformer or an Old Testament prophet. 39
In the early work, The Birth of Tragedy, no undue preference was seen
to be given to either of the elements Nietzsche identified as
Apollonian or Dionysian; it is in later writings that Nietzsche begins
to use Dionysus as the symbolic metaphor for his world-view and
emergent philosophy. Book Four of the Will to Power confirms Lewis's
view of Nietzsche's essentially Dionysian world,
the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this
mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my 'beyond good
and evil,' without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a
goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself
- do you want a name for this world?... - This world is the will
to power - and nothing besides! 40
Hence the Nietzschean subordination of reason as the servant of life,
Apollo subject to Dionysus, was totally unacceptable to Lewis, who
advocated a reversal of these terms, invoking the
unconsci ousness/intuitional=Di onysi an=musica] analogy in direct
opposition to that characterized by the complementaries of
consciousness/rationalism=Apollonian=plastic arts. The justification
for the reversal of these propositions is found by Lewis in the
Nietzschean concept of 'will' as received by him from Schopenhauer and
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radically adapted in the context of the concept of the 'will to
power', casting aside its pessimism in an affirmation of man's
potential for strength and mastery of the elan vital.
Inspired and influenced by Schopenhauer therefore, Nietzsche accepted
the principle of will as a driving life-force. He further believed
that mind is essentially an instrument of instinct to be used in the
service of life and of power, that illusion for man is as necessary to
him as so-called 'truth'. This being so, the will to power asserted
the principles by which man might master his own being and his
existence on earth, which of necessity would lead to conflict with
others, self-assertion, and the eradication of weakness and
self-indulgence. Nietzsche proposed a radical instrumentalist theory
of knowledge and a perspectivist analysis of truth, whereby knowledge
and experience is useful only subject to current purposes, and truth
and falsity are judged not in absolutist or moralistic terms, but
purely in relation to their effectiveness/ineffectiveness in context.
Purpose in a pragmatic sense was thereby imposed on Schopenhauer's
blind and irrational will, embodied in the Ubermensch who, striving
for the ideal generosity of spirit and enlightenment, is able to show
the way out of darkness. The will to power is not the source of evil
as feared by Schopenhauer, but in the hands of an elect few leading
the mass of mankind, it is a means to the ultimate good.
From the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche emancipated himself from
Schopenhauer's Buddhistic negation of the will, and his spirit of
pessimistic resignation to the extent of posing what would appear to
be a complete reversal of Schopenhauer's attitude. Appealing to the
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model of pre-Socratic Greek tragedy, distrusting the rationalism and
intellectualism of the later period, Nietzsche argued that it was
possible to face up to the very real horrors of existence, and to
affirm life in spite of this. Declaring explicitly that which was
already implicit in Schopenhauer's thought, Nietzsche's division of
artistic creation into the principles of Dionysian and Apollonian
origins was affected, where music embraces the god of ecstasy,
passion, and the senses, and the plastic arts become associated with
order, rationality and restraint. Schopenhauer, for Nietzsche, had
erred profoundly in his desperate pessimism, since art - Schopenhauer
had acknowledged - promised a respite, but yet he had failed to
recognize its importance, not as marginal relief, or an escape from
the evils of life, but a central, life-affirming reason for existence,
as well as a basis for a metaphysics. Art, Nietzsche declared, 'is
the great means of making life possible, the great seduction to life,
the great stimulant of life': it is the antidote to denial of the will
to life, the redemption of the man of knowledge, the man of action,
the sufferer, and is stronger than pessimism, 'more divine' than
truth. Concurring with Wagner, art is confirmed by Nietzsche as 'the
real task of life', 'life's metaphysical activity - ,41•
It would be difficult to suggest general points with which Lewis would
wholeheartedly disagree in relation to certain of these claims. At
least the ultimate aim of Nietzsche's quest for an aesthetic
metaphysics would be applauded, although the chosen route and methods
might be deplored. Not surprisingly, where Nietzsche's name is
directly invoked in Time and Western Man, Lewis is concerned to anchor
him more firmly to the time-doctrine, but it is not his purpose to
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support his attitude to the importance of the arts in the formulation
of metaphysical precepts, in the interests of developing his
philosophical thesis. Hence we are faced with a work which cannot
declare its inspirational sources and origins, for fear of
compromising its central position. Bergson and Nietzsche are duly
united by Lewis in respect of a mutual darwinianism and evolutionism
whereby the stifling processes of 'life' and the struggle for whatever
is on offer is central to their world-views 42 . The struggle may be
that of a threatened species for existence, or for man, the control of
the sophisticated trappings and exertion of the means to power - cash,
sex, territory, minds, influence, persuasion, coercion - the list,
which may change in detail, if not in character, is compiled, not by
the combatants, but the life-force which governs the evolutionary
race. The man-of-action in any event, would take the lion's share of
such prizes.
In Time and Western Man, Lewis is concerned to outline those aspects
of Nietzsche's work that directly ally themselves with Bergson's
thesis. 'The Romance of Action' to which Lewis dedicates a short
chapter 43, and the 'man-of-action' are core Nietzschean concepts
supported by the notion of 'superman' or tibermensch, identified by
Lewis as essentially subject to the operations of will, defined as
mechanism, 'action' but operating paradoxically to cause the present
inaction of current philosophical trends:
But the man-of-action (low-browed, steel-jawed, flint-eyed,
stone-hearted) has been provided.., with a philosophy. And it is
some form of that Time-for-Time's-sake philosophy we have already
briefly considered. 44
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It is necessary for Lewis, in placing the Nietzschean tradition within
the time-cult, to simplify its terms, and to make judicious use of the
popularized version where it suits the purpose. Nietzsche's
ibermensch, far from the superior qualities envisaged, is endowed by
Lewis with the attributes of the automaton, drunk with the romance of
action, and mechanically determined by its own doctrines. There is no
hope of independence of thought for this creature, in the equation of
action with the dionysian and dynamical, which is its province. There
is thus no room in Lewis's thesis for the consideration of Nietzsche's
characterization of the Ubermensch as a fine, essentially 'good',
non-evil and independent character. Lewis's own view of the true
man-of-action includes such a possibility - although this does insist
on the prior claims of intellect and rationality; the man-of-action
who submits to the concept of a will to power may never be anything
other than a slave to just those forces of will defined by
Schopenhauer. Indeed, for Lewis, the Ubermensch is the prime example
of a puppet mechanism - the 'low-brow' masquerading as a higher form
of life, but easily mastered by the intellectual capacities of the
'high-brow' 45, the rational thinker to whom the prefix 'super-' might
perhaps be more accurately applied, if it must be used at all, since
its very form betrays its origins 6 The qualities of Nietzsche's
man-of-action are thus outlined to accord with the vitalist philosophy
which drives him:
But this mechanical, functional creature would implicitly
possess such a philosophy in any case; since the
dream-quality of pure-action must leave him virtually a
child, plunged from one discontinuous, self-sufficing unit of
experience to another; always living in the moment, in moods
of undiluted sensationalism; the ideal slave and instrument
of any clever and far-seeing person - who, of course, is the
real man-of-action; for it is never the frantic servant of
this doctrine of action who ever does anything, at least of
any use to himself. 47
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The terms, 'action', 'reaction', 'inaction' are all relational in the
sense that they imply oppositions for Lewis. Although the relation of
dionysian-apollonian might be described paradigmatically as a
horizontally-conceived complementary opposite for Nietzsche, for
Lewis, the equivalents of will or mechanism and intellect must operate
on different planes of a vertical axis. In insisting the 'intellect
works alone' 48, Lewis does not seek to deny the instinctual impulses
of man, but would submit them to the controlling authority of rational
thought that is essential to creativity. A rational awareness of the
future, and a prophetic intuitive energy which appears, as it were,
from another source to that of the Nietzchean man-of-action, and which
is a characteristic of the creative artist, sets him apart from the
Ubermensch, whose actions are based on 'Presentism', present desires,
struggles and contingencies, inherited from the past. Declaring that
'the present man in all of us is the machine', Lewis requires that
A space must be cleared.., round the hurly-burly of the present.
No man can reflect or create, in the intellectual sense, while he
is acting - fighting, playing tennis, or making love... The
farther away from the present, though not too far, the more free.
So the choice must be between the past and the future. Every man
has to choose, or rather the choice is early made for each
of us. 49
It is this authority of intellect, the ability to reflect and to
create, that is in grave danger of erosion by the 'mystical
mass-doctrines' of which Nietzsche's 'romance of action' is a prime
example.
Nietzsche, it is argued, takes individualism to its extreme point
whereby it is itself not distinct from, but submits, in its extremism,
into a merging of mass-doctrines. The darwinian law of struggle and
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conflict would make of the Ubermensch, not a master of his fate, but a
victim of the élan vital; the only way to avoid the consumption of the
individual by the mass will is to practice relative isolation,
rationality and restraint in one's life decisions, to utilize
intellect to its limits, and refuse to be swayed or influenced by, the
enthusiasms of the crowd. In one sense, Lewis could be said to
'out-Nietzsche Nietzsche' himself in the identification of the
dualistic divide which is so profoundly marked out for Lewis in
English intellectual life between the 'high brow' and the 'low-brow',
herdsman and herd. Reflection, not action, characterizes this
intellectual elect, in many ways more benevolent and tolerant in the
Classical Greek tradition than Nietzsche's Dionysian superman, but
nevertheless as superior and remote from the crowd as the bermensch
professes to be. Lewis's argument is that such an isolation from the
mass will of Schopenhauer, or the herd that Nietzsche identifies, may
not be contemplated unless its governing precepts of irrationality,
intuitionism, and collectivity are subjected to the controls of the
analytical Intelligence.
In order to explain more fully the role of Nietzsche's ideas in the
context of the procedures of Time and Western Man, we need to have
direct recourse to Lewis's essays, and his writings on art and
aesthetics, which are an indispensible aid in understanding the
content and intention of the philosophical work. Indeed, I would
argue that unless we do this, the picture of Nietzsche's influence on
Lewis's philosophical strategies is incomplete and obscured, subsumed
in the prior interests of engaging in an intensive polemical challenge
to the time-cult of Bergson and issues directly relevant to that
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enterprise. In the context of the present chapter, the main point I
wish to establish is that the notion of an aesthetic metaphysics so
forcefully advocated by Nietzsche has direct bearing on the
formulation of the general concepts and procedures in Time and Western
Man.
In the essay, 'The Artist Older than the Fish', which raises a
discussion on the roles and functions of art and artists, and the
perception of those roles by 'instructed people', Lewis makes the
following illustrative statement:
A German philosopher, living in the heyday of last
century German music, accepted the theory of an aesthetic
justification of the universe. Many people play with this
notion, just as they play with Art. But we should have to
disembarrass 'art' of a good deal of cheap adhesive matter, and
cheap and pretty adhesive people, before it could appear a
justification for anything at all; much less for such a gigantic
and, from every point of view, dubious concern as the Universe! 50
Lewis does not name Nietzsche, but the form and expression is
unequivocally that which can be traced to ideas first expressed in The
Birth of Tragedy; 'Only as an esthetic product' Nietzsche writes, 'can
the world be justified to all eternity...' 51 . The vision of an
aesthetic justification of the universe, one which would alleviate the
metaphysical hegemony of science, is immensely attractive to Lewis,
but he is also intensely alert to the dangers of a less than serious
popularization of this idea, a fate bestowed on much of Nietzsche's
work. Lewis himself made use of this in relation to the popular
understanding of the bermensch and the will to power. This would be
an excellent reason why Lewis should not openly identify its origins,
because he does take it seriously, requiring a like response from
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others in the context of Lewis's own theoretical and philosophical
position. Hence it would not be unreasonable to identify an attempt
on the part of Lewis to dissociate from Nietzsche most urgently, from
the popular notoriety his work had gained. I am not suggesting that
Lewis was afraid of notoriety or censure by sections of the public;
rather that, having made use of Nietzsche's popular reputation for his
own purposes, it could compromise his own case if he were to quote
approvingly and openly from this source. Nietzsche, and others who
were allied to the time-cult, had to be confronted and actively
disengaged from Lewis's philosophical procedures, to be denounced as
major perpetrators of much that was superfluous even to Nietzsche's
own exalted notions of art's metaphysical meaning. The notion of an
aesthetic justification of the universe, if not prised loose from the
time-cult and its manifestations, would bring nothing but the decay
and dissemination of the visual arts, and would hold out no
particularized metaphysical function to art. As a manifestation of
the will to power 52, it remains firmly subordinated to the flux, élan
vital, and the blind purposeless wanderings of Schopenhauer's will.
If Nietzsche is thus precluded from offering a viable aesthetic system
as an alternative to a scientific metaphysics, or to a system which
takes its base point in Christian morality, on the grounds of the
contaminatory matter of chronologism, the way forward for Lewis was
clear. The Nietzschean notion of aesthetic justification primarily
located in the temporary and emotional art of music was bound to be
compromised for Lewis, but having studied Nietzsche, he was likely to
be aware that the plastic arts were by no means excluded by him from
the metaphysical heaven:
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...the pictures of Raphael, the frescoes of Michelangelo, the
Gothic cathedrals, presupposes not only a cosmic but also a
metaphysical significance in the objects of art.53
The arts which symbolized the calm and repose of Apollo were, Lewis
believed, better equipped to aspire to the permanence of a world
beyond the flux. Accordingly, an adherence to the idea of an
aesthetic metaphysics could and did legimately acquire centrality in
the core of Lewis's own philosophy. The journey Nietzsche embarked
upon was not so remote from Lewis's, but was certainly pursued by
following a very different road.
In sum, the only force which for Lewis could supply a brake to the
processes of the will, the only activity which holds out the promise
of separateness, eternal form prised from the flux, solidity and
stability, are those qualities which are common to the rational
philosophic attitude and the plastic work of art. The symbolic
ideal of Greek sculpture and a wide conception of the 'classical'
are benchmarks to which Lewis turns in order to illustrate the
epitome of the alliance between art and philosophy, as part of
platonic doctrine, to be discussed and regarded essentially as
philosophy, rather than as art that is commonly regarded as of
peripheral, not fundamental importance 55 . The postulation of this
relation is at the core of an antidote to the infinitely damaging
affirmation of the Schopenhauerian will by Nietzsche that pre-dates
Bergson's insincere optimism.
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53. Nietzsche, from Human, All Too Human (1878), quoted in A
Nietzsche Reader, selected and translated by R.J. Holliiigdale
(Harmondsworth, 1977, reprinted 1984), p.129.
54. Lewis clarifies his definition of the classical in 'Paleface',
Enemy, no.2 (London, September 1927): '"Classical TM
 is for me
anything which is nobly defined and exact, as opposed to that
which is fluid - of the Flux - without outline, romantically
"dark, " vague, "mysterious, "
 stormy, uncertain. The hellenic
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55. 'It is legitimate' Lewis writes, 'to regard greek sculpture as
part of platonic doctrine, as philosophy rather than as art.
That is, at all events, how I have always regarded it, and valued
it, and in that sense discuss it here' (TWM, pp.306-307).
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CHAPTER 3
SPACE-TIMEISTS: HISTORY, SCIENCE, RELATIVITY
I.3.i Oswald Spengler's World-As-History: Classical and Faustian
Cultures
The critique of Spengler's massive work, The Decline of the West
occupies a great deal of space in Time and Western Man. Lewis is at
pains to insist that this close attention to certain aspects of
Spengler's book is not intended to suggest, as it often might, a
respect for an opponent that one nevertheless wishes to demolish, but
is held up to view as an archetypal 'concrete manifestation' or a
representative example of timeist literary endeavour, surpassing in
its adherence to the 'timeschool' the works of fiction which Lewis
draws upon in 'The Revolutionary Simpleton' 2 . Spengler's historical
survey and theorizing is for Lewis the 'perfect model of what a
time-book should be' 3 and the historical world it describes is a
'world of the second-rate'. 'Is not' Lewis asks us,
any average volume of history a long account of the triumphs and
disappointments of the second-rate, of kings, bootleggers,
bishops and merchants? It is the average life of England, France
and America to-day, for instance, only past and treated
flatteringly as 'history'. What part does any truly great
achievement of the mind play in those historical feuilletons?4
Despite the attempt to persuade us of the mediocrity of a mindless,
descriptive rendering of detail and anecdote in the writing of
histories, it is precisely because Spengler has indeed applied an
organizing theory to his work that arouses Lewis's acute concern.
Spengler's is a time-mind which sees ultimately nothing in view but
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politics and history5. For Spengler, everything is but a reflection
of the Zeitgelst 6. In such a world dominated by time and by power,
there is no special place for art, for the creative individual, or the
independent critical mind. All is subordinated to the familiar
Darwinian struggle, the Nietzschean power-metaphysic and vulgar
'sleight-of-hand' that goes with an Intoxicant designed for
herd-consumption. Nietzsche's manifesto for the elect is grimly
complemented, concludes Lewis 7 , by Spengler's popularism which,
although he claims to be an anti-popular writer, nevertheless
understands his audience well, and hopes to 'enlist the sympathies of
what he knows quite well to be a large, popular, and for the most part
extremely vulgar, audience.' 8
Steeped in the 'Nietzschean power-metaphysics' which had 'long
obsessed european ideology and speculation' therefore, Spengler,
with 'pan-German pugnacity' had applied this obsession particularly
virulently in Lewis's view to the genre of history writing. In
rejecting traditional and unilinear accounts of historical
development, Spengler had evolved an 'organic' history whereby the
human past was presented as an account of essentially self-contained
'cultures' 
10 
that conformed to quasi-biological patterns of growth and
decay. Hence he contended that most civilizations would go through a
11
virtual life-cycle, or as he terms it, would follow 'life-courses'
so that historians may not only reconstruct the past, but might
predict, or even 'predetermine' history. But the 'spirit' which
attends one culture can never be transferred to another. A 'Classical
Revival', for example, follows the dictates of its own time, and
cannot recapture an earlier period, except superficially. The
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'Destiny' of the arts, having admitted them 'to be organisms of the
Culture' are 'organisms which are born ripen, age and for ever
12
die' . Civilizations follow a predetermined course of birth, growth
and decay like the natural organisms, such as forms of art, which act
as the microcosmic structures of the wider culture. This view was to
be most energetically contended by Lewis In his defence of the
uniqueness and endurance of the plastic arts. In doing so, the
Spenglerian concepts of 'world-as-history' and the opposition of
'Classical' and 'Faustian' cultures had to be closely dissected.
Spengler's 'world-as-history' takes on particular significance for
Lewis in the way it Insists on the logic of 'time' to be paramount in
all explanations of life, culture, history and creative endeavour. A
short passage from Spengler's work does much to crystallize the issues
with which Lewis is concerned. Taking an example of Kantian
categorization as his starting point, Spengler makes his own
distinction between what he calls the 'logic of space' which is 'the
necessity of cause and effect' and the 'logic of time' which is
'Destiny'. This category Is the key concept for him, and Is one which
utterly transcends Its spatial counterpart: it is
a fact of the deepest inward certainty, a fact which suffuses
the whole of mythological religions and artistic thought and
constitutes the essence and kernel of all history... 13
Further, Spengler asserts, this 'logic' is 'unapproachable through the
cognition-forms which the (Kantian) Ncrltique of Pure Reason"
investigates'. Similarly in his critique of Bergson, Lewis finds in
Spengler an equally clear aversion to the spatial domain, a
'time-jingoism' 14
 which downgrades the role of intellect and reason in
an overall world-view, and which prefers the 'deepest inward
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certainty' to the operations of an analytical intelligence. Like
Whitehead's juxtaposition of the 'concrete' with 'inward thoughts',
for Lewis, Spengler's 'inward certainty' is no certainty at all, since
they are contradictory terms.
The Spenglerian outline of time-as-history and history-as-time
dovetails neatly with Bergsonlan philosophy, Identical with the
sensationalism of the alan vital, providing an 'historic' picture of
the great 'Unconscious' encountered in Freud and von Hartmann,
foreshadowed in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche15 . His 'world-as-history'
locates its roots in the social, cultural and political fields and he
applies this term vigorously in an interpretation of historical data.
Inspired by Goethe's idea of 'Living Nature' 16 , and his distinction of
mechanism from organism - or from 'dead' nature to 'living' nature -
Spengler renames it 'world-as-history', insisting that the living
nature Goethe defined held the key to historical investigation,
Interpretation and classification. Out of biological science and the
concept of the living organism Spengler found his terms of procedure
in writing history, whereby the organizing elements of 'periodic
structure' and 'organic logic' would emerge 'out of the profusion of
all the challenging details' 17. A thorough-going relativism that
finds its varied outlet in Bergson and in Nietzsche is thereby
revealed. For Spengler, no universals are possible; the dogma of
process essentially roots out any possibility of absolutes 18 and
results, for Lewis in a political version of the same cardinal errors
which are inherent in Bergsonism, via the medium of an historical
rendering of an essentially crude Nietzschean power-principle:
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...the idea at the bottom of Spengler's book is that all
manifestations of art, mathematics, biology, physics,iFe
political. The Theory of Quanta, the Evolutionary theory of
Darwin, the music of Wagner and Weber, a Dresden Shepherdess, El
Greco and Einstein - all for him are inventions of a particular
time, produced in response to a culture-spirit, and they have no
validity except as chronological phenomena. They are events of
history merely, like the Battle of the Boyne or the Rump
Parliament. At bottom there is really no physics, no art, no
philosophy, only politics and history. 19
The Bergsonian errors which prominently result for Lewis as a
consequence of Spengler's ideology include the erosion of personality
and individuality, the subordination of mind to its prior role of
organism, the animism of 'dead matter' and the determining processes
of time-as-history which over-ride the essential distinctions between
types of human activity - such as art and science - and consigns them
to the flux of history, to bloom, develop, decay and be re-absorbed
like natural organisms. In Spengler's terms, a fatalism is thus
engendered whereby we as individuals, are subject to that 'Destiny'
that history holds for us; we do not, Lewis points out, make history,
but are on the contrary made by it 20 , as simply passive instruments of
the Zeitgeist, the 'homology principle' of Spengler's that makes us
into slaves of time, of fashion 21
 and that insists, at the first and
last analyses that 'we ourselves are Time'22.
By Insisting on the 'when' of things, and not the 'what' or 'how',
Spengler thus aligns himself firmly with the despatialization that
gathers momentum as a result of Bergson's theories. That Spengler
carries out, on the 'popular', literary plane 23 an analysis of culture
which continues to develop and propagate its hostility to the
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spatial 24 , dedicated to the cause of the chronological as the only
truth, makes him in Lewis's eyes perhaps even more dangerous than the
time-philosophers he complements. The strait-jacket of historical
determinism stifles any form of creativity of which man imagines
himself capable since all thought, reasoning and decision-making is
rendered useless under the hegemony of chronologism. It would,
according to Lewis's reading of Spengler, be a naïve, futile act on
the part of any artist to suppose his work might somehow endure or
transcend his 'time'. Nor is he allowed to assume his work as an
artist Is in any fundamental sense 'different' to that, say, of the
scientist; despite warming assurances that both, of course, work
equally creatively and cognitively In order to 'progress' in their
respective disciplines, Lewis cannot overlook the underlying threat
which erodes what is distinctive to his profession in the so-called
'fusion' of arts and sciences. This is another way of asserting the
superiority of the temporal and the determinism of 'organic logic'
over all independent, rational and creative activities. The warning
given throughout Time and Western Man is unrepentant and
uncompromising: the swallowing of Spengler's 'inconsistent', 'fat and
f1abbydoctrine 25, means that 'people are being taught not to reason,
to cease to think'26 . This, in regard to a doctrine designated as
essentially political in character, was seen to be blatantly
manipulative by Lewis.
If Spengler's theory of 'world-as-history' is the cornerstone of his
edifice, then the characterization of civilization into the
'Classical' and the 'Faustian' is its concretization, which had to be
roundly and conclusively challenged as the literary corollary of that
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which, Lewis believed, was manifest equally - and as 'concretely' - in
scientific theory. Lewis accordingly set out to expose their
'abstract' origins in the relevant theoretical areas. The
'abstractions' of Spengler's 'world-as-history' theory help to place
in context the details of this in practice, as expressed in the
opposing cultural tensions of Classical and Faustian Man. It is here
that Lewis finds the most telling 'concrete manifestation' of
Spenglerian dogma, and challenges its assumptions which for him reveal
a destructively hostile attitude towards the plastic arts and, as
already noted with regard to Schopenhauer, Bergson and Nietzsche,
'music' thereby becomes the favoured time-art. The difference in
Spengler's case, given his political and historical bias, is the
vicious way in which he sets '"Plastic" and "Music" at each other's
throats, in an eliminating contest'27 . Yet, as Lewis points out, we
must pay attention to what Spengler intends to convey by the opposing
terms. What was to Lewis the mark of a product of the worst kind of
romantic mind, of German origins, Spengler's 'artificial'
categorization of the arts of music and plastic expression submerges
their differences in response to an overall impulse to subordinate all
to a particular kind of 'Music', approximating rather to a 'late
Beethoven quartet rather than a Bach fugue'; presumably the latter,
Lewis notes, would offer too close an analogy to the 'Classical', the
arts of form and structure, to 'satisfy the faustian', romantic,
'musical' ideal': he continues:
It is not really with the art of music, that is, or with the art
of painting, that he is dealing, when he is contrasting Plastic
and Music, but with a certain kind of nature that has expressed
itself in one art or the other. 28
Thus interpreted as a result of Spengler's German romanticism, Lewis
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concludes that 'any plastic art in Europe that is not greek or
greek-influenced, he calls "music s '. No art may assert its
Independence of this 'music', nor develop Its own philosophical or
29
theoretical dimensions under a tyrannical regime that would seek a
literal organic systematization of Walter Pater's dictum that music is
the supreme art form to which all other arts aspire30 . To a
theoretician and practitioner of the visual arts, Spengler's sustained
undervaluation of plastic properties was anathema.
The unrestrained attack which Lewis directs at Spengler's analysis is
not softened, as it is even in the case of Bergson, by any explicit
agreement of underlying principles or of detail. It is not difficult
to imagine the effect on an artist, dedicated to the practice and
theoretical justification of his craft as a medium with its own
techniques and visual language, which he believes to rightly be
distinct from other, complementary arts, to hear Palestrina lauded as
the heir to Michelangelo 31 . The Renaissance, that 'disagreeable
retrospective contretemps' for Spengler 32, was similarly dismissed as
a pastiche of a Classical art which was static and non-vital inits
original format, and which was vastly surpassed by the age of baroque
and polyphonic music which followed. Spengler has to destroy the
prestige of the Renaissance since it celebrates the forms and spirit
of the Classical past: in love with the plastic, it had to be regarded
as a temporary 'aberration':
'Plastic' got its foot in for a moment quite by accident:
Gothic, Western, European, 'Faustian' man soon drove it out, and
reinstated Music and the gothic yearning for the Infinite, the
vague, that which has no outline and is innocent of either sense
of locality or of any concrete value at all. 33
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Hence Leonardo da Vinci is described by Spengler as a 'discoverer', an
artist-scientist, who by the literal means of the dissecting knife,
penetrated the 'inward secrets' of the body, not simply content to
study external form; and whose invention of sfumato is described as
the 'starting-point of Impressionism', the bate noire that haunted
Lewis in the formulation of his aesthetics, and which was purloined by
the 'space-timeist' Alexander as a cosmetic, popular veneer in an
attempt to give his bleak biological and mechanistic theories a more
34
palatable flavour
The vigour with which Spengler pursued his historical view of
aesthetics, setting art and artists irrevocably against one another,
was for Lewis, mistaken and highly damaging to all concerned. There
is, he notes sadly, 'no room upon the same earth for two such opposite
35
things as Plastic and Music' , but that the one must eliminate the
other, must gain aesthetic superiority and hegemony in the kind of
political Darwinian or Nietzschean power-struggle that gives no
quarter to the other side. The reasons for Spengler's uncompromising
stance on this most vital of issues therefore, is accordingly
identified by Lewis in the opposition of 'Classical' and 'Faustian'
that structures Spengler's work.
The title of Spengler's The Decline of the West refers to its author's
belief that the Western cultures had already passed through the
organic creative stage of 'culture' Into that of reflection and
material comfort, and that the future holds out only the possibility
of further, irreversible decline. Spengler compared classical
antiquity with its modern Western descendant in order to demonstrate
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his theory of organic life processes in the 'life' of civilizations.
Spengler, in characterizing what he calls the 'soul of the Classical
Culture', goes to Nietzsche for an appropriate term by which to
describe it: the Apollonian. Its attributes, of which he helpfully
lists examples, include the nude sculpture and statuary of Greek
origins, 'mechanical statics', the painting that celebrates form and
line rather than light and shade, and the 'Greek who describes his ego
as soma and who lacks all idea of an inner development and therefore
all real history...' 36. The Faustian soul, placed In direct
opposition to its Classical counterpart, takes the fugue and polyphony
as its major art-forms, and is predominantly Gothic-Dionysiac,
anti-Renaissance and anti-Plastic. 'The Faustian', Spengler declares,
'is an existence which is led with a deep consciousness and
introspection of the ego', and to qualify its place in this culture,
painting is 'that which forms space by means of light and shade':
Rembrandt Is therefore preferred to Polygnotus, and the characteristic
notions of merging, of indistinctness and mysticism are rehearsed.
Thus Spengler, for Lewis,
is for the 'Faustian' Culture (which resolves itself into modern
Western Romanticism). That is 'far-away' (or 'infinite'
'yearning,' etc.): that hates the line, that loves the
'perspective,' in which 'things' only exist in their relation to a
misty, 'far-echoing' Whole, not for themselves: it is those
attributes that he likes and teaches. 37
The simple statement that draws attention to Spengler's 'hatred of
line' aptly characterizes, if any doubt were left, the total
Incompatibility between Lewis and his opponent, for as much as one
despises the distinct and the delineated, the other is dedicated to it
in its physical manifestations in art, and all that It symbolizes in
thought and philosophical speculation.
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Even language, which, as Lewis notes, has to be used by Spengler in
order to coninunicate his doctrine 38, Is qualified by its division
into a duality of 'intellect-words' - which have clear meanings, are
unambiguous, and are therefore Classical', to be despised - and
'sensation-words' which can become 'mystery-clouded, far-echoing
sound-symbols' 39
 and are accordingly Faustian. When the word appears
to mean nothing, or anything, then, argues Lewis, Spengler is happy;
'it becomes material for music, and is no longer a part of human
language at all'. One would assume Spengler intended his book to
escape this rule, and would hope to utilize unambiguous comunication
techniques to convey its mystical message. To Lewis, however,
Spengler's words did indeed follow their ideological directive,
meaning 'nothing' or 'anything', except by default to those who had
already succumbed to the call for irrationalism and
non-intellectualism, and who were therefore unable to judge this
'time-book' critically. Indeed, Lewis pondered on whether Spengler
might have inadvertently argued for the Classical, in the face of an
excellent display of incoherence, light-hearted inconsistency, and the
advocacy of a 'mechanical vision'40.
In relation to the concept of 'world-as-history', Spengler claims
Faustian-Western as the only inherently 'historical' culture, in which
his theory of organic logic and historical life-cycles of epochs may
be observed in operation. Other cultures foreign to this are deemed
to be 'ahistoric', or static and non-organic, non-developing.
'Consider' writes Spengler,
the Classical Culture. In the world-consciousness of the
Hellenes all experience.., was ininediately transmuted into a
timeless, immobile, mythically-fashioned background for the
particular momentary present;...
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He continues:
But the Classical culture possessed no memory, no organ of
history...
the past is subtilized instantly into an impression that is
timeless and changeless, polar and not periodic in structure - in
the last analysis, of such stuff as myths are made of - whereas
for our world-sense and our inner eye the past is a definitely
periodic and purposeful organism of centuries or millennia.
Inevitably, then, the Greek man himself was not a series but a
term. 41
An obsession with 'timelessness' and 'changelessness', and the
favouring of opposing qualities is always, Lewis claims, a peculiarity
of space-timeists. The perpetual judgement of art, philosophy,
attitudes and states of mind in 'time-terms' is revealing. Classical
man for Spengler is also will-less42 , and though a difficulty in the
precise definition of 'will' is acknowledged, he invests the term with
the characteristic mysticism, the 'ineffability' which is the
stock-in-trade of the 'Great Unconscious' of Schopenhauer, von
Hartmann, Bergson, Freud et al:
Will - this Is no notion, but a name, a prime-word like God, a
sign for something of which we have an inunediate inward certainty
but which we are for ever unable to describe. 43
We have seen that, for Lewis, the notion of the will is far more
precise, representing the characteristic intuition which precedes all
creative activity, subject to the controlling intelligence. Classical
Man, as defined by Lewis, cannot possibly be 'will-less', but is able
and willj	 to accept the organizing principle of mind. All Lewis's
aesthetic sensibilities revolt against the notion of the arts as
blundering and running blindly 44
 in the manner of the Schopenhauerian
will, unmoderated by intellect, but neither does he concede the
extinction of will as Spengler would suggest.
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Yet because Lewis is concerned to dispute the whole theoretical basis
and tenor of Spengler's analysis, this characterization of the static,
soul-less and will-less Greek, whilst intended as an unfavourable
comparison in relation to the Faustian spirit, also sustains for him a
positive isolation of the art forms and types of philosophical
speculation he most valued; for that he must have been grateful to
Spengler. Questions of value and the attendant value-interpretations
of terms like 'Western' and 'Classical' were the source of the most
fundamental divisions between Lewis and the 'space-timeists', and in
developing his case against them, it was constantly necessary to
refine and define concepts where the variant interpretations reached
the point of maximum obscurity.
In the conclusion to the analysis of Spengler, Lewis articulates his
own 'values' in the case, making the point that what Spengler outlines
in regard to 'Classical Man', whom he takes to be the Hellene, is just
as applicable with reference to the 'static' and plastic cultures of
the East, the Chinese, the Indian and the Ancient Egyptian; the only -
and vitally important - difference is that they may be considered as
even 'more static.., than the Hellene' 45. In view of this wider -
artist's definition of Classical Man - which takes in Eastern and
Oriental cultures, Lewis is able to state his emotional and
intellectual preferences for one tendency rather than another:
So, my 'Classical' is not the Hellenic Age, as it is Spengler's:
and my Western is not his 'Western.' For me the contrast is no
longer Modern Europe and Classical Greece. We can very well be
the healthy opposite of 'romantic' (and all that entails) without
being greek. On the other hand, if Time-travel were able to
offer us the alternative of residence in New York or residence in
Periclean Athens, I should choose the latter. 46
Indeed, it is not unexpected that Lewis should choose to outline a
89
rather curious and comprehensive concept of the artistic and
philosophical tendencies with which he finds himself most in sympathy,
united under the loosely-held banner of 'Classical Culture'. Held
together in Lewis's analysis by the notion of spatiality and the
non-dynamic, the linear artistic styles of Indian and Oriental art and
the systems of thought which they symbolized had impressed him far
more than the essentially Western plastic equivalent to the extent
that he was more than willing to underline its superiority on the
basis of linear quality:
It is a matter of fairly coninon agreement to-day that Asia has
produced plastic art of a far higher order than Europe, in many
ways more complex, mature, sensitive and beautiful. I dont
think the Europeans generally realize how little original plastic
art has come from Europe. If you could get rid of the
Renaissance (as Spengler does) it would be very noticeable. 47
Spengler, of course, cannot simply 'get rid of the Renaissance' and
the hated plastic values in which its finest art-forms find
expression. In designating all arts - except those affiliated to
German music as 'ahistoric', or akin, as Lewis observes, to the
buddhist static and timeless haven of Nirvana, Spengler becomes an
energetic ally of Lewis's cause since he describes and correctly
assigns precisely those qualities Lewis would wish upon the art-forms
he champions. The values placed upon the defined qualities of the
respective arts are a different matter, and in this case, Lewis makes
for the theoretical jugular vein of Spengler's discourse.
It would have been enough to attract Lewis's attention if Spengler's
book were to be seen as herd propaganda, perpetuating the attendant
mass values of novelty and fashion which serve to maintain docility
and order; these 'intoxicants' or 'concrete' effects of the time cult
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he believed, exist at every level of a society drunk with
chronologism, and must be exposed, analysed and eradicated. This
cannot be done without attending to the causes, the metaphysics and
modes of thought which lie at the root of these outward effects in the
arts and society. Lewis accordingly set out to expose their
'abstract' origins in the theoretical field, and matters which for him
must be subjected to much closer analysis could be usefully
highlighted in the more 'popular' form of Spengler's work, as a
preliminary to more inaccessible writers, since the ideas expressed
there clearly threatened the foundations of the aesthetic precepts
upon which his own philosophical world-view is based. The question of
a theoretical struggle between opposing combatants may not,
ironically, be far from the Darwinian arena that Lewis eschewed; it is
at least as intense a battle on the level of minds as Darwin envisaged
between species, a struggle which had only begun with Spengler, and
was to be carried into the rarefied atmosphere of the philosophy of
contemporary science.
I.3.ii	 Modern Science, Philosophy and Plastic Art
The war of words with Spengler is but an essential preliminary to the
primary task which Lewis sets himself. 'This spenglerian background'
he writes,
is extremely useful to bear in mind if you wish to
understand better the far more seemingly abstract notions of
the philosophers with whom we now will have to deal. 48
Lewis thus believed that 'organic' theories like Spengler's
consolidated the contemporary outbreak of Bergsonisrn on the popular,
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cultural plane, but that it was post-relativity science, supported by
relativist or 'timeist' philosophy that had injected Bergson's Ideas
with new life in the wake of Einsteinian physics 49 . The new science
had supplanted - in the best of scientific and progressist traditions5°
- the Newtonian notion of matter as inanimate, as distinct from the
substance and the operations of live mind, and had encouraged a
time-dominated conception of space that took time as the 'supreme
reality'. In identifying such a general tendency, a massive
scientific and philosophical orthodoxy manifesting its principles in
the time-obsessions of Bergson and his followers, and in the
'timelessness' of relativity theory, which indeed merge with one
another, Lewis knew that as an artist he would be censured by the
specialists and experts in the field. Anticipating the objections of
his critics, Lewis is aware that his linking of relativity physics
with the manifestations of the 'time-mind' would cause difficulties
for his case at the very least:
My critic, if he wished to be amiable, would say:
'I agree that there is a time-mind, as you call it. I think you
have proved in your Revo1utionary Simpleton TM
 that such a thing
as a TMtimemind M
 may be said to exist. With your concrete
analysis I am in agreement. But the existence of this
"timernind TM
 has nothing whatever to do with Einstein, Bergson, or
with Whitehead or any of the philosophers you mention, who depend
on Relativity. Your association of Einstein with Miss Stein, of
Swann and Stein, of Bergson and Bloom, of Miss Loos, Charlie
Chaplin and Whitehead, is still to me meaningless. There is no
connection that I can see. Such a connection, I protest, is not
proved by you, nor can it be proved.' 51
The evidence that Lewis sets out to provide in answer to such
objections comes from the testimony of the scientific relativists
themselves, notably Alexander, Whitehead and Russell, who make
explicit in their own writings the connections noted. The continuity
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that Is stressed, between the flux of Bergson and Einstein, and the
relativists 52 comes easily from 'minds of the same stamp': the
quantity and extent of devotions to the time-god, Lewis claims, were
not difficult to find, but plentiful. It follows that the selection
of evidence therefore, which naturally accords to an artist's bias,
may be freely acknowledged in the realisation that all have particular
axes to grind, and that professional 'interest' in presenting one's
ideas is but a common levelling factor.
Given the admission of a particular perspective, Lewis thus clears the
decks for the development of his continuing analysis in the area of
scientific philosophy. This analysis can usefully be examined
according to specific areas of contention; the demise of the subject
and individual consciousness, the parallel fate of the object in an
organic philosophy, and an idea of reality based on a mentalist
animism of matter, expressly articulated in Lewis's attitudes towards
the 'space-timeist' precursors, Bergson, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.
In addition, the role of science in general as the essential anchor of
the time-mind, and the particular applications of popularist versions
of relativity theory, are already implied in the analysis of those
earlier thinkers, but are followed up in greater contemporary detail
in the work of Alexander and Whitehead.
Lewis largely accepted Bertrand Russell's interpretation of
Einsteinian physics as a basis for his own purposes. Russell's The
ABC of Relativity 53 , which attempts the formidable task of setting out
the bare principles of Einstein's achievement in laymen's terms, in a
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readable and entertaining fashion, may well have formed the nucleus of
Lewis's understanding of the subject. There is no doubt, in Lewis's
analyses of aspects of Russell's work, that he both respected and
admired the philosopher, but he is nevertheless regarded as a fair
target in view of what Lewis regarded as his fashionable
philosophical, scientific and psychological 'enthusiasms'. The ABC of
Relativity was accordingly censured for its romantic, primitivist and
emotional nursery-rhyme approach, Lewis giving full rein to his talent
for satire:
Indeed, in all exposes of Relativity Theory it is quite evident
that the naTf... point of view is what we are being fed with.
The spoon of Mr. Slosson or of Mr. Russell (in his 'A.B.C.' for
little Relativists), held out invitingly, but firmly, towards the
Public's little astonished mouths, is full of that particular
treacle. Einstein-physics, too, are 'tremendous fun.' But the
sort of nursery atmosphere that develops in the popular expose of
Relativity, the 'shut your eyes and Open-Your-Mouth!' ('you'll
feel giddy at first! you'll soon get over that!') sort of
attitude of the Relativity nurses and governesses, is due to this
side of the matter, which I think has not, so far, been put in
evidence. 54
Lewis had referred to Russell as a 'born entertainer' and a 'true and
typical Western man', perhaps recognizing in an opponent certain
shared characteristics. Russell however, had become a willing convert
to the evolutionary creed of the time-philosophy55 when woken 'from
his dogmatic slumber' by his friend and colleague, Dr. Whitehead, and
had declared himself ready to embrace the mechanistic model of man's
nature propounded in behaviourist psychology. His presentation of the
time-view in the revised edition of Our Knowledge of the External
World was accomplished, in Lewis's view, according to the 'vigour,
integrity and charm of this fine philosophic intelligence' 56 , but
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despite Its 'pristine brilliance' was overshadowed by its 'navet',
sensationalism and emotionalism. His saving grace, as far as Lewis is
concerned, was that even after his 'conversion', Russell would not
57
have Bergson 'at any price' , but Lewis is also not slow to point out
that a position which advocates evolutionism and yet rejects the
acknowledged high priest of that movement must be logically flawed.
For Lewis, both Einstein and Bergson should be regarded as the 'river
officials of the great River Flux, of its conservancy staff: they
both, in different ways, administer it' 58 . By accepting the science
of Einstein, and the principles of evolutionary philosophy, Russell
cannot but admit to Bergsonism.
Like Lewis, Russell had attempted to build his philosophy on
perceptions of 'coninon-sense', but had tried to reconcile these with
modern physics, and as a consequence, Lewis felt he had become too
closely embroiled with the time-philosophies of Alexander and
Whitehead to retain any sense of the spatial reality and the stillness
present in our coninon-sense perceptions of things. The familiar
displacement of ego and mind for organicism, 'fashionable
primitivism', infantilism and a sensationalist world of 'neutral
entities' was to be found in Russell's interpretation of timeist
philosophy and relativity physics just as much in Whitehead's and
Alexander's versions. With Russell, therefore, although Lewis agrees
there are considerable points of disagreement with the more orthodox
accounts of Alexander and Whitehead, nevertheless we 'arrive at the
non-plastic, illusory, Alice-in-Wonderland world of post-einsteinian
philosophy' 59. An examination of Russell's ideas In relation to the
demise of the 'object' as discussed in Time and Western Man forms part
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of my Chapter 4, but here it is necessary to stress his role as an
interpreter and supporter of contemporary physics, and to note his
relation to the space-timeist 'orthodoxies' of Alexander and
Whi tehead.
Lewis's concern with the illusory nature, world of images and the
inherent mentalism of the time-cult finds its outlet in the recurrent
discussions and refining of different notions of 'abstraction' and
'realism', or the 'unreal' and the 'concrete' which are found to be
necessary in establishing his position. This, briefly stated, takes
the opposite road to the 'abstract' philosophy of the so-called
'realist' philosophers. The 'death' of the ego, or the 'subject',
fiercely resisted by Lewis and perpetuated in the accounts of Bergson,
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, is finally traced to its cause; the
development of science and its contemporary effects, brought to an
extremist manifestation through the undoubted genius of Einstein60.
The concentrated attention placed by Lewis on scientific matters
should not obscure his overarching intention, which is to defend his
profession against any philosophy that would appear to threaten its
existence or minimise its status. The analysis of scientific theory
highlights his sympathy with the kind of mechanical world of matter as
projected in the traditional, Newtonian conception which is considered
preferable to the modern alternative only on the grounds of his prior
interest as an artist. 'I am' he constantly insists, 'merely stating
the case for art, as against what is vilely misnamed Nrea1ityu6l.
Art itself, or an aesthetically valid metaphysics, was for Lewis the
vital issue here, not science 62. In following through aspects of the
main areas of contention that I have outlined in relation to Lewis's
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discussions of Alexander and Whitehead - the extinction of the subject
and the object, mentalism, and the vital role of science in
underpinning the time-philosophy - it is necessary to point out the
aesthetic character of the ground on which Lewis chooses to meet his
adversaries. He will not be foolhardy enough to attempt an assault
from a position of weakness, but whenever his quarry rashly strays
even indirectly into his realm, Lewis is careful to plead his case
selectively, from the basis of his own specific expertise.
Samuel Alexander's Space, Time, and Deity is taken by Lewis as a
prime example of contemporary Bergsonism; indeed, Alexander's
'time-obsession' would appear to outdo his master's in its apparently
uncompromising belief in time - or duration, or space-time (with the
emphasis on the latter) as a basis for reality 63. Alexander's central
thesis of 'emergent evolution' is, for Lewis, 'our old friend
"Creative Evolution,N under another name, and with a few additional
attributes' 64. Thus Lewis's encounter with Alexander is sealed into a
format that, if he had chosen to do so, would surely have informed any
in-depth critique of Bergson, but which also concentrates on the
'extremism' that takes Alexander further on the timeist and organicist
road, and which stands perhaps even more securely than Bergson's
philosophy in direct opposition to Lewis's world-view.
Alexander's metaphysics attempts to develop according to a principle
of 'emergent evolution' involving the definition of interrelationships
that are manipulated by the familiar counters time, space, matter,
mind and deity. His world-view posits a single cosmic process, with
the idea of space-time as the basic cosmic 'matrix' from which
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'emergents' 65 , - gestalt-like formations or properties - arise and
contribute to the formulation of higher syntheses and processes.
Mind, according to Alexander's 9nterpretation of the facts' is 'an
emergent' from life, and life an emergent from a lower
physico-chemical level of existence' 66 . Alexander's organic theory
gives rise to the notion that space-time thus produces matter, which
is prior to the development of mind or 'awareness' as a further,
qualitative synthesis. Mind then, Is a development, an emergent from,
space-time via matter. This all-embracing metaphysics, that takes the
notion of space-time as its primitive stuff, out of which everything
'emerges' thus moves along its evolutionary way towards deity
which, although it is a still unrealized ideal, may nevertheless be
approached by way of its most primitive origins. This hierarchy of
change and progress towards an ultimate goal, that relies on an
acceptance of flux, emergence and synthesis - complements, but may
also compromise - Bergson's quite traditional dualism of intellect and
instinct and the distinctions that he made between duration and
spatialization, to the extent that not only does mind explicitly
emerge from space-time, but that reason and operations of intellect
are but 'outgrowths' from intuition. Intuition and reason are thus
deemed to be different, yet one 'grows' somehow from the other67 . The
balance of the space-time equation is tipped to its limits, and
unequivocally distilled to its essence. Alexander reaches an early
conclusion therefore, that
Space must thus be regarded as generated in Time, or, if the
expression be preferred, by Time. For Time is the source of
movement. Space may then be imaged as the trail of Time, so long
as it is remembered that there could be no Time without a Space
in which its trail is left... Time as it moves from past through
present to future.., is the occupation of a stretch of Space. b8
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The process of despatialization that Bergson sets in motion is
confirmed by Alexander in no uncertain terms; in the bid to 'take Time
seriously', space, and the qualities connected with it, are certain to
be the main casualties for Lewis. In placing time at the bottom of
everything, Alexander simply trades that which is 'concrete' for that
which is 'abstract', and 'unreal', and that the propositions which
follow, and upon which the intelligibility of his metaphysics depends,
are built on nothing of any consequence. Both Lewis and Alexander, it
must be noted, shared an aversion to the final application of
philosophically vague terms like 'idealism' and 'realism', objecting
to the over-simplification and confusion which attends the
manipulation of mutually exchangeable concepts, and which act
increasingly as umbrella hosts to a myriad of conflicting ideological
and philosophical variables. Alexander nevertheless claims the label
of 'realist' for his own theories, and since it is often similarly
applied to the relevant work of Whitehead and Russell 69 , Lewis is
accordingly obliged to examine the basis for such claims. The grounds
for their concerns, however, differ markedly. Alexander demonstrates
the professional philosopher's careful awareness of the acute
ambiguity of generalist conceptions. This motivates Lewis, too, but
it also denotes for him a tendency, coninon, he feels, amongst
time-philosophers, to actively encourage the fusion and
interdependence of hitherto reasonably distinct concepts in keeping
with the wider trend towards 'unanimism'.
In Chapter VIII of Time and Western Man, Lewis outlines a brief
philosophical 'history' of the terms, 'idealism' and 'realism' and
considers the Classical basis for understood differences. The
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contemporary situation, as far as he is concerned, has resulted in the
fusion of originally quite disparate concepts, with the resulting
ambiguity of meaning that has hindered any clear thinking about the
issues which lie beyond the question of semantics. The 'unanimity'
that he describes, the 'meeting of extremes' 7° that is traced, not
only in the unification of philosophical discourse, but in the
traditional distinctions by which we live our lives, and which falsely
unites the self and not-self, reason and intuition, science and art,
is a direct result of organic theories like Alexander's, which will
always submerge the particular in the whole, until we can no longer
distinguish any remarkable properties of the unit. For Lewis, the
merging of 'idealism' and 'realism' that is apparently accomplished,
where an equal quality of reality unites all existence and an organic
nature holds sway, heralds only a new absolutism that the relativists
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or 'realists' would appear to wish to avoid
In seeking to define more closely what it is that Alexander intends to
convey by his 'realism', Lewis proceeds from aesthetics as his natural
benchmark in developing his philosophical response. In order to
illustrate the accuracy of this statement, we need to discuss more
fully the implications of Alexander's use of the term, and Lewis's
objections, in the context of the former's metaphysical projections.
Alexander states, in the Preface to Space, Time and Deity that his
work
is part of the widely-spread movement towards some form of
realism in philosophy, which began in this country with Messrs.
Moore and Russell, and in America with the authors of The New
Realism. 72
Lewis acknowledges the differences and difficulties in attempting to
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reconcile a 'commonsense', or 'plain-man's' view of reality with
technical philosophical definitions, but is nevertheless prepared to
set his 'plain-artist's' understanding securely against the
scientist's contribution, as it is utilized by Alexander and
Whitehead. Reality, for Alexander, Lewis notes, is Space-Time; that
is the fundamental reality 'upon which a house of cards of emergent
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qualitied relata are constructed 	 .	 Despite the space-timeist s
propensity to stress the interconnected nature of all things,
Alexander would appear to make a distinction between what is the
'real' and what is the 'true'. This, Lewis finds, illustrates most
clearly the inadequacy, in his point of view, of Alexander's 'rag-time
philosophy'. If we are to regard Space-Time as - paradoxically -
Alexander's 'absolute', or the fount of his so-called objective
reality, then what, Lewis asks, is the truth it offers? Alexander's
truth, like Nietzsche's, is perspectivist; It is variable, it is 'what
works', it progresses according to the theory of emergence, and it
takes science as its model:
...what is 'unscientific' believing to-day is 'scientific'
believing tomorrow. So it does appear that 'truth,' like
Alexander's God, is variable. It expands and contracts. 'Truth'
is only what is within our temporal purview. 74
The only 'truths' of this reality are seen to be variables, for as
Lewis coments, what we find is that 'time and change are true -
nothing else'. He concludes that, following on from the theory of
organic growth and emergent principles that evolve from Space-Time, by
in effect investing everything with 'reality', Alexander is unable to
distinguish the 'real' from the 'unreal', and that as a consequence,
his claim to be a 'realist' has no meaning, since it is based on an
abstraction, and cannot claim any distinctive or stable identity.
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Truth, similarly, is an abstraction, 'merely a coherence', a
'perspective' of an 'incoherent' reality. The uncharacteristic
timeist separation of concepts such as 'truth' and 'reality' is
totally false and unacceptable to Lewis, for to him they must cohere:
'for us truth is reality, and there is only one truth' 75 . At the crux
of the debate, Alexander's notion of reality stands divided, and the
enemy of the flux and its operations appears to support a fusion of
concepts. This is emphatically not, however, a compromise on the part
of Lewis, since he draws attention to the essentially abstract nature,
the mentalism that characterizes accounts like Alexander's which
underlines the emptiness of its terms. Looking to Aristotelian
traditions Lewis is able to justify his position by appealing to
pre-relativistphilosophy prior to the alleged fusion of idealist and
realist sympathies. The clearest refutation of Alexander's realism
and the basis of his belief in the 'one truth' however, is found in
Lewis's aesthetics.
Taking up the notion of 'variable truths', Lewis considers its
application on a matrix which runs from the 'most real' to the 'least
real', or the unreal. Where a truth coincides with the highest
measure of reality, it is there that Lewis's world-view originates.
Conversely, in the case of Alexander and fellow space-timeists, the
most unreal coincides with the most variable of truths. Wishing not
to court undue abstraction in the explanation of his thesis, the
archetypal philosopher's chair is pressed into service. 'In any
armchair' he begins,
there is to be found side by side, (1) the 'truth' about it
belonging to the artist who observes it as a factor in some
picture he is painting: (2) the 'truth' of the upholsterer:
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there is (3) the practical 'truth' appreciated by its possessor:
and then there is (4) the 'truth' of the electronic mass of
science. 76
Although many more 'truths' may be sought, these are sufficient to
illustrate the point. The opposite ends of the matrix, the 'most
real' is occupied by the truth of the artist, and the 'least real' is
the electronic mass of scientific imagination which sees no mere
armchair, but the molecular flux which accords to the Theory of Quanta
and Alexander's reality, the 'early chaos' that attends progressist
and evolutionary systems. The latter, by comparison with the artist's
chair, has 'almost no reality', since it is a world of hypothesis,
unending flux, and of Images only. The reality of the artist is
contrasted strongly with that of science in that it has the power to
transform and to re-make the objects it ponders in new ways,
confirming new realities, whilst the scientist dissolves and disperses
them, giving no stable reality in the chaos of perpetual time and
change. By this token, Lewis is able to lay claim to the position on
the matrix that supports a unified concept of 'reality' and 'truth':
...the armchair of the artist is scarcely any longer an
armchair, if the artist is a good enough one. It then goes out
of reality at the other side, the opposite to that of science. 77
It is the most powerful basic notion that motivates Lewis in his
dealings with the time-philosophers, since it enables him to exercise
his artist's interpretation of the real in comparison with contrasting
philosophical systems, to choose between what is congenial in them for
his purposes, and to develop a coherent response to the formulations
of rival metaphysicians.
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It is clear that Alfred North Whitehead's Science and the Modern World78
is selected as a necessary subject of analysis by Lewis on somewhat
different grounds than those that led to his discussion of Alexander.
Both are inevitably regarded by Lewis as 'Space-Timeists', hailing
Bergson as their master, and are to be placed as one in their equal
devotions to Time, the flux and fashionable scientific theorems, but
within the brief of Time and Western Man, differing aspects of the
time-cult are at issue. In the case of Alexander, despite his
recurrent references to the Romantic poets, and to the sculptor Rodin,
he offers no developed notions of aesthetics. This allows Lewis a
free hand to concentrate his efforts on challenging the minutiae of the
organic metaphysics that is put forward, in order that his own
philosophy, derived from a freely acknowledged interested viewpoint,
may gain sufficient explanatory power to support his version of
aesthetics. Whitehead's book, however, influenced by Alexander's
philosophy, purports to encroach directly upon Lewis's field. Bearing
in mind the 'armchair matrix' that Lewis offers in explanation of his
view of reality in contrast to Alexander's, Whitehead's aim appears to
suggest a fusion of Alexander's end of the matrix with Lewis's, or a
displacement of one with the other. Thus 	 Whitehead, It is
claimed,
...has been at the greatest pains to reinstate scientifically,
as it werq the art-object... in place of the 'scientific
object.' '
This proposition may be be fully understood only in relation to the
undercurrents of the familiar time-philosophy to which Whitehead is
indebted. The organic fusion of specific concepts like art and
science that accompanies timeist metaphysics, and which occupies
Whitehead in particular, is strongly opposed by Lewis in favour of
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sympathy but disparity. Whitehead's version of this issue is for
Lewis clearly formulated in the name of Bergsonism and it is what
chiefly motivates his analysis:
It is indeed his determination at all costs to effect this
reunion that is so much objected to here, and It is that that has
made me single his particular doctrine out for criticism.80
A theory which would claim to displace the scientific object for the
art-object would appear, on first acquaintance, to favour art above
science, but, as indicated in the extract from Whitehead's book at the
opening of Time and Western Man, it is an organic, time-infested art
that is likely to contain the 'inward thoughts of a generation'. I
will return to this quotation, but we can note that here, in short, is
what Whitehead understands by 'art'. His preference for the aesthetic
properties of modern science and mathematics is exchanged for the
static mind/matter dichotomy of traditional Newtonian physics and the
reasoning of Hume's epistemology, and what art is left must conform to
the demands of an organic metaphysics. To Lewis, Whitehead, (like
Alexander, but to a much greater degree), appears to need art to add a
kind of sophisticated and cultured plumage to mask a hard-nosed
scientific outlook. Whitehead, the man-of-science, and his mystical
accomplice Brmond both exploit the 'artistic consciousness and the
methods of the artist 1
 and '...neither of them at all in the
interests of art or of the artist' 81 . This not unnaturally leads
Lewis to contemplate the motives of those who require a cosmetic
support from unrelated disciplines, and to ponder on the nature of
inherent inadequacies that might necessitate such action.
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For Lewis, Whitehead's urge to reconcile contradictory concepts and to
attempt to fuse separate areas of activity under the banner of
organicism is again the true mark of a time-mind. Although Whitehead
professes to be 'all for the poets and the artists', he wishes to
render what is distinctive in them inoperable and unfunctional
according to, and in subservience to, the void of science, but
persists in claiming a position of necessity for the arts, as long as
they meet the conditions laid down by an organic metaphysics.
The distinction that is made by Whitehead, between the 'organic' and
the 'mechanical' which he associates with the 'mechanical udeadness
of materialist science' 82 is necessary, Lewis argues, if he is to try
to avoid that 'deadness' and the pessimistic conclusions that follow.
Therefore what emerges front a popular point of view from space-time
doctrines, is 'organism' in place of the old 'matter', in tune with
the 'great theory of Evolution - just to cheer us up!'. We are being
offered something alive in place of something that we previously
regarded as 'dead' and mechanical. This is pure fiction for Lewis, a
philosophical confidence trick designed to fool the unwary:
For what the benefit to you, in this famous change from matter
to mind, from 'matter' to 'organism,' is going to be, it is very
difficult to discover. For it is not you who become 'organic';
you have been organic all along, no on1as ever questioned that.
TFis your tables and chairs, in a pseudo-leibnizian animism, not
you, that are to become 'organic.' As Professor Whitehead puts
it, 'the things experienced and the cognisant subject, enter into
the common world on equal terms.' 83
Whilst Whitehead distinguishes, as he must, between the principle of
organism and the 'mechanical', for Lewis they are, of course, one and
the same. What is organic, controlled from within a larger mechanism,
must be mechanical itself. What interests Lewis intensely is how the
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outcome of such a thorough-going animism inevitably leads to
disastrous consequences for the individual, whose notion of
uniqueness, or at least of relative independence from the matter
surrounding him, cannot logically be sustained if the organic
principle is accepted. The price to be paid for this belief is a
'phalanstery of selves', a fragmentation of the ego into constituent,
atomic parts according to the relativist scientific version of matter.
'You lose', Lewis concludes, 'not only the clearness of outline, the
static beauty, of the things you commonly apprehend; you lose also the
clearness of outline of your own individuality which apprehends
them' 84. The ordered world of 'classical common-sense' is replaced by
Whitehead with the naivete of the 'romantic nature-poet' whose
pantheism subordinates his personality, the sentimentality and
mock-innocence of the eternal Child who takes no responsibility
for his own life, content to throw in his lot with a cosy organicism
and determinism that absolves him from the difficulties of
deci Si on-maki ng.
Clearness of outline, and distinctions between entities and
objects are the values Lewis places uppermost in his debates with
time-philosophers; it is no accident that these are also the qualities
that characterize his aesthetics and art practice. We find
accordingly, that the most striking incompatibility between Lewis and
Whitehead is revealed in a head-on clash of opposing aesthetic values
that is paralleled and complemented in each case by opposing
philosophical, scientific and world-views. The main issue that needs
to be highlighted in respect of Lewis's analysis of Whitehead, is that
philosophical and scientific beliefs are conspicuously represented by
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an appropriate aesthetics in the case of both writers, but whereas in
Lewis's view, the plastic arts provide the justification and impetus
for philosophizing, Whitehead's model of romantic nature-poetry
provides merely an attractive and humanistic veneer to mask the darker
purposes of an overweening organicism.
So art, for Whitehead, cannot be static, imbued with permanence,
independent, nor distinct in its essential properties. Charged with
the task of the 'fertilization of the soul', art must follow the
organic road:
A static value, however serious and important, becomes
unendurable by its appalling monotony of endurance. The soul
cries aloud for release into change. It suffers the agonies of
claustrophobia... Great art is the arrangement of the environment
so as to provide for the soul vivid, but transient, values...
This element of transition in art is shown by the restlessness
exhibited in its history. An epoch gets saturated by the
masterpieces of any one style. Something new must be discovered.
The human being wanders on. 85
Lewis notes that Spengler's urge to periodize cultures is unavoidably
inherent in Whitehead's own notion of 'mental climates'; it is simply
the spectre of zeitgeist under another name, keeping the individual
entity securely wedded to a wider, historical and time-dominated
controlling power. Whitehead, following Bergson, calls strongly into
question the notion of the 'entity' and intellectualist divisions
between subject and object, which are seen as false given their common
origins, and must be abandoned. In this all-embracing view of
reality, each of the basic elements, or what were previously regarded
as separate entities, are now for Whitehead 'actual entities', but
they are not self-contained or fixed, but consist of processes of
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self-creation, by the selection and re-arrangement of the material
provided for their backgrounds. The analogy, for Whitehead, Spengler
and Alexander is to clearly be sought in the notion of life-cycles, of
plants and animals underpinning the philosophy of organism.
Lewis cannot accept this principle in any guise, especially as applied
to the arts, and given the implications for the individual ego.
Whitehead's scientific mysticism that elevates the electron as the
basic unit of creativity, which 'blindly runs' but which derives its
importance 'from the fact that it is an integral part of a whole
greater than (though possibly as blind as) itself, and not a mere
lonely, alien atom' 86, cannot embrace for Lewis the complex
intuitional and rational processes of creating art. He seems almost
to forgive Whitehead his 'honest sentimentalism' and 'naivetê' In his
scientific enthusiasms, his devotion to the nature poetry of Tennyson
and Shelley, and the allied romanticism that wishes to see a cosy,
idealistic unity between art and science, but the clear influence of
Bergson, 'the perfect philosophic ruffian' is not so easily
oven ooked.
It is therefore not insignificant that Time and Western Man opens its
account by quoting from Science and the Modern World. In full this
reads:
It is in literature that the concrete outlook of humanity
receives its expression. Accordingly, it is to literature that
we must look, particularly in its more concrete forms, namely in
poetry and drama, if we hope to discover the inward thoughts of a
generation. 87
Lewis's reasons for placing Whitehead's words at the head of his own
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text, as the expression of a view which he is concerned to discuss and
dispute, may be an expected or self-evident ploy in its polemical
context. it is not obvious to the reader at this ,juncture, but what
increasingly becomes clear as Lewis's case unfolds, is the realization
that this quotation is an exemplification of what he regards as the
ambiguous, misleading use of concepts and terminology that reverberate
throughout those texts chosen as representative of the time-cult in
contemporary thought: the modern equivalents of Bergson, Schopenhauer
and Nietzsche that Lewis finds in Alexander, Whitehead and Spengler.
Their coninon hostility to the individual personality or the 'subject',
manifest in Alexander's and Whitehead's metaphysical allegiances, and
chronologist attacks on 'Classical' ideals are seen as representative
examples of the predominant tendency that pits time-values against
space-values to the detriment of the latter.
Lewis's use of the term 'concrete' has important ramifications in
respect of Whitehead's employment of the term here; it is also a term
which necessarily takes a high profile in his version of metaphysics.
Whitehead's narrow, specific use of the word in this quotation is
crucially important to Lewis in developing his own main thesis in Time
and Western Man, and a brief consideration of the implications of this
key concept leads us squarely to the centre of the debate. One
meaning that Lewis draws attention to at the beginning of his book is
that it is used as a term of convenience and description when he
wishes to refer the effects on the arts - the 'concrete
manifestations' of the time-cult. In pursuit of this, Lewis widens it
to include more generally the arts of fiction, poetry and painting,
whilst Whitehead excludes visual art from what he characterizes as the
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expression of the 'concrete outlook of humanity'. Whitehead's
strategy might in effect elicit some approval from his opponent, since
although Lewis considers that each one of these arts may all
demonstrably suffer from the taint of chronologism, it is in literary
forms of expression - including history, biography and autobiography -
that those effects are most severe. Indeed, in omitting the visual
arts from his analysis, Whitehead appears to add albeit unwitting
testimony to the grounds of Lewis's own case that the visual arts
alone may escape the fate of literary counterparts as convenient
instruments used to probe the 'inward thoughts of a generation', or as
Lewis might put it,- to wallow in the fetid Schopenhauerian or
Bergsonian 'stream of unconsciousness'.
Another interpretation of the 'concrete' which is important to draw
attention to is that, for both Lewis and Whitehead, it is also a key
term in the philosophical debate between the 'real' and the 'unreal',
or the 'abstract' versus the 'concrete'. Whitehead's theory of the
'Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness' developed in Science and the
Modern World attempts to point out the error, in the light of modern
physics, of the 'abstract' separation of mind and matter that has
'ruined' modern philosophy 88. This strategy, Lewis argues, is
so fanatically directed to disintegrate and to banish the
bogey of 'concreteness,' that it would be impossible not to
receive the impression of a peculiar hostility to 'the
concrete,' in its most inclusive sense, in favour of
something abstract and mental... 89
Lewis's argument comes to rest on the paradox implied by the terms
'abstract' and 'concrete', a paradox which in turn characterizes the
view of the 'space-timeists', writers of the 'time-school' for whom
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a	 90time and change are the ultimate reality' . For Bergson and the
space-timeists, as an ultimate reality lies in the region of
temporality, transience and mutability, the fusion or convergence of
principles that had hitherto maintained clear distinctions - as in the
traditional separation of elements of mind from elements of matter -
is thereby metaphysically affirmed. Hence Lewis's position, which
attempts to outline the ways in which the time-philosophy itself
courts abstraction. His own philosophy, in sympathy with the
so-called extremist idealism of Berkeley, may on the contrary, he
would claim, be considered as a more likely candidate in the
establishment of an-accurate interpretation of the terms, 'concrete'
or 'non-abstract', being in direct opposition to the notions of
Whitehead, which are based on a temporal idea of reality. Such a
philosophy as proposed by Lewis, meant for 'surface creatures', would
naturally draw attention to the added contradiction in Whitehead's
text between the alignment of 'concrete' and 'inward' which are, in
Lewis's view, violently incompatible terms.
The quotation from Whitehead serves to illustrate the belief that
motivates Lewis throughout the detailed analysis of contemporary
time-philosophers. This belief, he tells us, was reached as a process
of induction, from observing the effects of the time-cult on the
'concrete manifestations' that were closest to him in the arts,
subjecting them to analysis, and consequently seeking theoretical
confirmation of this 'great orthodoxy of thought' that was in the
'process of consuninating itself'. He concludes:
The result of my investigation was that I found the same
unanimity rampant throughout the contemporary theoretical
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field. Point for point what I had observed on the literary,
social and artistic plane was reproduced upon the
philosophic and theoretic: 91
That unanimity, Lewis was convinced, had resolved itself into a 'cult
of Time', and was not confined to the arts where it had first been
discovered, but resounded from the highest levels of philosophy and
scientific endeavour, to its most trivial manifestations in popular
culture. 'There seemed no doubt' he continued,
that the more august of these two regions had influenced the
lower and more popular one, and that the great principle of
its cult, namely Time or History, had reproduced itself with
a god-like fecundity, taking a multitude of original, hybrid, and
often very grotesque forms upon the mundane plane of
popularization and fashion. 92
The scale	 of Lewis's undertaking is thus revealed, but in his
analyses of Spengler, Whitehead and Alexander, of the 'grand theories'
of the historical development and decline of Western culture, and the
equally forbidding territory of modern science, relativity and quantum
mechanics, he never forgets his layman status, nor would attempt to
enter into theoretical or technical areas which are clearly beyond his
competence or interests. Neither, Lewis asserts, is this necessary,
since he is concerned to point up the effects of such theories on the
about
activitiesA which he does consider himself to be knowledgeable.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1.	 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (German title, Der
Untergang Des Abendlandes, 1918-1922). English one-vo1ui
edition translated by Charles Francis Atkinson (London,
1932, seventh impression).
2.	 Notably James Joyce, Ulysses, and works by the 'time-children'
Anita Loos, and Gertrude Stein. Ezra Pound's interests and
personality are critically examined by Lewis in this connection,
and who indeed identifies him as the 'Revolutionary Simpleton'
referred to.
3.	 TWM, p.133.
4.	 TWM, p.17.
5.	 See TWtI, p.262: 'There is no person more persuaded of the
political, or historical, nature of everything than is Spengler:
and that is, of course, the "Time"-nature. That is his main
source of argument: all his very long book is written to show,
scientifically, how everything is a factor or creature of Time,
and as entirely contingent upon the time-atmosphere or
time-climate as is a fish or bird upon the presence and structure
of its native medium.'
6.	 Drawing parallels between the devotion of Spengler and Whitehead
for the notion of periodization or a 'mental climate', Lewis does
not hesitate to recognize the operations of Zeitgeist. History,
and the artistic cultural theories propounded by Spengler, and
atomic science, as discussed by Whitehead, are thus united under
one banner: 'So for Spengler logically, and as a matter of
course, the conceptions obtaining in the art of the theatre are
identical with the political conceptions of the same period, and
the "discoveries" of science (whether the atom is envisaged as an
aggressive "force-point, full of purpose, or is a little ball
knocked blindly hither and thither by fate) are also reflections
of the political and social ideas of the time. All the most
abstract science as much as anything else, in politics, is
Zeitgeist. The claim of the man-of-science to an absolutist
status, to being a "discoverer, " independent of the march of
political and social events, is humbug, or at least
self-delusion.' (TWM, p.278). If we read 'artist' for
man-of-science in this passage, Lewis's reasons for advocating a
status of relative autonomy for both art and science are
illustrated.
7.	 Lewis carefully dissociates the intellectual power of Nietzsche's
writings from Spengler's 'fat and flabby' doctrine; they are
alike in their claims to be 'anti-popular' writers, but Spengler
is 'only humbugging', lacking Nietzsche's 'initiatory genius or
his thoroughness' (TWM, p.301).
8.	 TWM, p.302.
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9. TWM, p.286.
10. Spengler was apparently prepared to fully accept all the social
and biological connotations of the term, 'culture', which in the
context of his book leads to the kind of semantic ambiguity to
which Lewis most objected, and which was taken to be a
characteristic mark of the contemporary time-mind.
11. See Spengler, The Decline of the West, I, p.3: '...for human
history is the sum of mighty life-courses which already have had
to be endowed with ego and personality, in customary thought and
expression, by predicating entities of a higher order like "the
Classical" or "the Chinese Culture," "Modern Civilization" -...'.
12. Spengler, op cit., I, p.281.
13. Spengler, op cit., I, p.7.
14. Lewis seriously questions the motives of both Spengler and
Alexander with regard to the issue of superiority of race,
periods and cultures, and in relation to the period-determination
that transcends the individual mind and personality, drawing
attention to Alexander's contention that 'not even the mind of
Plato could be free from the habits of his age...' (TWM, p.229).
15. This 'picture' that is conjured by the Unconscious, Lewis is
concerned to point out, is an image merely, an abstraction,
without substance or concrete reality; as a characteristic of
time-philosophy it builds its edifice on nothing. (See TWM,
p.284).
16. Spengler draws upon Goethe's concept of 'living nature', which in
The Decline of the West is characterized as a'method of living
into (erfuhien) the object, as opposed to dissecting it'. Such a
method, claimed as non-scientific, is what Spengler declares he
will apply 'to all the formations of man's history, whether fully
matured, cut off in the prime, half opened or stifled in the
seed' (op cit., I, p.105). The biological analogy is exploited
to the full in support of his 'organic' approach to history;
Goethe's world, Spengler assures us, was indeed an 'organism' in
the first instance (op cit., I, p.96).
17. Spengler, op cit., I, pp.25-26.
18. The work of Einstein, placed at the base of time-philosophy by
Lewis, is the catalyst or 'mathematical guillotine' in the
rooting out of the principle of 'the Absolute' from the Cosmos.
In effect, Lewis takes Newtonian science as the representative of
this abandoned principle (see TWM, pp.15-17).
19. TWM, p.150.
20. TWM, p.230.
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21. TWM, p.24.
22. TWM, p.233.
23. It was plain that Spengler's book, characterized by Lewis as 'the
greatest highbrow best-seller of the last ten or twenty years'
(TWM, p.263), first published towards the end of the First World
War, touched a nerve in his public, and was, in any event,
exceptionally widely read. His translator notes that this
'severe and difficult philosophy of history found a market that
has justified the printing of 90,000 copies', a '"popular,"
philosophical product of the German revolution'. The English
translation of Spengler's title had undoubtedly influenced Lewis
in the choice of Time and Western Man for his own work,
conceived in direct opposition to Spengler's thesis and ideas in
sympathy with it.
24. Quoting from Spengler, Lewis connects this hostility directly to
Bergson: '"We ourselves are Time, N
 Spengler writes and
italicizes; and he could say no more if he were Bergson. Time is
the personal and organic; "Time is a counter-conception to
Space'' (TWM, p.268).
25. ibid.
26. TWM, p.303.
27. TWM, p.295.
28. TWM, p.296. Lewis places heavy emphasis on this passage by
italicizing it.
29. Lewis observes that for Spengler, 'No art has a philosophy of its
own for him: indeed all arts, the moment they really begin to
understand themselves, show a tendency to melt away into "music"
- into something intangible, abstract, non-plastic - 'infinite."'
(TWM, p.296). The overall purpose of Time and Western Man is
dedicated to the strongest possible refutation of these
propositions.
30. Walter Pater, 'the great nineteenth-century romantic and
aesthete' is twice quoted by Lewis with inaccuracies of phrasing
and transcription (see TWM, p.196 and p.296). Pater's text The
Renaissance (1873; revised and enlarged edition, London, 188Wr
has 'AU art constantly aspires towards the condition of music'
(italicized), p.140.
31. Spengler, op cit., I, p.277: 'With Michelangelo the history of
Western sculpture is at an end. What of it there was after him
was mere misunderstandings or reminiscences. His real heir was
Palestrina.'
32. TWM, p.298.
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33. TWM, p.407.
34. For Lewis, the 'fluid photographs in commercially-produced
marble' of the 'famous impressionist sculptor, Auguste Rodin'
provided plastic counterparts for Bergson's élan vital, and
looked as though they 'had been done expressly to illustrate' the
doctrine. Alexander, not surprisingly, had used Rodin's work as
a vehicle which could furnish appropriate plastic illustrations
of his own 'space-time flux' (see TWM, p.156). To Lewis, Rodin
and Impressionist art illustrated the highly damaging effects of
the time-cult upon the plastic arts, effects which must be
eradicated if those arts were to achieve again their lost
I ndependence.
35. TWM, p.295.
36. Spengler, op cit., I, p.183.
37. TWM, p.292.
38. Spengler's attitude towards specifically defined types of words
is discussed by Lewis in TWM, pp.273-274. Lewis notes that
Spengler must express himself in words; 'such is the cross that
the philosopher has to bear. He cannot be a philosopher or an
historian In anything but words...the great god "Time" has to be
adored in this inadequate manner; and Spengler has to keep up a
running apology for his language to his resounding,
inexpressible, sound-symbol of a deity.' (TWM, p.273).
39. Lewis quotes from Spengler's text: TWM, p.269.
40. TWM, p.280. '...is Spengler's whole book a subtle argument for
the Classical, after all?' asks Lewis (TWM, p.295), ob1lque1
taking advantage of what he regards as Spengler's ineptitude in
argument and sheer intellectual incompetence.
41. Lewis quotes extensively from Spengler's text (op cit., I,
pp.8-9) in TWM, p.227.
42. See Spengler, op cit., I, p.309: 'Classical man, belonging wholly
to the present... is will-less. The Classical idea of destiny
and the symbol of the Doric column leave no doubt as to that.'
43. Spengler, op cit., I, p.300.
44. Lewis refers to Whitehead's illustration of the 'blindly running'
electron in order to make this connection with Spengler's brand
of organicism, indebted to the notion of 'will' as characterized
by Schopenhauer. See TWM, p.285.
45. TWM, p.306.
46. ibid.
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47. ibid.
48. TWM, p.407.
49. 'The influence of Bergson' Lewis claims, 'went down beneath the
wave of formal enthusiasm that immediately preceded the War.'
That Vorticism had played a central part in this
de-popularization of Bergson, Lewis would have had no doubt.
'But' he continues, 'the War and einsteinian physics have turned
the scales once more. There is naturally no question of
reinstating Bergson; there are plenty of others of the same sort,
but with a more up-to-date equipment, without having recourse to
him' (TWM, p.156). Principally, Lewis intends to cite as
examples of the new time-philosophy, the work of Alexander,
Whitehead and Russell.
50. Lewis required his readers to understand the essentially variable
'truths' that science offers, thus anchoring them securely to the
shifting boundaries of a metaphysics that accepts time as its
prior principle. He resisted strongly the suggestion that such
truths were in any way inviolable, or should be accepted
uncritically. An artist's truth, he argued, was more legitimate
than the variable, 'progressive' contributions of science, since
it endures, and is not compromised by succeeding generations.
Leonardo's work was not surpassed, for example, by that of later
achievements in art, but was different, and could not be
compromised by other artistic truths. See Lewis's discussions of
the 'variable' truths of science in TWM, pp.450, 466, 469ff.
51. TWM, p.218.
52. See TWM, p.102: 'The philosophy of the space-timeist is identical
with the old... It is essential to grasp this continuity between
the earlier flux of Bergson, with its Time-god, and the
einsteinian flux, with its god, Space-time. Alexander, and his
pupil Whitehead, are the best-known exponents, of philosophers
writing in English, of these doctrines. It will not require a
very close scrutiny of Space Time and Deity, for instance, and
then of some characteristic book of Bergson's, to assure yourself
that you are dealing with minds of the same stamp.'
53. Bertrand Russell, The ABC of Relativity (London, 1925), revised
edition 1958, third impression.
54. TWM, p.431. 'Mr. Slosson' was Edwin Emery Slosson, the author of
Easy Lessons in Einstein, (London, 1920). The text includes an
article by Albert Einstein (reprinted from The Times), and a
bibliography.
55. The 1914 edition of Bertrand Russell's Our Knowledge of the
External World contains, Lewis notes, a strong critique of
evolutionism, and Bergson's work in particular. This was later
revised in the 1926 edition, and although Russell maintained his
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attitude towards Bergson, he had become an enthusiastic convert.
Lewis's references are largely to the later edition of this work.
56. TWM, p.422.
57. TWM, p.201.
58. TWM, p.414.
59. TWM, p.432.
60. Lewis generally accepts the ideological detachment of the work of
Einstein from the metaphysical systems that he challenges,
recognising the scientist's indisputable genius in his field.
But, he argues, that It 'is mere superstition to suppose ua
mathematician" to be a sort of divine machine. In any
reasonable, and not romantic, account of the matter, we must
suppose the mathematical physicist not entirely unaffected by
neignoouring metapnysicai tflougflt. Ihat einstein... had not at
least read the work of Bergson, and formed some opinion upon it,
favourable or otherwise, is unlikely, to say the least.' (TWM,
pp.13-14). Laying the blame securely at the door of
metaphysicians who followed Bergson, Lewis largely exonerates
Einstein from the taint of the time-cult, but nevertheless
insists on the crucial importance of the general implications of
his work in physics as a catalyst for the ideas of those
philosophers.
61. TWM, p.289.
62. See TWM, p.427.
6• See TWM, pp.444
ergson' in his
'space', and in
means equal.
64. TWM, p.103.
and 445: Alexander in effect 'out-bergsons
insistence on the priority of 'time' over
the phrase 'space-time', the balance is by no
65. The notion of emergents', Alexander acknowledges, is indebted to
the work of Lloyd Morgan (see Alexander, op cit., II, p.14 and
note), whom Lewis also discusses briefly. See TWM, pp.103, 440.
66. Alexander, op cit., II, p.14.
67. See Alexander, op cit., II, p.147 on this paradox; he refers to
the relationship of intuition and reason as parent and child,
which are different, but able to develop out of the same body;
they are for him 'empirical determinations' or 'legitimate
children'. Such a difficulty occurs in the work of Bergson, but
the problems are marked in Alexander's theory. Lewis felt that
organism inevitably led to a kind of monism that would be
detrimental to the individual object or subject, with no clear
differentiation between entities or their functions.
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68. Alexander, op cit., I, p.61.
69. Lewis recognizes certain vitally important differences between
the ideas of Russell, Alexander, and Whitehead, particularly in
respect of Russell's sympathy, with Lewis, for 'berkeleyan
idealism' (TWM, p.476). If pressed for a label, he would prefer
to attach the term 'idealist' in support of his argument
regarding the mentalism and abstraction of the time-cult, and in
the case of Alexander and Whitehead, is prepared to acknowledge
their own advocacy of a kind of realism by characterizing their
positions as 'idealo-realists' (TWM, p.257). But the emphasis,
for Lewis, would always be on the first term in that equation in
respect of the 'realism' they had proposed.
70. In this connection, Lewis cites the description provided by
Bernard Bosanquet (TWM, p.244). See Bosanquet, The Meeting of
Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy (London, 1921).
71. Absolutism, which relativism had apparently abolished under the
aegis of Einstein's theories, and which had superseded the old
absolutes provided by Newton, was nevertheless, in Lewis's view,
replaced by a new kind of absolute - that of time. Lewis makes
reference specifically to the 'absolutist manners' of Alexander
that are the result of the time-obsession (TWM, p.450).
72. Alexander, op cit., I, p.vi. The work Alexander refers to was a
series of essays by Edwin B. Holt and five other authors,
collected in The New Realism (New York, 1912).
73. TWM, p.467.
74. TWM, p.466.
75. TWM, p.469.
76. TWM, p.472.
77. ibid.
78. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (London,
1926).
79. TWM, p.204.
80. ibid.
81. TWM, p.194.
82. TWM, p.174.
83. TWM, p.175.
84. ibid.
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85. Whitehead, op cit., p.283.
86. TWM, p.285.
87. This quotation (TWM, p.1), contains slight inaccuracies of
transcription, from Whitehead, op cit., p.106.
88. See Whitehead, op cit., pp.78-79.
89. TWM, p.168.
90. TWM, p.169.
91. TWM, p.219.
92. ibid.
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CHAPTER 4
A PHILOSOPHY OF THE EYE
I have recently worked out, with great care, a system. The
present essay is its philosophic elaboration. 1
In the Introductory section of this study, it was noted that
contemporary reviews of Time and Western Nan and assessments of
Lewis's philosophy, whilst giving due weight to his interests as an
artist, do not isolate those interests as centrally determining nor as
a primary impetus In the process of acquiring and developing
philosophical principles. Similarly, E.W.F. Tomlin's later essays on
Lewis's philosophy 2
 are informative and give much insight on the
subject, but owe much to types of approach which explore aspects of
the literary implications of the work, and thus do not penetrate to
the deeper recesses of Lewis's psyche as a plastic artist, the
consideration of which he stressed always dominated his thought. 'I
am an artist' he wrote in The Art of Being Ruled,
and,through my eye, must confess to a tremendous bias. In
my purely literary voyages my eye is always my compass.
...Nothlng could ever convince my EYE - even if my intelligence
were otherwise overcome - that anything that did not possess
this simplicity, conceptual quality, hard exact outline, grand
architectural proportion, was the greatest art. 3
Lewis may well be guilty here, as elsewhere, of self-conscious
'image-building', but taken with the determination to mount a
sustained attack on Bergson and chronologism, his motives are revealed
and are found to be unerringly consistent in purpose:
Bergson is indeed the arch enemy of every impulse having its
seat In the apparatus of vision, and requiring a concrete
world. Bergson is the enemy of the Eye, from the start;
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But I can hardly imagine any way in which he is not against
every form of intelligent life. 4
The defence of art, as revealed in Lewis's response to the
philosophical ideas of Bergson, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and the
contemporary theories of the 'space-timeists', must be closely
followed by a defence of intellect; 'pure' instinct, or art which is
produced without the conscious operation of the mind's capacity for
reason will be, of necessity, bad art5 . Since 'good art' is Lewis's
ideal, not only for himself, but other aspiring practitioners, a
formula of thought freed of harmful notions is required. The
theoretical position that results from this standpoint must therefore
be carefully constructed and tailored to be consistent with these
aims. The priority that Lewis's profession takes in the formulation
of his philosophical views is explicitly stressed throughout Time and
Western Man; my contention, that this work Is indeed an 'elaboration'
on a system already worked out from the viewpoint of art practice and
aesthetics, requires that an analysis of the main philosophical
principles Lewis adopted should be carried out, before the foundations
of that body of thought may be traced and explored in the second part
of this thesis.
It would be inaccurate, or at least misleading, to suggest that
Lewis's philosophy, or any component of his output, Is dedicated to
the wholesale painstaking and logical elimination of all the
paradoxical and contradictory propositions that tend to pepper his
exposition. Evidence that would appear to count against Lewis's
thesis is often simply ignored by him, or might perhaps be
unceremoniously dismissed. Whilst the latter might be an academically
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acceptable practice for the 'sober' writer, it becomes capricious in
the light of Lewis's more unorthodox methods6 . As a non-philosopher
and artist, the excitement of paradoxical discourse is on the
contrary, often openly acknowledged by Lewis, to be seen as enriching,
and even to be celebrated, rather than suppressed, or sanitized:
Nietzsche's example in this matter of style and approach was far more
stimulating for Lewis than the prosaic style of Hegel could ever hope
to be. Like Nietzsche, Lewis, in stressing the crucial factor of
individuality and personality, could and would not retreat behind
theoretical concerns to the extent of eliminating his essential self.
Nor could he be even-handed with those accounts that would appear to
contradict his own viewpoints, even to the acknowledged extent of his
strong bias, for that which implies a failure of nerve or resolve did
not endear itself to him. 'I have said to myself', he writes,
that I will fix my attention upon those things that have most
meaning for me. All that seems to me to contradict or threaten
those things I will do my best to modify or to defeat, and
whatever I see that favours and agrees with those things I will
support and do my best to strengthen. In consequence, I shall
certainly be guilty of injustice, the heraclitean 'injustice of
the opposites.' But how can we evade our destiny of being 'an
opposite,' except by becoming some grey mixture, that is in
reality just nothing at all? 7
A fierce resistance to the possibility of becoming some 'grey mixture'
underpins Lewis's purpose; his greatest defence is to allow the
contradictory elements of personality and thought to struggle towards
a fixation of what he calls the 'most essential ME'; '...when it comes
to the pinch, I will side and identify myself with the powerfullest
Me, and in its interests I will work'8.
The interests that motivate Lewis in Time and Western Man are
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therefore explicitly asserted. His 'philosophy of the eye
amalgamates those concerns in a theoretical form which demands a
spatial viewpoint in order to achieve the 'painter's heaven of
exterior forms'. Yet, true to Lewis's idiosyncratic methodology, It
Is a paradox which stands squarely at the base of a philosophy which
claims the eye as its primary sense-organ. In claiming the rights to
a 'philosophy of the eye', Lewis Is yet fully aware that he needs to
set down very precise conditions in doing so. The time-philosophy
which he resists might, he acknowledges, be more accurately termed a
philosophy of the eye In its insistence on sensation and not
perception.	 This is a crucial distinction for Lewis: if the data
offered by the eyes Is accepted in its unmodified form, apparently
isolated from the organizing influence of mind or intellect, then it
is 'pure sensation', and the data which results is characterized as
merely fleeting, non-concrete and mirror-like Illusory imagery or
purely optical sense-impressions, subject to the distortions of
movement, both physical and chronological. The stick which appears to
be bent in the water of a pond is claimed to be bent in reality, as
Lewis observes9 . Sensations of this optical variety, at the base of
'timeist' world views and concepts of reality have no intellectual
meaning for Lewis, and therefore are more properly the domain of the
instinctive and the unconscious, out of which our dreams and illusions
are made. They have no prior place in definitions of the concrete
reality which Lewis puts forward, since they are peripheral to the
operations of conscious mind. He cannot countenance the division of
eye from mind that sensationalist philosophy projects: in a strict
sense, therefore, this is much more a 'philosophy of the eye' than
Lewis's view appears to be, but the access It gives is to the 'unreal'
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and the abstract only, barring the way to the perception of what is
'real' - and vitally, what is not. If, Lewis argues, some cognizance
of concrete reality is the aim, then the full co-operative and
relational duality of eye and mind must be recognized and given due
philosophical weight. Hence the 'philosophy of the eye' for which
Lewis searches comes to have its opposite meaning:
...if by 'philosophy of the eye' is meant that we wish to
repose, and materially to repose, in the crowning human sense,
the visual sense; and if It meant that we refuse (closing
ourselves In with our Images and sensa) to retire into the
abstraction and darkness of an aural and tactile world, then It
is true that our philosophy attaches Itself to the concrete and
radiant reality of the optic sense. That sensation of
overwhelming reality which vision alone gives is the reality of
'coniuon-sense,' as it is the reality we inherit from pagan
antiquity. And it is indeed on that 'reality' that I am basing
all I say. 10
In preferring to 'deal with what is directly in front of all our
eyes', Lewis appeals, not to the optic sense in isolation, but to its
insights in conjunction with our knowledge, or the 'couwnon-sense'
condition of the kind which has been inherited from classical thought,
opposing contemporary scientific and psychological trends. A
consistent emphasis on that tradition, as a means for positing and
understanding self and the material world from an artist's point of
view, is uppermost in Lewis's response to the modern theoretical
challenge. In essence, the benchmarks for exploration that Lewis
identifies involve the fundamental philosophical issues and debates
relating to the subject, or self, deity, and the object (matter) and
it is chiefly around these topics that the basis of his philosophy is
constructed, and upon which my own discussion is based.
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1.4.1 Perceptual Reality and the Object
Lewis's 'conmion-sense' view of reality turns, therefore, on the data
gathered by sight, emphatically not as isolated sensation, but in full
perceptual co-operation with intellect, knowledge and previous
experience. This being the case, he claims for himself the
descriptive nomenclature of 'realist', with the proviso that his
realism is to be understood in spatial terms - the strongest visual
impression of the external world being that of stability, and not of
change. The eye, in effect, concretizes and ininobilizes objects
clearly and distinctly, and the relation between retina and brain is
such that it is this stable object which is recalled in the mind when
the eye is no longer focused upon it. It does not move, nor does it
change, but is static. Vision, in the service of intellect, may be
raw and untutored, but never innocent. The objects upon which our
eyes focus have already been anticipated by the mind and can thus be
said to have been created there, the 'finished product of our
perceptive faculty', the result of 'the organizing activity of our
minds':
When we say we see them, in reality what we perceive is not the
direct datum ofinsation, but an elaborate and sophisticated
entity, or 'object.' We do even in that sense 'create' them more
than 'see' them. 12
The 'static' picture of the external world, the traditional, classical
'comon-sense' metaphysical construct, out of which intellect creates
the material world, and to which Lewis owes the basis of his
philosophical position, is radically threatened by those in sympathy
with the world-view of the time-mind. In defence of his own beliefs,
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Lewis takes extended issue with the writings in particular of Bertrand
Russell, whose idea of a fluid, moving and essentially dynamic mode of
sense-perception directly contradicts the static order advocated by
Lewis. Russell, argues Lewis, wishes to animate that picture, so that
the hitherto static image is imbued with 'life', and the picture
accordingly 'moves and lives inside its frame' 13 . The object itself
does not make an appearance, but only the states of the object; our
knowledge, that is, what we know about It is excluded In favour of
what we see; for Lewis this is purely optical sensation and takes no
account of memory and intellect. Perception is subordinated to
sensation, in the manner of Bergson's evolutionism, with the result
that the world-view constructed in this way must, for Lewis
necessarily rest on data provided by the crudest optical sensation.
The 'roundness' of an object, for example, is inferred by intellect
when it is not seen by the eye, as any artist is aware; but as far as
Lewis is concerned, if the eye 'alone' is to be trusted, an object
seen as flat and two-dimensional is, according to Russell's view,
exactly that 'in reality'. This results in a sham, unreal world which
structures itself around images only, like those in a mirror or
looking glass, and which are flat, insubstantial and ephemeral. In
order to reach the point of perception where our couon-sense begins,
following Russell's view, it is necessary for us to
...move round the object, and as far as possible get inside
it. With the thousand successive pictures we thus obtain we
shall have - only successively, nothing all at once, except a
punctual picture and momentary sensation - the perceptual picture
of conznon-sense... But thought, perception, and indeed all the
stationary acts of the observer of 'common-sense' or of 'naif'
realism, must be turned into movement. We must move and act, if
we wish to apprehend anything, or to have a thing at all.IT
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Indeed, Lewis points out, there will be no need for thought at all, or
even sight, if one can arrive at a rounded perceptual reality by means
of action, movement and interpenetration, for by this measure the
action itself stands in for, and becomes, the thought and the function
of the eye, in the same way the object is, not 'itself', but its
'states' or Its 'successive "effects". The entity, which was
spatial, stable and distinct exists now only in relation to its
effects, not its cause; it becomes, in essence, a multiple series of
15
'events' . The impressions thus gathered are counted as reality, and
appearances are seen as even more 'real' than the object itself
The analogy which counts most with Lewis is that distinction which
characterizes the plastic arts and music; knowledge of a picture, for
example, is to be had statically, or all-at-once, whereas a piece of
music unfolds in time and sequentially. The serial nature of
Russell's successive sense-acts allies itself more with the art of
music, whereas Lewis's spatialized world depends on the plastic for
its inspiration and means of expression.
This paradox of conflicting 'realisms' in contemporary philosophy had
arisen, Lewis is convinced, because modern thinkers had moved so far
away from the 'plain-man's' view, supported by populist,
sensationalist theories like Bergson's. It is, for him, a poor
realism that depends on image and illusion for its basic elements,
abandoning the concrete for the abstract. As he notes in his
discussion of 'space-timeists', if sensation is the arbiter of the
'real', if matter is animated and infused with 'life', then there is
no means of distinguishing between the 'real' and the 'unreal'. What
Russell, Alexander and Whitehead take to be 'real' is more likely to
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be understood as 'unreal' if the spatialist's view is considered. In
any case, the interfusion of matter with 'time' indicates an integral
monism, or a one-substance universe which implies either total reality
or total unreality; no clear distinctions are possible beyond that.
What Lewis wishes to put forward is a means for establishing once
again clear philosophical categorizations between the concepts of the
'real' and the 'unreal'. Mindful of the history of philosophy, and
the difficulties attending this endeavour, Lewis's formulation is less
dualistic than pluralistic; it is plural, not in the sense of
timeist and relativist fragmentation and atomism, which is accompanied
by the concept of organic monism (microcosm-macrocosm), but attempts
to see entities as separate, distinct and independent of each other.
The organizing principle of this universe is thought, which leads
Lewis to the conclusion that matter (nature) may well be sensationally
'real' but since this mode of experience in itself implies that no
organizing or creative thought is brought to bear upon what is
experienced, it is therefore perceptually 'unreal', and if it can be
shown that it is perceptually unreal, then that is its ultimate
character.
If there is one thing more than another that is essential to
provide a 'sense of reality' - our sheer sensation that there is
something real there before us - it is the deadness, the stolid
thickness and deadness, of nature... And it is because they know
that this particular 'concreteness' can be shown to be unreal,
that these philosophers wish it away. What is most sensationally
'real' (as ultimately it is, perhaps more than anything else,
demonstrably unreal) is the deadness of nature, once more. And
for any view of the world such as we are arguing for here to be
successful, that deadness is essential. 17
So for Lewis, the 'realest' or the 'livest' concept is mind, the
critical intelligence, and the 'deadest' is matter. The entire
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physical world is, for him, as it is for Berkeley, manifestly
'unreal', imaginary and mechanical 18 in relation to mind. By
animating matter, and by 'pumping It full of time', by denying the
'deadness' of matter, the time-philosophers divest mind of its
creativity and organizational powers. The world, according to
Russell, is disintegrated and dependent for its 'reality' on 'compact
series" 19 and appearances rather than 'things'.
Lewis is aware his position contains within it the seeds of paradox
and self-contradiction; he maintains the physical world is 'unreal',
and at the same time insists that it is 'non-abstract', 'stolid', and
concrete. The justification for this is revea1ed if we return to
Lewis's discussion of Russell, and his characterization in Our
Knowledge of the External World of 'conion-sense' metaphysics 20. This
view, claims Russell, is quite an 'audacious' piece of metaphysical
theorizing, since it rests unaccountably upon the belief in the
existence of objects without the benefit of mind or sense-perception.
The former condition is a 'capital error' for Berkeley, as the latter
proved to be for Russell, who saw a 'first departure from the
imediate data of sensation' 21 . Insisting that this view is the
product of the 'primitive' or 'caveman' who, 'dreaming in his cave,
constructed the "world of comon-sense"we Inherit and currently use",
Russell points out that he had imagined a mountain and a tree that
'were always there' whether or not they were being looked at22.
Lewis has recourse to Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge for
clarification of his own view on the matter:
As to what Is said of the absolute existence of unthinking
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things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems
perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, nor is It
possible they should have any existence, out of the minds of
thinking things, which perceive them. 23
The doubt on the absolute existence of objects in the external world
is noted. The concept of 'unthinking things' however, is vital for
Lewis's thesis. Time-philosophies, In imbuing matter with mind, where
all is mind to an extent, do not recognize this categorization of
things'. In sum, Lewis's primary metaphysical formulation is thus:
thinking, the ability to think, and the functions of conscious mind is
what constitutes reality. That which does not think, an unthinking
thing, must be dead, and unreal by this token. But it is also
fliably and massively concrete because of the very power of the
thinking mind which creates it:
And so the material world must.., be imaginary: and the very
effrontery of its superb solidness and the bland assurance with
which it is camped before us, should actually help us to realize
that. That air of being so perfectly at home, at rest and
serenely unconcerned (of being 'unthinking,' in short, and
without feeling) should be the greatest proof of its unreality...
it is playing at being. And the more solid it is the more
unearthly... 24
Against the flux of Bergson and Alexander, Lewis places the world of
'dead' matter, insisting, in direct contradiction to their
formulations, that stability - inertness, death - is the goal and
ultimate fate of organic life, not the perpetual motion produced by an
obsession with time and its effects. He recognizes, too, that
Bergson's and his own world pictures are both forms of nientalism, but
maintains that these exist at opposite points of the matrix of
abstraction and concreteness. When time and change are taken as the
'ultimate reality', the resulting position is a gravitation towards
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the 'abstract', or a view which depends on sense-perceptions and
appearances, rather than the 'thing itself', and hence the possibility
of our understanding of the object is obscured. When we read a book,
for example, as Lewis points out, 'what we notice is the meaning of
the printed words: not the peculiarities of the print or paper. We
ftperceive,N that is; we do not TM sense. " With all of the external
world it is the same' 25
In support of the 'concrete', Lewis cites Berkeley's work which,
although often regarded as 'extreme idealism', nevertheless stands
squarely for the solid, dead world of matter he wishes to outline.
When dealing with self-styled 'realists' such as Alexander, Lewis is
careful to make his position clear, aligning his philosophy with
Berkeley's idealism and against the contemporary adoption of an
'abstract' philosophy from Bergson and which assumes a
post-relativity, 'scientific' definition of the 'real' as
fragmentation and atomism, controlled by the vagaries of flux:
All that I suggest should be borne in mind is that, with the
'realists' with whom we shall be dealing, their 'real' is the
opposite of the concrete. And the position from which we are
conducting this analysis - and which would come under some
heading of 'idealism' - is in favour of a conception of reality
that is as concrete as theirs is abstract. 26
Lewis's own claims as a 'realist' should be encountered and considered
more accurately in relation to a Platonic, and not a materialist
context, since the acid test of a belief in an absolute existence of
objects without benefit of organizing intelligence finds as little
support in Lewis's world-picture as it does in Berkeley's. Yet
sensation and theories of instinct and intuition that have been put
forward by Bergson and Schopenhauer as vitally important in the
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process of artistic creation, and which have been accepted, in part,
by Lewis, have been reconciled with the 'extremism 1
 of Berkeley.
Lewis's formulation concedes that it is the unconscious mind,
responsible for the inspiration of creativity, for dreams, illusions
and the imaginative capacity of man, that enables the possibility of
the existence of objects independently of the active consciousness.
Thus the mind, 'in its unconscious part, could be said to maintain the
mountains, tables and chairs in imaginative sub-existence, when not
directly objects of perception' 27 . Such a possibility, for Lewis,
highlights one major difficulty which prevents a full acceptance of
the implications of Berkeley's philosophy, regarded in this respect as
less than 'serious'.	 However, concerned less with labels than with
the value a construction of reality offers, Lewis finds much to admire
in Berkeley in pursuit of his specialized aims.
The fate of the 'object' as a result of an avid application of
'abstract' time-philosophies is for Lewis disintegration, a false
animism of dead matter, and loss of outline, distinctness and
definition. It is, in short, the artist's object which is vitally at
stake in the challenge to the time-cult 28 , and it is that object which
ensures Lewis's adherence to traditional models of common-sense
notions of reality at the base of his concept of matter. Attempts by
contemporary philosophers to seek out a more 'vivid' reality have had
the 'curious result of making it, in effect, less real.., a mirror
world' 29, against which is ranged Lewis's 'realism', in debt to
notions of a idealism that supports mind, in its conscious and
unconscious states, as the arbiter and creative force in the
projection of a solid, concrete world of matter.
'34
I.4.ii Self and Deity: Pictures of God
...God the artist is a more significant image than God the
mechanic. 30
The challenge to the 'conon-sense' basis from which Lewis builds and
refines his particular philosophy, and the disintegration of the
'concrete' object under the time-doctrine has similarly devastating
consequences for the self, or the subject, and its potentiality for
rational thought, which had already been under attack from sources
pre-dating Bergson's assault, in the ideas of Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche. The 'object', Lewis declared, suffers for the sins of the
'subject' in an organic universe that animates matter, and eliminates
31
the 'mind, 'soul,' or 'psyche' . When a wallpaper is imbued with a
soul, as in Russell's formulations 32, it is usurping a characteristic
function that hitherto was regarded as the essence of uniqueness and
individuality of self. The onslaught on both subject and object was
for Lewis also an attack on the ordered classical, rational and
commonsense world, of highly destructive romantic and fanatical
33
proportions
Whereas we find the notion of the unconscious mind accounted for in
Lewis's definition of reality, alongside, but subordinated to, the
functions of conscious mind, which produces our concrete knowledge of
objects, the time-philosopher balances the equation in favour of the
unconscious: 'a long time ago' Lewis notes,
a battle was engaged between the Unconscious and the Conscious:
...we have been witnessing the ultimate triumph of the
Unconscious of recent years... the 'emotional' against the
'intellectual,' the Many against the One. So it is that the
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Subject is not gently reasoned out of, but violently hounded
from,very cell of the organism: until at last... he plunges
into the Unconscious, where Dr. Freud... is waiting for him.
'Consciousness' is perhaps the best hated 'substance' of all.34
The death of the person or the ego, as far as Lewis is concerned, is
presided over by Bergson, aided and abetted by the contemporary
passion for 'fashionable' theories in psychology. The behaviourism of
Watson and Freud's psychoanalysis develop approaches to the individual
psyche in ways which undermine and devalue to the point of extinction
vestiges of intellect and independence, and the operations of
conscious mind. The portrait of modern man which emerges,
characterized and illustrated consistently in art by Lewis in visual
and literary terms, and which is subjected to his stringent
theoretical analysis, is the mechanical puppet of external forces,
utterly determined, and blindly obeying the dictates of instinct and a
powerful Schopenhauerian will.
In contemporary philosophy, enthusiastic support from William James is
found by Lewis to encompass the final passing of consciousness; not
only does 'all of behaviourism' reside in James, but it is he who is
charged with the responsibility of pursuing its bleak conclusions to
ultimate limits 35. Russell, too, is identified as a 'distinguished
adherent' and avid supporter of Watson's theories36 ; the celebrated
'Professor of Movement', in substituting his moving, changing picture
of sensation for the static idea of the perceptual thing, displaces
the mind and ego from the contract. Since movement, change and time
is all, there is no requirement for an organizing intelligence, and
object thereby becomes subject. The fusion of subject and object
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returns to the notion of the one 'substance', the same 'primeval'
stuff found in Bergson, Alexander and Russell, out of which mind and
matter are said to emerge. Yet in the breaking down of distinctions
already established, Lewis argues that, whatever your views on the
origins of life and of matter, the effects remain the same 37.	 To
attempt to re-merge, in theory, what had become separated in the
course of organic development is surely to unduly falsify the
world-view of comon-sense reality, and to affect a return, to a
primitive, infantile or ' naif ' state, which for Lewis is the hallmark
of the relativist attitude. Indeed, Russell's appropriation of
behaviourism is revealed in the establishing of a new orthodoxy, to
replace the traditional and 'audacious metaphysics' of the 'savage
ancestor'; the operations of habit and custom need to be cultivated,
and brought into service in order to replace one out-moded world view
with another.
The conceptions of the external world proposed by Russell are intended
'to supersede those of the classical intelligence and of the picture
of the plain-man', utilizing every propagandistic means at his
disposal, including the findings of psychological theory and research,
and education to 'impose this picture upon the plain-man and the
simple common-sense intelligence'. The common-sense of tomorrow, in
order to become accepted without question must take advantage of any
manipulative means it can muster. Aside from the political
consequences of any such endeavour, the reader is allowed to assess
the consequences for independence of ,judgement and action with no
extended prompting from Lewis:
Mr. Russell stresses the impossibility of effecting this
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transformation without the co-operation of the powerful
influence of habit, of 'familiarity.' And, of course, there is
nothing at all that once people are familiarized with it and
taught to take it as a matter of course, does not seem natural,
and that would not therefore assume the authority of a
'coninon-sense.' But a thing that has to appeal to this special
discipline can hardly claim that it is its intention to 'free'
the mind from prejudice. It is evidently introducing the mind
only to another orthodoxy, which appears to have every practical
interest of the average life against it, to go no further than
that. 38
The exploitation of habit and familiarity that Lewis claims to
identify in Russell's strategy is yet another instance of the doctrine
which places the herding instinct in man above or equal to, his
intellect, and would wish to manipulate the instinctive reaction 'for
his own good'. Dispensing with intellect makes man rather more
manageable, as the individual self is whittled away to nothingness in
the group psyche. Where the self does persist, it is disenfranchised
by becoming a multiplicity, a 'phalanstery of selves', denying the
unity which we believe our 'self' to have. James, in doing for the
self what Russell does for the object, considers the belief 'that the
Me of yesterday is the same as the Me of today' is a mere 'subjective
phenomenon', one to which we fondly but erroneously cling, convinced
of its truth for us. The behaviourists and their philosophical
supporters are of course, as Lewis archly points out, enlightened as
to the 'real' state of affairs.
Lewis's uncompromising opposition to the developments in contemporary
psychology rests on philosophical, social and political objections to
the devaluation of the individual personality in every aspect of its
operation and functioning. The presentation of behaviourism and
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psychoanalysis, and their assimilation in popular forms, had perhaps
aided Lewis's own cause since issues which were previously obscurely
understood, if at all, were being openly pursued by radical
enthusiasts to their extreme limits. The theories of behaviourism, in
stressing the importance of physical and mental conditioning on the
individual's actions, approximate to the caricatured 'Tyro' character,
all teeth and no brain, that Lewis presented in the l920s (PLATE I).
Puppet-like and reacting to external stimuli like a kind of embodied,
elemental and Schopenhauerian will, Lewis graphically illustrates the
extreme consequences implied by Watson's ideas. There is too, a more
subtle point to be made in relation to the Tyronic vessel, in that
Lewis never denied our function as 'external', or 'surface-creatures',
treating this aspect of our existence as indeed vitally important in
the denial of the time-cult and its philosophical formulations, which
would seek to submerge visual differences and outlines in one
coniuunal, visceral, internal mass. He drew particular attention to
the ways in which the demands of personal will and sensuality, and
mass conformity in the shape of habit and familiarity were constantly
competing with the rational mind for control of the body and its
actions.
Freudian psychology, concerned with revealing the domination of
conscious mind and actions by the processes of the unconscious mind,
accorded well with the emphasis on intuition in Bergson, and gave
added impetus to the popular obsessions with 'primitivism', the 'naif'
and the child-ideal that Lewis examines in detail. A sensationalist,
determinist and 'psychological', or 'internal' philosophy, like
Bergson's is therefore complemented by Freudian and behaviourist ideas
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of the 'self', cementing an impulse towards integration and
interpenetration rather than solitary isolation, self-unity and
intellectual independence.
One model of the 'self' which, within strict limits, Lewis found
attractive In the indictment of Bergsonism and the 'space-timeists'
was found in Leibniz's concept of the monad. Lewis does not describe,
or explain this 'psychic genus', for its terms and characteristics as
expressed by Leibniz are not easily compatible with his own
philosophy 39. It is not necessary that Lewis should outline Leibniz's
definitions, since it is a concept which Lewis converts in his own
way, to serve his own purposes, interpreted as an entity which, in his
own highly visualistic conception, approximated to the idea of the
isolated individual that he envisaged, apart from the mass and
confusion of other minds, and which are entities that are
non-relational and separated from other substances. It was as a
'visually logical' being that the monad presented itself to Lewis40,
and in which terms it survives (PLATES II, III, IV, V).
It is the separation of the monad upon which Lewis places greatest
emphasis in his employment of Leibniz's formulations against those of
the time-philosophers. The universal animism which he saw as a
fundamental error was censured too, by Leibniz; in support of his own
position against the 'average space-timer of post-Relativity
philosophy', he quotes a passage from Considerations on the Principles
of Life, etc 41 which ends: 'it must not be said that each portion of
matter is animated, just as we do not say that a pond full of fishes
is an animated body, although a fish is' 42. Lewis concludes that the
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self, to retain any vestige of the qualities with which it was endowed
in 'coninon-sense' metaphysical systems, must strongly resist attempts
to animate matter, or to call the pond itself in which the fish swims
'organic', or lose its own identity and perish in the conglomerated
mass of collective 'life'.
Lewis does charge Leibniz with the 'invention' of the 'unconscious',
in the wake of his epic struggle with the philosophy of Locke, but
points out that Its role in relation to the characterization of the
thinking subject has become unbalanced in the hands of timeists and
'mystical psychologists'. The stress by Leibniz on the uniqueness of
individual monads 43 would have interested Lewis greatly and the
simple, or 'bare' monad that is described in The Monadology, as
mechanistic and primitive, the 'divine machine' or 'natural automaton'44
rather appropriately achieves visual form also in the Tyronic
characters created by Lewis.
However, despite Lewis's regard for the Leibnizian monad as 'a
marvellous, though imperfectly conceived.., intuition of genius'45,
its explicit microcosmic relation with the universe was too organic
and mechanistic to accord with the image of anindependent, rational
46
self that had power over its own actions . But in the Lewisian
characterization of it as the 'smallest possible form of god', it
provided him with a secure and elevated value-system from which the
self could be judged. Leibniz had stated that
...souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe
of created things, but that minds are also images of the Deity
...capable of knowing the system of the universe, and to some
extent of imitating it through architectonic ensamples, each mind
being like a small divinity in its own sphere. 47
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But it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that
distinguishes us from the mere animals and gives us Reason and
the sciences, raising us to the knowledge of ourselves and of
God. And it is this in us that is called the rational soul or
mind (sprit). 48
In direct challenge to those who would devalue the self, the
'walled-in' monad, whose loneliness is utter, whose form allows no
windows on the world, 'through which anything could come in or go
out'	 and which has no communication with other substances, except
directly with the supreme being, the mediator of relations on its
behalf, is recognisably pressed into service by Lewis;
Human individuality is best regarded as a kind of artificial
godhood. When most intensely separated from our neighbour and
from all other things - most 'ourselves,' as we say - we are
farthest away, clearly, from an Absolute, or any kind of Unity.
Yet, in another sense, we are nearest to it. 50
Whatever reservations Lewis had about Leibniz's system as a whole, it
provided him nonetheless with an assurance of a 'clearly-cut,
individually-defined universe' in direct opposition to the
'impressionistic disorder' or the 'cheerless mechanism' of the
behavioural scientist. Restoring identity and liberty to the subject,
drowning or already lost in a sea in which all is mental, all is
psychic and ruled by unconscious desires, is Lewis's goal. In the
merging of mind and body with the world of matter, both are destroyed,
and in the pitting of intellect against sensual desires, the
unconscious against the conscious mind, the principles which hold our
individuality intact are disintegrated.
The question of deity as a necessary concept in the formulation and
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explication of a philosophical construction of reality, and a critique
of rival metaphysics, is explicitly accepted by Lewis in Time and
Western Man. There is, he notes, no attack on God in the
time-philosophies he considers, and on the contrary, deity of a
particular 'variable' and relational character in keeping with
organicism Is indeed positively affirmed, especially in the work of
Alexander. Lewis does not simply discuss the timeist concept of God
because it can be shown that it is typically a product of the
tendencies that have already been identified and criticized by him,
but the notion of an absolute in a humanistic form is more attractive
to him than Bradley's 'perfection', the 'old darwinian, evolutionary
nightmare' 51 which dwarfs the potential of self and intellect and
crushes individual achievement. The idea of God as a personalized
concept presents Lewis with a means for consolidating his own
principles and beliefs within a framework which offers a respite from
the demands of the lower reaches of the unconscious and animal life,
and offers a transcendental route to sublimity by means of thought.
We are emphatically not, argues Lewis, God's children - this is
implicit in organic doctrines, where the partnership between the
all-powerful, protective and yet vengeful deity and the impotent
subject is unequal - but we are his thoughts; the humanistic image of
deity Lewis supports eliminates the Tyronic body:
God must be a sexless image, not the 'matrix' of Alexander, but
a head and its mind; so the body goes, a better way than into the
matrix of space-time. And so we shall be considered as
originating in a mind, too, rather than in a matrix. Also God
must be imagined as indifferent. We do not want a God that is a
kindly uncle, nor do we wish to see a God 'in love.' Any
interest taken in us can be nothing but an intellectual passion:
and surely we should be satisfied to be 'thoughts,' rather than
'children.' 52
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Lewis observes then, that most contemporary philosophies would appear
to affirm, or support a version of deity. This tendency he attributes
to the example of Kant, who, whilst hailed by Reine as a
'God-killer' 53 , nevertheless finds a place for a God within his
system, although Lewis notes - surprisingly perhaps without approval -
that it is a rather chilling, pragmatical deity. Both Alexander and
Whitehead, having 'discoursed empirically upon "Space and Time"
still add "Deity," with a more or less kantian, pragmatical, gesture,
at the end...' 54 . The time-deity is far from Kant's conception of
God, but Lewis's God is just as pragmatically conceived as is Kant's,
in its stress on the intellect as the means and source of
coninunication with the 'absolute'. Like Kant, too, Lewis had deemed
it necessary to outline 'a rationale or "reason" of its own' in order
that his primary purposes might be served. It is notable that the
ambivalence of Lewis's attitude towards deity surfaces most strongly
in his discussion of Kant's influence on the time-cult.
Kant's rational demystification of theology had been thorough, and for
Lewis this was always to be preferred to the emotional alternative of
the 'religionists'. The 'chilling' pragmatic deity of Kant had, in
Lewis's view, gone so far towards the other extreme that a meeting of
opposites was considered an inevitability. The monism of the timeists
was for him paralleled rather too closely in the ultimate Unity made
necessary by the conclusions of Kant's 'practical reason'. 'Oneness',
wherever It originates from, is none other than the embodiment of the
timeist predilection for merging, in theological form, and must be
resisted in the interests of a plurality which must follow from a
philosophy of externals and outlines for surface-creatures. In those
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interests, Lewis warns,
we think it is most true and better to say there is no God. To
us the practical requirements seem to iiTcate the ctrary of
Kant's pragmatical solution - to require the conception of a Many
instead of a One... Evidences of a oneness seem everywhere
apparent. But we need, for practical purposes, the illusion of a
plurality. 55
There could be few more pragmatically-conceived statements of the
notion of deity than this; Lewis shows that he is not unduly or
necessarily concerned with any superfluous speculation about the
existence of God. If God is an intellectual concept, then ideas of
God will be experienced intellectually, rationally: 'God is for us
something to think, not feel' 56
. The reality attributed to intellect
thereby reveals the paradoxical assertion that 'it is we who have to
pretend to be real, if any one has to, not to pretend that God is':
For if He is real, He is so much realler than we that there
is no need for Him to be bolstered up by our 'practical
reasons': and if Ne does not exist, then there is no need at
all to invent Him, with a voltairean gesture. 57
Rational belief in a form of God is therefore perfectly acceptable to
Lewis, but he will not countenance the type of mystical belief which
must obscure the processes of clear, rational thinking in order to
promote any kind of mass religious hypnotism, and to subdue the self
in relation to doctrines that demand unthinking responses. Turning to
notions of deity in a pragmatic pursuit of his own definitions of
reality, Lewis finds the idea of God practically essential to
philosophical investigation in general, but it is also a concept which
is clOsely and deliberately woven into the fabric of his own
specialist version of metaphysics.
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Differing notions of deity that are proposed are accompanied by
attitudes towards the place of that deity within social and
philosophical systems. Here Lewis makes a distinction between the
'secular' mind and the 'religious' mind, corresponding to the debate
between spatialist and temporalist conceptions of metaphysics, that is
between the concepts and ideas that Lewis himself draws upon, and
those which he characterizes as typical of the time-mind. Both
categories - 'secular' and 'religious' - refer to contradictory
conceptions of, and attitudes towards, deity. For example, the
secular, for Lewis, is characteristic of the kind of 'catholic
consciousness', at the base of which he finds the Thomist, Catholic
theology and the philosophy of 'commonsense' perception to which he
adheres. This typically places stress on the 'division and separation
of things' 58upon independence of substance, and external
relationships. The 'catholic consciousness' then, for Lewis, is secular
and non-religious, or irreligious, retaining in matters of deity and
metaphysics the 'objective hardness' that he demands from systems of
thought.
If ideas of God may be constructed on a rational basis, free from
emotionality and mysticism, then for Lewis the traditional Catholic
model of St. Thomas and scholastic rationalism is preferred. Its
direct antithesis is the 'religious' consciousness, which is
'constantly melting and hotly overflowing', and which cannot fix its
theology on any semblance of an absolute. This describes the
pragmatical deity of James and the variable, Time-God of Alexander.
Whilst Thomism posits a world of movement that derives from an unmoved
first Mover, a static, absolute 'uncaused' first cause, Alexander's
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God hands over the problem of cause to the will, entering into the
general flux where Time may be said to step 'into the shoes of
Cause' 59, no more acutely so than in the case of deity. This God
never courts stability, but is always in the state of Becoming; it is
God the child, primitive and naïf, non-infinite and ininanent, the
God-of-action that is governed by the same evolutionary forces as
terrestrial beings, yet is never to achieve an ultimate form.
Thomism, to Lewis, would appear to offer a measured, reasoned way of
approaching the concept of deity, but it is made clear that he finds
the sweeping historical viewpoint of St. Thomas to be in the same
category as the ideas of Spengler, and has deep reservations about the
more conservative and anti-modernistic elements of his doctrine; yet,
he would side with Thomism in competition with the timeist for its
emphasis on distinctness and rationality alone. Even Berkeley's
theology is inherently distasteful to Lewis, being 'dim in its
mentalism, and dark, definitely, sometimes' 60 , leading to an imbalance
of God in his philosophy, which Lewis nevertheless regarded as 'the
best of all possible worlds'.
If Lewis regarded the 'self', in its purest, isolated form as the
vehicle which is most likely to offer us the possibility of
coninunication with what he calls 'an Absolute' or a 'Unity', the
preservation of individuality as a unity in itself, as already noted,
becomes a philosophical priority. Leibniz, as far as Lewis was
concerned, in investing the monad with a direct line to God, might
usefully be cited, but he was careful to clarify his own position.
Lewis felt that Leibniz had liberally and enthusiastically attributed
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'too much divinity' in the course of formulating his philosophy, and
that there was also too great a hierarchical gap in the relationship
between the simple monad and its maker. Lewis's 'self' would have had
to be an extremely rich and superior 'compound' of monads, for he had
envisaged a much more equitable relationship between subject and
deity, in shifting the balance to the direct opposite of the
Leibnizian hierarchy, by hailing the self, or rather the highest
reaches of rationality and experience, as the constructor of a
personalized deity.
In defining his notion of deity, Lewis laid strong emphasis on the
concept of creativity, expressed as thought in the process of
communication with earthly subjects, and mutually celebrated in the
highest intellectual and artistic achievements of man. When Leibniz
referred to the 'divine art' of nature 61, the analogy of God as artist
was far from uncommon, but in Lewis's philosophy, the arts - and
especially the plastic arts - vitally complete the equation which
parallels divine creativity with the highest forms of expression to
which rational man may aspire. Some of the most rarely elevated
passages in Time and Western Man are devoted to the divine
potentiality that Lewis sees in the creative artist. With Aristotle,
he approves the construction of God according to 'what we possess in
our experience', taking our raw material 'from the highest reaches of
62
our own contemplative states' . This, he argues, is in fact all we
have with which to create our God, and that it is 'completely
adequate'. The following quotation illustrates the strength of
conviction and the sheer intellectual pleasure that is displayed by
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Lewis in describing his thoughts on the subject, whilst observing at
the same time that this insight is sadly not available to all:
To at once be perfectly concrete, we can assert that a God that
swam in ...the music of a Bach fugue, or the stormy grandeur of
the genii in the Sistine Ceiling, or the scene of the Judgement
of Signorelli at Orvieto, who moved with the grace of Mozart... -
such a God would be the highest we could imagine; that God would
be so perfect in power and beauty that, however much people may
assert they find it possible to experience a greater God (to whom
all human experience would be relatively imperfect)... we are
entirely justified in not believing them. Such people, indeed,
are usually those who are proved to be congenitally incapable of
experiencing the things from which we draw our analogies.., for
them... it is quite sensible to fix the 'divine' upon some plane
inaccessible to their senses. But we may without ininodesty
conclude that they are referring precisely to that plane that we
have experienced in our enjoyment of our intellectual and
artistic faculties. 63
This statement is made on both a personal and theoretical level; if,
in the practice of his art, and the employment of intellect, Lewis had
been led to experience of the 'divine' as described here, his
Aristotelian personal construction of God is fully realised. It is
certainly secular in an additional sense, since its origins are to be
sought rather in the greek Logos and the pagan classical world
than in conventional Christian theology. Given the framework of the
'catholic consciousness' and Thomism, and taking into account those
ideas Lewis finds congenial in relation to contemporary philosophical
tendencies, itis with Aristotle that the initiative and inspiration
lies, whose world-view and whose 'contemplative God' Lewis places in
direct opposition to the 'evolutionist God of Time and Action'.
Within the context of the purpose of Time and Western Man, the
hierarchical distance between man and God must be virtually dissolved,
in an equalising and connecting link of rational thought processes and
experiences in order that art may be invested with its proper
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metaphysical significance. For Lewis, if that means for some that
such a God, constructed in this way, is accordingly devalued as a
transcendental being, then the function of art is not properly
understood, and will almost certainly never be in many cases. In
equating divinity with the practice of an art, he does not easily
countenance the evolutionist view, that God is in man, and that man is
in God. This would be to affirm the merging process which is
abhorrent to Lewis. Mediation between man and God, since a deity
would be for Lewis transcendent and not inuianent, and external to
man's sensible life, is effected through the operations of not-self,
which is pure thought, and separate from the Tyronic body:
It is in non-personal modes of feeling - that is in thought, or
in feeling that is so dissociated from the hot, imediate egoism
of sensational life that it becomes automatically intellectual -
that the non-religious Western Man has always expressed himself,
at his profoundest, at his purest. That is, of course, the
heritage that is being repudiated in the present 'time'-modes.64
The detachment from the animal body and 'pureness' of thought is the
peak of man's potentiality, and is at the root of Lewis's picture of
God; that 'picture' is a literal, as well as a metaphorical
conception, since Lewis would claim that at the highest reaches of
artistic endeavour, physicality and the sensual is transformed in
conjunction with the spatializing processes of intellect, and is
permanently crystallized into the forms of a concrete, static, and
subli me world, far closer to the cognition of an absolute than any
steamy, 'religious' or mystical experience, by virtue of the
'not-self'. This is indeed that cold, dead, portion of us which is
Spengler's bite-noire, but for Lewis, it holds the key to the self,
external reality and the transcendental rationalism he defends.
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I.4.iii Metaphysics: the Debt to Idealism
Lewis leaves us in little doubt that his endorsement of the philosophy
of Berkeley in Time and Western Man is conceived primarily from the
plastic artist's point of view. He has scant regard for Berkeley's
stifling, all-embracing theology, preferring to deify the processes of
thought and intellect after the pragmatic example of Kant, and would
rather develop a rationalistic notion of self conununing directly with
deity, in his admiration for Leibniz's monad, than accept the
Berkeleyan's total dependency on the mind of God for his world of
objects. Lewis's 'concrete object' is profoundly indebted to
Berkeley's solid world of things, however, and enables him to develop
the seemingly paradoxical formulation of 'concrete idealism' that is
the basis of his attack on the Bergsonians. Both Bergson's and
Berkeley's worlds are strictly mental conceptions, as Lewis concedes.
Yet the whole edifice of his own 'philosophy of the eye' rests on his
contention that these positions exist at extreme ends of a matrix, and
are manifestly regarded as mutually exclusive world-views. Support
for Bergson's philosophy is support for the abstract, for
interpenetration, merging, and monism; it is for Lewis violently
anti-art. A philosophy which is able to uphold and provide
justification for a world of solid, concrete and clearly-divided
objects, and which gives due consideration to the importance of
surfaces and outlines and the prior role of the intellect as a vital
organizing factor inevitably finds favour with a practising artist who
has already defined the essential character of his aesthetics.
Apart from Lewis's obvious doubts about Berkeley's theology, the
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Berkeleyan world of 'common-sense' which, he claims, comes so close to
his own understanding of how objects should be conceived, evidently
presents certain theoretical difficulties if a substantial acceptance
of its terms are envisaged. Described by A.J. Ayer as 'subjective
idealism', although 'very much more than a perverse affront to common
sense' 65, Berkeley's philosophy is often categorized at the extreme of
idealism that persists in the belief that to exist is either to be
perceived or to perceive 66, and which is dedicated towards the denial
of the absolute existence of matter without the benefit of mind. Like
Lewis, Berkeley was convinced of the dangers of admitting 'abstract'
ideas into philosophy; Locke's idea of independent, 'unknowable',
matter was accordingly anathema to Berkeley:
For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to
distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being
perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? 67
'Matter', the subject of the lifelong philosophical conflict of
Berkeley with Locke, is precisely the concept which needs to be
clarified further with regard to Lewis if his ideas are to be
accurately represented, and located in relation to the traditions of
thought he found congenial or otherwise. In consideration of Lewis's
philosophical attitude towards the object itself, it is necessary to
determine whether Lewis shared Berkeley's conviction that matter, as
an inert, unreachable mass, or indeed as a collection of distinct
'unthinking things' has an absolute existence apart from the mind, or
whether he inevitably clung, as an artist, to a world of 'independent'
phenomena. This is a crucial question, which ultimately determines
the way in which his philosophy is to be assessed. There is a case,
depending on the reader's interpretation, for 'classifying' Lewis's
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philosophy within either the basic range of 'idealist' or 'realist'
traditions, and yet another for specifying a position somewhere in
between. Such would be almost universally true in consideration of
any complex philosophical exposition, and any attempt to impose a
rigid classification, dubious as it undoubtedly is on the sole grounds
of oversimplification and distortion, must nevertheless be considered
in context, not least because it is ultimately widely used and
understood as a shorthand method of indicating where sympathies
primarily lie. Hence A.J. Ayer's 'subjective idealism', applied to
Berkeley's philosophy, and by inference to those who accept his ideas
to a significant degree, is a categorization that must be faced with
regard to Lewis, who explicitly acknowledges that for such purposes
his own analysis 'would come under some heading of "idealism"'68.
However, whatever we call ourselves, Lewis claims, we are all
'realists'. This he bases on our 'common-sense' view which brings us
in contact with a stable natural or external world; change is not the
strongest impression we receive since we have to wait, to look, to
detect it 69. The distinction that Lewis makes between perception and
immediate sensation of objects would appear to be reversed in relation
to this formulation; immediate sensation is apparently equivalent to
stability, and perception or conceptualization approximates to time
and change. But the idea which counts for Lewis is that of the
strength of the impression received. What cannot be expressed in a
complete, definite form, and perceived as such, belongs to the world
of ephemeral sensations, however intensely the cognitive process works
in order to take hold of those impressions70.
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Yet, Berkeley's 'common-sense' world does differ profoundly from
Lewis's, if not primarily in terms of effect, then certainly on
theological and causal grounds. Both worlds are built of solid,
tangible objects, and Berkeley is very far from asserting that objects
simply disappear when not perceived by us; they are emphatically not
ephemeral illusions 71 . The strength of perception to which Berkeley
refers is God-caused, however; if objects are not directly perceived
by us, they are nevertheless ultimately perceived in the mind of God.
For Berkeley, we can thus be sure of their concrete existence. Such a
faith is beyond Lewis, whose notion of deity is not mystical or candid
enough to support his external world of unreal, but tangible objects.
Claiming to adhere more closely than Berkeley to the pagan world of
Classical coninon-sense censured by Russell, Lewis points out that 'of
course the plain man would scarcely recognize himself in the shape
Berkeley attributes to him'. Lewis is ready to acknowledge a deity of
pure thought, but cognition of the world is decidedly the province of
man. Our strong impressions of nature are the work of the conscious
mind, whilst the unconscious mind, given its due importance, rather
than the timeists' falsely elevated view, is responsible for
maintaining 'the mountains, tables and chairs in imaginative
sub-existence, when not directly objects of perception' 72. The
concept of God does not enter into the equation at the same point as
in Berkeley's philosophy, and it does not assume a central role for
Lewis; its main function lies in the nature of the relation of deity
to the separate issue of the primacy of ego, or self, not in the
cognition of objects.
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Lewis's aesthetic delight in laying claim on his own behalf to
Berkeley's 'extremist' philosophy of façades and 'surface-creatures'
is predictable, and consistent with his own aims. What is perhaps not
so evident, is the opportunity it gives Lewis to reclaim for the self,
in mitigation of extremism, the 'insides' that had been roundly
denounced in Schopenhauer's 'philosophy of the intestines', and to
re-shape them, not as blind, thought-less will, but as anatomical and
common-sense 'facts' known to the dissectionist and artist, and simply
reminiscent of the surfaces which surround them. But Lewis wishes to
distinguish without a hint of compromise, his own complex position
towards the function of our inner mental life from the formulations of
time-philosophies. He may speak literally of physical organs and
processes, but the core of his philosophy depends on how successfully
he is able to restore a specific understanding of the processes of the
unconscious self in the wake of a sustained attack upon the Bergsonian
versions. Since '"esse is percipi"' forbids all entrails', and since
Lewis's theoretical position is dependent upon a view of man's inner
life which foregrounds the imaginative and creative functions of the
unconscious mind, investing it with a vital part in our cognition of
the external world, it is expedient that he should allow Berkeley to
play the role of extremist. Lewis's own case, in appealing to the
reason and sense of his reader, is made to occupy the position of
moderation and plausibility by comparison:
...I think we should be justified in saying that by some
analogical process the inside of an elm or a cedar, for example,
could be said to be there, although it has never been perceived.
When the food goes into the body we can feel it, of course, so
that gives us back our own insides, even on the berkeleyari
basis. 73
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Another layer of 'common-sense' is in this way imposed upon the
Berkeleyan structure and whilst Lewis is intent upon remaining
faithful to its spirit as a 'surface-phi1osophy'cannot accept many
of its fundamental assumptions in the interests of his own world-view.
Berkeley's opposition to the idea of a world of 'things' or 'matter'
as distinct from the appearances of those things to us does not
accurately characterize Lewis's attitude. Naturally hostile to
'matter' as undifferentiated mass, Lewis must nevertheless be able to
distinguish differences between 'things'. This is not incompatible
with Berkeley's view, but Lewis tends to favour a variant notion of
the Kantian 'thing-in-itself' which serves to represent the true
nature of what he takes to be reality, and which is non-material; but
whilst for Kant, this will remain unknowable, for Lewis it can be
approached through the transformations effected by the artist. Thus,
to recall the mentalist matrix used by Lewis, comprising the strictly
'unreal' worlds of Berkeley versus Bergson, it is the artist's
'concrete' armchair that achieves the most profound degree of reality,
that
and the scientist's molecular or 'abstract' versionis the least
real	 The 'thing-in-itself' does therefore exist independently of
appearance for Lewis, but it does not approximate to the will of
Schopenhauer, nor to the élan vital of Bergson, nor to the
transcendental idealism of Kant; and it is not represented by Locke's
unreachable mass, or matter. It is related to the creative powers of
artistic expression, a 'concrete', perceptual, but an emphatically
un-mystical magic by which the 'supernatural sources and
potentialities of our existence' are tapped 75. The intense activity
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of the artist is paralleled for Lewis on an 'everyday' basis simply by
the act of perception, which is intellectually creative and is able to
organize, transform and concretize forms from a constant stream of
sense-impressions:
To make things endure (to make something solid, relatively
indestructible, like a pyramid) is of course, ... a sort of
magic, and a more difficult one, than to make things vanish,
change and disintegrate... Of these opposite functions of magic
we daily perform one, in our sense-perception activity, better
than magic could. This function we justly call 'creativeness':
...The objects of our perception, with their mystifying
independence and air of self-sufficiency ... are far more uncanny
than the unity we experience in our subjective experience. These
strange thins, that stand out against a background of mystery,
with their air of being eternal, and which really appear to be
'caused' by nothing that we can hold and fix, and from which we
can see them being actually produced, ... are the finished
product of our perceptive faculty... of the organizing activity
of our minds. When we say we see them, in reality what we
perceive is not the direct datiiTof sensation, but an elaborate
and sophisticated entity... 76
Such entities for Lewis are created in the mind rather than passively
seen, and cannot therefore be said to exist independently of it, which
is in substantial agreement with Berkeley's formulation.
It is important to note that Berkeley rejects the absolute existence
of 'things' or 'matter', but I wish to suggest that Lewis, in
accordance with his stress on the physicality of the world, his
'open-air proofs' and his insistence on dealing with 'what is directly
in front of all our eyes' and in his subsequent need to re-affirm the
independence and solidity of his object in the absence of the
Berkeleyan controlling deity, successfully maintains the concept of
'things' as a consequence of his aesthetic beliefs. In short, Lewis's
idea of creativity has the concretizing force of Berkeley's God, and
the practice of art enables an approach to a kind of noumenal reality
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that is signally represented in the 'everyday' phenomenal object of
perception or even more closely in the art-object. 'Phenomenal' for
Lewis is still clearly an intellectually subjective and mind-dependent
concept; the term, 'concept' must be emphasized for him, since in
speaking of a 'concept' of the phenomenal world, the Berkeleyan denial
of matter is retained.	 But the meaning of phenomenal is still for
Lewis heavily dependent on that early Platonic distinction between the
sense-appearance of an object in contrast with the 'real' object as
apprehended by the intellect. As his position finally rests with the
mentalism of Berkeley, Lewis is left with the apparent difficulty of
reconciling the Classical model of 'coninon-sense' reality with the
'subjective idealism' of Berkeley, and with affirming his stance as a
'realist'.
However, as Lewis's view of perception is constructed around the
operations of both the conscious and unconscious mind, which cohere in
a mutually understood notion or idea of a 'connon-sense' world where
an independent world of things is the strongest impression received,
it is perfectly acceptable to Lewis that he should maintain the
seemingly contradictory stance that the physical world is both real
(in the Classical sense) and unreal (in the Berkeleyan formulation) at
one and the same time. In common-sense parlance, it is real, whilst
philosophically it is manifestly unreal, in the same way he makes the
distinction between nature as being sensationally 'real' and
perceptually 'unreal'. This is thus not seen to be a problem for
Lewis, whose claim to support a vivid realism and the kind of
'subjective idealism' found in Berkeley was not automatically to be
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regarded as a priori incompatible with it; there would be no
hesitation on the part of Lewis in accepting his characterization of
perceptual reality as • consistent seeming' and sensational appearance
as 'mere seeming' 77, but to this Berkleyan construction of
'common-sense' perception, Lewis adds a another view of the 'real'
which brings into play the transforming power of art occupying the
place of Berkeley's God.
What must be emphasized at every point is that the physical world is
solid and dead, never animated or infested with a false sense of
'time'. This is what truly threatens Lewis's aesthetically conceived
version of metaphysics. In his close concern for Berkeley's
philosophy, Lewis was aware that his would be termed 'idealist'. This
was of much less concern to him than what he identified as the modern
tendency towards 'unanimity' that persisted in the merging of
'realism' and 'idealism', an impulse implicitly contained along with
the 'comon worship of Time and Change', and which Lewis traces to the
example of Kant:
When Kant was woken from his 'dogmatic slumber' he proceeded to
invent what he called 'criticism,' and since the main
characteristic of that slumber was that it was 'dogmatic,' his
'criticism' was in the nature of things an undogmatical gesture.
He became the greatest of all 'mediators' of the modern age... It
is... highly questionable if this particular 'critical' gesture
of Kant's was such a blessing... or even... so undogmatical: for
an orthodoxy of a critical order, founded in the 'meeting of
extremes,' has now become a dogma. 78
It would probably have been better, Lewis concludes, if Kant had not
been woken from his slumberings after all, since in his view the
problems he identifies as a consequence of contemporary chronologism
are directly attributable to Kant's 'trick' of philosophical and
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critical 'mediation'.
In postulating what I suggest is an essentially three-fold formulation
of reality utilizing received distinctions between conscious
perception, unconscious or motor-sensation and creative (imaginative,
artistic) categorizations, Lewis has gone far beyond what Berkeley
intended. In so far as the third category is concerned, I would argue
that, despite Lewis's resistance to the Kantian systematization that
he places at the root of crucial aspects of the time-philosophy, there
are specific areas of Lewis's own thought that reveal deeply Kantian
influences, both in metaphysics and aesthetics.
In Time and Western Man, the discussion devoted to Kant is cursory
compared to the amount of space Lewis devotes to the 'space-timeists'
and direct followers of Bergson. In respect of what there is, much of
it is negative, and as indicated above, Kant is seen to play a major
role in the process of philosophical unanimity that characterizes the
time-cult itself. Lewis wants, and needs, clear distinctions between
positions, whatever terms are used to describe them, so that
chronologism may be easily identified by its characteristic elements
and judged on its demerits. So it is for the mediating role, surely
not for his critical systematization and clarification, that Kant is
censured. There was no sensible justification for Lewis to include
Kant in the opposing Bergsonian camp in the manner that was deemed
appropriate to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, who were nevertheless both
thinkers whom he admired. If Kant's ideas were not seen by Lewis as
destructive in the same way as the views of other precursors, there
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were aspects which he felt were drawn upon and exploited by
time-philosophers in pursuit of their analyses. According to Lewis,
Samuel Alexander's principle of the 'emergent quality' from whence all
life - including mind - is organically 'grown', owes its inception to
Kant:
It is produced by the same manipulation of Kant's idea of
'intensive quality,' which is at the bottom of Bergson's
conception of time - a use, it is hardly necessary to say, to
which Kant did not anticipate its being put. 79
Although Lewis acquits Kant of blame in the matter, it is a central
issue if Bergson's conception of time is attributed to a Kantian
source.
The terms 'extensive' and 'intensive', in the context of Alexander's
doctrine of emergence, may be taken to denote a general quality which
either allows divisibility into spatial parts (extensive), or it does
not (intensive). The application of the latter term does have
relevance to the notion of a one-substance universe in which spatial
divisions do not occur, or if they seem to occur, are manifestly
false 80. Such is the 'timeist' position for Lewis, and it would
appear to accord with Kant's own characterization of the 'schema of
quality', which is
the synthesis of sensation or perception with the representation
of time; it is the filling of time. 81
It is the interpretation of Kant's terriiinology to which Lewis objects;
the 'filling of time' with actions or thoughts by man is a
comon-sense formulation, but the pumping of dead, immobile objects
with the effects of time is a travesty of the plain-man's view.
Indeed, Kant's notion of the value and function of time would have
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found favour with Lewis: it is, Kant writes, 'nothing but the form of
inner sense' nor can it be a 'determination of outer appearances; it
has to do neither with shape nor position, but with the relation of
representations in our inner state' 82 . Time, for Kant, is only the
mediatory 'condition of outer appearances', and denies any claim that
is made for time as a form of 'absolute reality', since it is
'nothing'. The chronologists' borrowings from Kant are strictly
selective; although the concept of 'intensive quality' may be used in
support of their ideas, an absolutist interpretation of the function
of time must be substituted for Kant's valuation.
In relation to Berkeley's version of the 'common-sense' tradition, we
find that Lewis was obliged to make quite wholesale readjustments of
emphasis and content before it could be said to approximate to his own
view. If Berkeley's philosophy, despite its stress on the 'concrete',
represents a too-theological extreme for Lewis, then Kant may be
placed in the opposite position. I would suggest that there are some
direct correspondences between Lewis's common-sense world and Kant's
empirical realism that are not revealed in a parallel comparison with
Berkeley's philosophy.
Kant's concept of space is seen by Lewis as 'about identical with the
popular or "common-sense" view'; it is as instinctive to man as the
sensuous space inhabited by animals, 'installed at the very centre of
our perceptive faculty', and is independent of the content which it
supports. The empty space of man thus described, a place of distinct
objects, is Lewis's, and is contrasted with the interpenetrating,
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mental, inner world of direct sensation that comprises the space that
creatures occupy: Bergson's world of dure. Both space and time, for
Kant, are not included as concepts or categories83 , but are both forms
of intuition. Time, which is the form of our inner senses and states
of mind for Kant, is elevated by Bergson: space, that which Kant
characterizes as the intuition, or form of our outer sense, is the
realm of the external appearances of the world, of objective things,
and is celebrated by Lewis. The mediation of Kant between these forms
of intuition would not have found favour with Lewis, especially in
view of Benda's assessment that Kant, like Bergson, tended to
subordinate space to time 84. However Kant, in stressing the intuitive
function within a rationalized systematization of space, to the extent
that he hails the imagination as the intermediary between the
functions of sense-perception and reason, provides Lewis with a solid
philosophical model for his own interest in the intellectual control
of the inner senses and creative impulses.
If Kant's philosophy is to be categorized in relation to the
traditions of thought which preceded and followed it, it is useful to
refer to the dual strands of empiricist realism and transcendental
idealism which inform its procedures 85. In relation to Lewis, this
classification helps to bring into view the complex strands of
continental and British empirical thought which had been absorbed into
his philosophy, and enables a clearer consideration of what may be
regarded consequently as uniquely 'Lewisian'. Lewis would have had no
basic quarrel with Kant's basically empirical formulation of the
phenomenal world; in pointing out that the 'real' for Kant was that
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which related only to us 86, contrasted with the fundamentality to the
time-philosopher of space-time (with the emphasis, of course on the
latter), Lewis was stating, in another format, his own beliefs. If
the notion of 'real' at all is to be considered, he reflects, it has
to be that which we can 'irmiediately know and of which we have some
87
experience'
Berkeley's philosophy is more congenial to Lewis than Kant's in
respect of his adherence to his artist's world of solid objects, but
the phenomenalism which was seen to be a necessary consequence of
Berkeley's vision - a kind of Berkeley without God - could not support
a philosophy that placed an emphasis on a reality which is projected
beyond the imediate appearances of those objects. Lewis's idealism
cannot be designated as 'transcendental' as defined by Kant88 , not
because it stresses the concreteness of the external world, but in the
way it assumes a connecting link, or two-way process of communication
between types of phenomenal and noumenal worlds. The appearances of
the external world, although ultimately subject to mind, are for Lewis
the base materialsout of which, subject to the transformations made in
the creative process, the noumenal world may be approached. The
relief that art offers for Schopenhauer, and the aesthetic
justification of Nietzsche could not in any sense be ratified by Kant,
who considered that aesthetic experience, (primarily of nature) does
not supply a route to a transcendent world, but allows us only to
consider the possibility of such a world89.
Lewis is indebted to Kant for the systematization of the
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'thing-in-itself', and the notion, contrary to the protestations of
the time-philosophers, that in order for change to be possible, an
unchanging substance must, a priori, be required 90 . In the place of
Kant's 'thing-in-itself' stands the 'vortex' for Lewis: they are
schematically related notions, although their wider philosophical
ramifications are remote, and the mirror images are reversed; Kant's
noumenal world stands outside, or beyond phenomenal experience whilst
the vortex is the still centre of the flux. The vortex, which is
Lewis's noumenon, and is foreshadowed in the disembodied not-self, is
similarly independent of time but is considered to be parallel to the
empty, isolated space of common-sense, and true to the notion of an
essential void, which must contain neither space nor time. It gives
as much order to Lewis's intuitive account of creativity as Kant's
systematic and transcendental method imposes an order upon an
essentially intuitive account of morality. The outcome in each case
accurately reflects the interests of the originator.
A schematic rendering, or sumary of the main philosophical principles
which emerge from Time and Western Man demonstrates the force of this
point. If we seek to represent Lewis's three-fold notion of reality
as a structure comprising two concentric circles, the second
superimposed upon the first, and both sharing an infinite core, it is
possible to identify the relationships between each layer in the
hierarchy, for Lewis's philosophy assumes the possibility of
interactive processes between the intellect, intuition and creativity.
The band which forms the lower circle represents Time, the flux, the
duree of Bergson, and the scientific, atomistic, interpenetrative mass
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of Alexander and Whitehead, the evolutionist world-as-history of
Spengler, and Nietzsche's cult of Dionysus. It is also equivalent to
the will of Schopenhauer, the animal world of sensation, instinct and
raw intuition. As the realm of the unconscious, it is replete with
image and illusion, and the unreality of a dream-world. Yet the
deepest stirrings of the creative urge originate in the flux, as Lewis
is ready to acknowledge, but must await the transforming power of
man's intellect in order that these might be concretized into art.
The second band of the structure, superimposed upon the first, is
Space; Lewis does not seek to falsely isolate Time from Space, but
wishes to claim theoretical priority for the latter in the face of
undue and extreme contemporary stress on the former.
'Space-Timeists', as Lewis notes, should really have their terms
reversed, since this would more accurately reflect that bias. Space
therefore is not exclusive, but should be perceived as a 'superior'
overlay to Time; it absorbs sensation, intuition and the unconscious,
but subjects the elements of the flux to the controlling influence of
intellect and the conscious mind. The equation of sensation and
perception cements the notion of 'self' as a conscious, thinking,
individual being, and objects, which are mere illusions and
mirror-images as present to the unconscious, are rendered as concrete
objects of perception in, and by the mind. Objects are still 'unreal'
in the Berkeleyan sense, but are solid and tangible. The operations
of the creative mind thus result in our external world of surfaces,
outlines and separate things.
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If the conscious mind plucks the images sensed by the unconscious out
of the 'stream' and isolates them by rendering as concrete objects,
then the artist, for Lewis, is empowered to immortalize them. The
core of this tripartite structure is represented by the vortex itself,
the still centre that alone lays claim to the 'real', which allows the
object to be plucked from the confines of the unconscious, to
transcend the limitations of the conscious life, and assume an
independent status. We are able to construct therefore, a 'picture'
of Lewis's philosophy that places realism as its ultimate goal, but
assumes an idealist emphasis on mind or intellect as the essential
creative enabling force. The art-object, as the symbol of this
process, suffices to indicate the reality which is approached as a
consequence of an essentially intellectual activity, shaping and
transforming the raw materials originally presented in the region of
flux. The vortex is thus the one concept which encompasses the
complementary elements of Lewis's pragmatic thought-god, the not-self,
Kant's noumenal reality and Schopenhauer's Nirvana, and is able to
provide a schematized, philosophically-coherent formulation of the
notion of an aesthetic justification of the universe that Nietzsche
had somewhat vaguely envisaged.
This outline of Lewis's philosophy does run counter to the method of
presentation in Time and Western Man, but serves two main functions.
One of these is that it clearly reveals a coherence of thought that
may have otherwise have been overlooked. In the text, the vortex has
been all but named by Lewis as the guiding principle of his
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philosophy; in a comment at the close of his exposition he reiterates
the purpose of the work:
It has not been with a view to promoting any theory of my own,
however, that I undertook the writing of this essay, but only to
supply a fairly detailed analysis of the prevalent time-doctrine.
To specify further or even to outline the particular be1iefsthat
are explicit in my criticism would require another book. That I
propose soon to publish. But, as far as this particular critical
task is concerned, I now have completed it. 91
Lewis did not publish another detailed philosophical study with the
purpose and scale of Time and Western Man, but many of the ideas
expressed here had surfaced prior to this study in his critical
writings and commentaries on art. I suggest that the content and
purpose of Lewis's philosophy becomes much more intelligible if one
always bears in mind his prior motives. In tracing through the
various strands of Lewis's philosophy in the context of the major
systems of thought which have informed and shaped it, one 'interest'
remains paramount, and has determined which ideas should be censured,
and which might lend a measure of support to the formulation of his
theoretical scheme. At no time does Lewis accept propositions which
could invalidate or compromise his world view in favour of that which
would be deemed alien to the interests of the visual artist. If this
much is clear, it is more difficult to pinpoint precisely what Lewis's
aesthetically-defined metaphysics - if indeed 'metaphysics' is the
correct term - amounts to. This is largely due to the method employed
in Time and Western Man, reminiscent of an Hegelian thesis-antithesis
progression which necessitates the rehearsal of opposing ideas and
objections which do not always come from Lewis himself. He draws upon
many different sources for his evidence, and may on occasion use the
168
same source in a different, sometimes contradictory manner. This
ambivalence stems from these and other reasons, and a clear summary of
the basic ideas is necessary here: my Chapter 6, on Vorticism,
elaborates on the roots and purpose of Lewis's idiosyncratic
methodology in identifying a specific 'logic of contradictions'. But
the second function of my schematized version of Lewis's philosophical
ideas works towards establishing the point that principally, a reading
of Time and Western Man is partial if a parallel study of Lewis's
aesthetic principles - derived from practice - is not made. If, as I
argue, the philosophical work is in essence, an exploration of the
consequences of adopting the essential characteristics of the vortex
as the anchoring point of a world-view in the context of metaphysics,
then its full meaning is obscured if this concept is de-centralized.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1.	 TWM, p.38.
2.	 See Tomlin's essay, 'The Philosophical Influences', in Wyndham
Lewis: A Revaluation, edited by Meyers, op cit., pp.29-46. A
longer study by Tomlin of Lewis's philosophy in the context of
other writings is to be found in the pamphlet, Wyndham Lewis,
Writers and their Work no.64 (London, 1955). In 'Reflections on
"Time and Western Man"', in Agenda (pp.97-108), Tomlin examines
the critical dimensions of Lewis's work, which he regards as the
key to his whole oeuvre, in the context of the intellectual
climate of his day.
3.	 ABR, p.391.
4.	 ibid.
5.	 'Bad art' for Lewis would always emerge from practices which were
allied to elements of chronological thinking. Hence Futurism,
which directly espoused the tenets of Bergsonism, was already
doomed. Similarly, the later Surrealist movement, dedicated to
automatism, primitivism and the 'naïf', and to plumbing the
depths of dreams and the unconscious for its artistic imagery,
could never approach the coolness and external delineation of
Classicism for Lewis. In response to Surrealism (or
'Super-Realism' as it was known), he coined the term,
'Super-Naturism' which was intended to oppose the employment of
what he regarded as random, sub-conscious and indulgent imagery
in art, preferring to lay emphasis on the intellectual
transformations of the external world by the artist. See the
essay, 'Super-nature versus Super-real' (WLA, pp.11-64).
6.	 A review by David Corbett
	 of SueEllen Campbell's
book, The Enemy Opposite: the Outlaw Criticism of Wyndham Lewis
(1988) suggests an attempt to 'oversysternize' Lewis's criticism
with regard to the 'Enemy' persona and Time and Western Man.
Corbett	 arguesthat Lewis's 'discontinuities' should be
allowed and recognised, as part of his intellectual development
and conscious critical strategy. In relation to my study, and in
the way in which I suggest Lewis's Vorticist aesthetics had been
formulated and expressed (see Chapter 6), this is agreed. It is
also perhaps necessary to add to this point the statement that
methods should not be confused with aims with regard to Lewis,
and that whilst he revels in surface 'discontinuities', his basic
concerns as a practising artist and theoretician are consistently
pursued. (See David Corbett, 	 Enemy News 27, Winter
1988, pp.22-23).
7.	 TWM, p.6.
8.	 ibid.
9.	 See TWM, p.417: 'The most characteristic part of the theory is
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where the 'sensum' is a stick seen partly in water, and so
appearing bent. According to this theory it, of course, is bent.
...For the bent stick is an example of a sort of frozen
movement.'
10. TWM, p.418.
11. The characterization of the 'innocent eye' which Lewis traces to
Descartes, is brought to bear by time-philosophers in the 'Theory
of Sensa'; it is, argues Lewis, 'of the nature of the cartesian
return to naked, direct, vision. It implies to some extent the
tabula rasa. It is temperamentally, and in time, still more
nearly affiliated with Bergson's plunge into the sensational
flux, or with Alexander's more recent bergsonist doctrine of
"emergence"' (TWM, p.413). It is precisely this innocence which
Lewis challenges.
12. TWM, p.373.
13. TWM, p.418.
14. TWM, pp.408-409.
15. This is Alexander's doctrine of 'event-fact', '...a sort of flock
of spatial apparitions made up of pure instantaneous sensations,
enclosed in a temporal pen or corral' (TWM, p.429). Lewis's
example is from Russell's 'time-picture' of a wallpaper that is a
different entity, not only from year to year, but in the smallest
possible unit of time to the extent that it is never fixed.
16. See TWM, p.413, p.420.
17. TWM, p.212.
18. TWM, p.478.
19. See TWM, p.433.
20. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (1914). Second
revised edition of 1926, sixth impression (London, 1972).
Lecture IV, p.107.
21. ibid.
22. See TWM, p.423.
23. This passage from Berkeley is quoted by Lewis in TWM, p.473. In
A.C. Fraser's edition (The Works of George Berkeley, 4 volumes
Oxford, 1901) the passage reads, '...out of the minds or thinking
things' (...Of the Principles of Human Knowledge, I, 259) where
Lewis has 'of thinking things'. There are some additional minor
errors in transcription. In Fraser, Berkeley has emphasized the
word, 'absolute' (which Lewis does not) and the emphasis on
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pages later, Lewis does explicitly
emphasis on the term, 'absolute',
to it in the context of his own ar
things' is Lewis's here. A few
acknowledge Berkeley's
as he wishes to draw attention
gument (see TWM, p.478).
24. TWM, p.478.
25. TWM, p.413.
26. TWM, p.170.
27. TWM, p.480.
28. Lewis himself, in a discussion of Whitehead, fields the idea from
a detractor's point of view that this is his primary concern, and
is aware that objections will be raised regarding his bias; his
critic might claim, for example, that 'the machinery of the
physicist is one thing, and the predilection of the artist for
concrete objects is another, and that in my criticism it is only
that predilection that is at stake' (TWM, p.204). Lewis cannot
seriously claim to refute this charge comprehensively, since his
concern for physical science amongst the philosophical interests
he evinces are inspired by his wish to retain the 'concrete
object', an artistic predilection, certainly, but it is also an
intellectual choice. Instead, he goes on the attack; Whitehead,
who is 'all for the poets and the artists' appears to have
brought into the 'scientific' debate precisely the interests for
which Lewis anticipates censure.
29. TWM, p.480.
30. TWM, p.381.
31. TWM, p.430.
32. See the extended discussion of Russell's ideas in TWM,
pp.427 ff.
33. See TWM, p.406: 'We have shown the attack upon the Subject to be
one of the ultimate phases of that universal attack upon
"Substance," and upon the common-sense of the Schoolmen, or,
behind that rationalist body of dogma, upon the beliefs of the
Classical World'.
The fanaticism of the time-cult is thus outlined by Lewis: 'The
disintegration of the world-picture of "common-sense" effected by
the introduction of private and subjective time-systems, by the
breaking up of the composite space of the assembled senses into
an independent space of touch, a space of sight, a visceral
space, and so forth: the conversion of "the thing" into a series
of discrete apparitions - all this comprehensive and meticulous
attack upon the very basis of "common-sense" (the term used in
philosophy for the ordered picture of the classic world, and
equally the instinctive picture we inherit from untold
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doubt, but it does not seem to bear the mark of a truth-telling
or veridical passion, so much as a romantic and fanatical impulse
of some description' (TWM, p.426).
34. TWM, p.320.
35. TWM, p.362.
36. See TWM, p.345: 'Professor Watson represents the most powerful
movement of extreme positivism in american psychology to-day.
And this movement is deeply influencing english work in the same
field and in philosophy: Mr. Bertrand Russell being its most
distinguished adherent, withholding his assent only on one
capita] point, that of the "image."'
37. Whatever world-concepts one supports, Lewis observes, the effects
that we see every day are not altered; his theories of dead
Matter and the organic version give 'in all important respects
identical results... From that point of view the whole argument
is much ado about nothing. Where the great change occurs, or
where is it sought to make it occur, is in our heads, only. It
is our attitude to the external world that it is proposed to
modify, not the external world itself, of 'materialist' practice,
for that is impossible.' What is vitally at stake for Lewis is
in the values or attitudes adopted, which depends on individual
bias: 'It is art or metaphysics that is in question, rather than
fact or natural science' (TWM, pp.426-427).
38. TWM, p.433.
39. Leibniz clearly explains the concept of the monad in The
Monadology (1714), translated by Robert Latta (Oxford7T898).
'1. The Monad...is nothing but a simple substance, which enters
into compounds. By "simple" is meant "without parts"' (p.217).
Lewis is inclined to read 'self' for monad, where Leibniz himself
has 'substance'.
40. In the 'Introduction' to the Catalogue of the Tate Gallery
Exhibition in July-August 1956, Lewis had written: 'I had at all
times the desire to project a race of visually logical beings;
and this I believe I attained in the constructions named Tank in
the Clinic (PLATE II) and The Mud Clinic (PLATE III). Such
pictures as The Stations of the Dead (PLATE IV) and even the
Surrender orwarce]ona (PLATE V) are an extension of this
intention. Whether as a banshee, a strutting soldier, or the
invalid inhabitant of a Mud Clinic, my creatures of that kind
served a visual purpose. They were not created as we create
characters in a book, but with some purely visual end in view.
If I had given them a name it would probably have been monads'
(WLOA, pp.452-453).
41. The full title of the essay to which Lewis refers reads:
'Considerations sur les Principes de Vie et sur les Natures
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42. TWM, p.323.
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artificial automata' (Leibniz, op cit., p.254).
45. TWM, p.309.
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63. ...Now this body of a living being or of an animal is always
organic; for, as every Monad is, in its own way, a mirror of the
universe, and as the universe is ruled according to a perfect
order, there must also be order in that which represents it,
i.e. in the perceptions of the soul, and consequently there must
be order in the body, through which the universe is represented
in the soul' (Leibniz, op cit., p.253). Although Lewis would
resist the organicism of Leibniz, and he would put intellect in
the place of 'soul', the characterization of man's animal nature
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47. Leibniz, op cit., p.266.
48. Leibniz, op cit., p.233.
49. Leibniz, op cit., p.219.
50. TWM, p.396.
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54. TWM, p.385.
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Mozart are conspicuously more acceptable to Lewis's model of a
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Warnock's study, Berkeley (Harmondsworth, 1953).
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the Principles of Human Knowledge (in Fraser's edition, I, -
Philosophical Works, 1705-21).
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69. TWM, p.211.
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Warnock (op cit., p.158), to say the senses infer; it is only
people who infer. This would not be disputed by Lewis.
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view' (Berkeley, op cit., p.273), and he distinguishes between
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78. TWM, pp.251-252.
79. TWM, pp.440-441.
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'intensive quality' as a direct equivalent to Alexander's
'emergent quality': 'This ne, intensive quality, is the
"meaning," however, of thalwhich it is not a quantitative
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higher plane of things, leaving the group behind it on the lower
level, in what seems a rather undemocratic way...' it has
'"emerged" in more and more complex "quality," and more and more
intense meaning... according to this system, things will probably
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81. From the 'Schematism' of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
(1781), translated by Norman Kemp smith (London, 1929, reprinted
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82. Kant, 'Transcendental Aesthetic', op cit., p.77.
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Scruton, Kant (Oxford, 1982), pp.28-31.
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91. TWM, p.480-481.
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PART II
ART THEORY AND THE CULT OF TIME
CHAPTER 5
OPPOSING FORCES: THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN AESTHETIC
If the development and statement of Lewis's philosophy in Time and
Western Man can be traced to certain fundamental beliefs about the
nature and function of the visual arts in an intellectual culture, an
examination of the foundations and sources of those beliefs becomes a
pressing priority. This is not solely an historical task in the sense
of gauging or interpreting the perceived 'causes' which are said to
lead to a determining influence of one discipline upon another, taking
into account the evidence at hand which terminates at 1927 and the
publication of Lewis's philosophical work, discussed in Part I of this
thesis. It is equally important to emphasize the retrospective
framework of much of Lewis's later writings on art and aesthetics, the
basic elements of which had been initially measured in Time and
Western Man against types of philosophical analysis, and which had
proved to be confirmed and sustained by the juxtaposition.
178
Lewis's retrospective views of his earlier activities and statements
on art are confidently affirmed, I would suggest, in view of the
philosophical stance which was worked out in detail by 1927. No ether
in-depth study of philosophy was to follow, but the critique of the
time-philosophy is to be found in various forms, expressed in Lewis's
writings and meditations on art. Having found a congenial
philosophical perspective, Lewis put it explicitly to work in the
service of art and aesthetics, a theoretical perspective which could	 -
be brought to bear as an intellectually coherent defence against
tendencies in art which he defined as universally destructive and
personally abhorrent.
Therefore, to effect some kind of an historical closure at 1927 would
be to distort the lifelong depth of Lewis's concerns about his
profession and its practice, and it is evident that much insight is to
be gained by considering writings which continued the aesthetics-
philosophy dialogue after the publication of Time and Western Man,
with Lewis refining his ideas in relation to a philosophical stance
from which he never departed. It is important to stress however, that
as modern art, and the values attached to It changed around him, his
own beliefs did not remain static; but once convinced at an early
stage of the evils of Bergsonism in all its recognisable cultural,
aesthetic and philosophical ramifications, any manifestation in art
that would appear to be based, wittingly or unwittingly, on
chronological precepts, was to be comprehensively resisted by Lewis.
This included so-called progressive or radical forms of modern art
that depended on notions which could be explicitly equated with the
179
time-cult, such as 'primitivism' and associated ideas that purported
to 'return' man to a primal, pre-rational state, free of the
domination of rationality and intellect.
I would therefore argue in the light of this that the foundations of
this counter-attack on irrationalism were already laid prior to
Vorticism in respect of Lewis's experiences as a young artist in
England at the turn of the century. These were subsequently visually
and intellectually articulated in a Vorticist aesthetic which
struggled to define itself in opposition to Futurist and Cubist
interests, to be systematized in the critical writings of the l920s
and beyond.
II.5.i	 Legacies of Romanticism
The analysis of the 'Romantic mind' in Book I of Time and Western Man
is a fundamental reference point for any undertaking which attempts to
outline and assess early influences on the development of Lewis's
aesthetic beliefs, and to place those beliefs in the later context of
his declared philosophical 'system'. 'Romance', as Lewis defines it,
in its many forms, represents in essence the types of cultural, social
and artistic expression which are equivalent to, and paralleled by,
the time-philosophy of Bergson and his followers. These are the
'concrete manifestations of the time-mind', the outward effects of an
underlying system of thought which directs and sustains certain kinds
of artistic practice. The importance of Lewis's attitude to 'Romance'
l8
becomes clear if we consider his characteristic declaration that the
outward effects of the time-cult in the arts are what drew him first
to examine the possible theoretical underpinnings; that his analysis
and questioning of philosophical precepts followed hard upon a
formulation of aesthetic objections to those effects.
The foundations of such objections in Lewis's case rest on an intimate
acquaintance with the traditions and attitudes that he attacks. As I
have outlined in Part I of this thesis, Lewis's early involvement with
the ideas of Bergson, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche reveal profound
intellectual and emotional debts that are never entirely obscured by
vehement repudiation. In terms of attitude, style, temperament and
cast of mind, the romantic legacy that is deemed by Lewis to embrace
the precursors of the time-philosophy is equally relevant to him. One
who specifically recognizes and perpetuates a classical-versus-
romantic dichotomy in whatever form, does not operate independently of
the traditions he juxtaposes; on the contrary, Lewis's detailed
concern with the composition of the romantic mind and attitudes which
are associated with it is accomplished in the light of close personal
knowledge and experience.
The period of travel in Europe, between 1902-1908, provides an
historical context for any statement about the nature and extent of
Lewis's residual romanticism. In his biography of Lewis, Jeffrey
Meyers' account of Lewis's 'bohemian adventures' 1 testifies to the
kind of company he relished, the café haunts frequented by earnest
young artists and intellectuals; and Lewis's own letters and memoirs
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recall the often hand-to-mouth existence that could cheerfully be
borne by the young, but which is found to be rather less bearable -
less 'romantic' - in later life 2. Augustus John, in recalling the
acute paranoia of the young Lewis, and his habit of adopting various
physical disguises, concluded that 'such behaviour could only be the
desperate strategems of an incurable Romantic in flight from
himself!' 3. This assessment by one close to Lewis is full of insight
as to his character and temperament, but a clear distinction is to be
made between the excesses of youthful behaviour, the carefree
existence of the young, who would be bent on discovering the joys of
travel and the stimulation of cosmopolitan society, and the conscious
adoption of certain intellectual attitudes that are instrumental in
formulating mature beliefs. Both these issues are relevant to Lewis,
in view of the extent to which his emotional and intellectual
development was most fully nurtured in the context of European social
and cultural traditions.
'Romanticism', as a variously understood aesthetic tendency and a
personally-worn icon, may have been emotionally, if not wholly
intellectually embraced by Lewis at an early stage of his chosen
career. However, in view of his associations with modern artists,
intellectuals, and various avant-garde groups whilst abroad, and given
that his studies had included attendance at Bergson's lectures at the
College de France, Lewis would have been fully exposed to ways of
thinking which were naturally predisposed to the aligning of certain
types of artistic practice with the principles of sympathetic
philosophical systems. Bergson's élan vital and the encouraged fusion
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of 'art' with 'life' would have been too prominently advertised in the
context of 'bohemian' romanticism to go unchallenged, or at least
unremarked by Lewis.
In seeking a direct equation of the philosophy of Bergson and
'romance', given his own background, education and temperament,
Lewis has to be most careful to define his terms, and to outline his
own position as a result. In 'The Diabolical Principle', which
continues the analysis of romanticism begun in 'The Revolutionary
Simpleton', Lewis attempts to counter the kinds of charge succinctly
characterized by John, that he is indeed a romantic 'in flight from
himself':
•.elt has been objected that my own critical writing is full of
storm and stress: that I am a counter-storm, merely, and that I
do not set an example of Olympian calm to my romanticist
adversaries.
That I have deliberately used, often, in my criticism, an
incandescent rhetoric is true. But then, of necessity, rapidly
executed polemical essays, directed against a tireless and
innumerable people of termites, can hardly be conducted in any
other way. The athenian draughts, at war with Sparta or Persia,
did not provide a spectacle of hellenic grace and
imperturbability, I think. Such an essay as Time and Western Man
is not supposed to imitate in its form an attic temple. It is a
sudden barrage of destructive criticism laid down about a spot
where temples, it is hoped, may under its cover be erected.4
It is accepted that Lewis's method of undermining his opponents owes
much to the spirit of that which he deplores; but this does raise
certain difficulties of analysis for the reader, and problems of
coherence for the author. What seems to emerge most strongly from
this is that a clear differentiation between specific types of
romantic temper is thereby made by Lewis himself. In the course of
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identifying an oppositional duality of the 'classic' versus the
'romantic' mind, Lewis does not confine himself to an historically
perceived Hellenistic culture, but presupposes a much wider definition
of the 'classical' which approximates much more closely to his own
methods and temperament.
For Lewis, the 'classical' is a universal attitude, and one which
escapes the confines of historical categorization like that which is
proposed by Spengler; it must be ahistorical, describing 'anything
which is nobly defined and exact, as opposed to that which is fluid -
of the Flux - without outline, romantically Ndark, vague,
"mysterious," stormy, uncertain' 5 . The terms 'noble', 'defined' and
'exact' which Lewis takes for his creed describe most accurately the
Nietzschean characterization of the Apollonian origins of artistic
creation that spring from the same source in Greek Tragedy, but which
become subsumed for Nietzsche in the dark cult of Dionysus. The
spiritual, philosophical and artistic followers of Dionysus are for
Lewis those who oppose the plastic values of stability and definition,
and who are the natural adherents of the time-philosophy and Dionysian
'romance'.
I would thus argue that, if Lewis ' s critical concerns and methods are
to be accurately represented, it is especially useful to bear in mind
the descriptive terminology of what we can regard as Lewis's
essentially Apollonic romanticism. This phrase serves the function of
foregrounding Lewis's concern with specific types of 'ahistorical' and
'classical' values which are necessary to the expression of his ideas,
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and which reminds us too, of certain relevant details of biography,
educational background, attitude and methods. Nor may the debt to
precursors like Nietzsche and Schopenhauer be forgotten in analyses of
Lewis's objections to the time-cult and its romantic concretization in
the arts.
The attribution to Lewis of an Apollonic romanticism allows a
clearly-drawn analysis of the essential elements of his case against
the Dionysian-diabolical-Faustian effects of the time-cult, without
sacrificing the complexities and subtleties of his argument. On a
theoretical level, the romanticism that formed the backdrop to Lewis's
experience referred strongly to continental models, thinkers and
artists. But as a practising artist in England, the traditions and
attitudes that most directly affected Lewis in pursuit of his
profession stemed from a more insular base: what he would have
regarded as the 'flabbiness' of the arts at the turn of the century6
was manifested in English art as mediocrity, the result of the
preponderance of sentimentalism and blind tradition, conservatism and
dilettantism. The conditions prevailing upon the art market in
England at the start of Lewis's career had been overwhelmingly
influenced by the social, cultural and intellectual legacies
bequeathed to the twentieth century by the arbiters of Victorian taste
and aesthetics. Such dominant and serious figures as Ruskin, Morris,
Carlyle and Arnold nevertheless loomed large for Lewis in relation to
what he saw as the particularly cloying and popular blend of romantic
nostalgia, fin de siecle decadence, 'snobbism' and above all, the
stifling traditionalism that he recognised in contemporary academic
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attitudes to art, represented in England by the Royal Academy.
Combined, these elements became symptomatic of the underlying
intellectual malaise which, as far as Lewis was concerned, had
gratefully merged into timeist dogma in the first decades of the
twenti eth century.
The analogical equation of disparate historical, philosophical,
social, artistic and cultural ideas and conditions by Lewis in order
to arrive at a systematization of the theoretical and practical
ramifications of the 'time-cult' appears idiosyncratic and untenable
if the central unifying principle is marginalized. Lewis is concerned
from first to last with the fate of art, and it is that concern which
drives him to expose all possible manifestations of that which
threatens it; Bergsonism provides the philosophical target, of which
'romance' is its wider cultural expression. Lewis is specific about
the characteristics of the attendant baneful tendencies as revealed in
the arts. In 'The Revolutionary Simpleton', 'some meanings of
Romance' are explored; the main context from which the discussion is
developed is not primarily European, but English. Lewis is concerned
to trace the origins and character of 'romance' as it is manifest in
the consciousness of the English public, to examine from his point of
view the culture as a whole, to consider the role of traditional
institutions like the Royal Academy and provision for the arts, the
dilettante and 'moneyed' classes, self-styled avant-gardes, artistic
and political 'revolutionaries', the 'low-brow' diversions of the
man-in-the-street, and to illuminate the character of possible motives
involved in the manipulation of a mass public mind by economic,
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political, commercial and industrial interests.
For Lewis, the doctrine of 'What the Public Wants', a Bergsonian,
vulgarized and commercial version of the Schopenhauerian will, had
become a double-edged sword; mass persuasion and consumer power,
congenitally hostile to the fine artist, restricted the means by which
he could earn a living, and the odious spectacle of a mass mind
represented at its basic level the pervasive effects of a
philosophical dogma and an orthodoxy which allowed of no absolute
distinctions between 'art' and 'life'. In both cases, art is attacked
on the same front, materially and intellectually; professional artists
would face the prospect of starving for their art, and the Bergsonian
'merging' process would soon ensure that the arts - and particularly
visual art - as a distinct activity would be non-existent.
So the 'romantic', in Lewis's formulation, is as much an equivalent
for the 'unreal' as Alexander's molecular armchair proves to be. It
is not uncharacteristic that he should suggest an opposition between
the 'romantic' and the 'real' would be likely to have greater
explanatory force than the usual 'romantic-classical' dichotomy, since
for him, the term 'classic' must be re-defined to include his own
specialized concept of the 'real'. The only reality inherent In the
romantic would be that of yesterday, the historical, or of tomorrow,
not of the 'here and now', but of somewhere else.	 It would
approximate to the Spenglerian 'homology principle', of a
world-as-history, subject always to the periodic, the circular and
notions of timelessness. The time-denying mind reveals a seemingly
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contradictory romantic obsession which Is nevertheless a vital
identifying factor:
The profession of the 'timeless' doctrine...always seems
to involve this contradiction: that he will be much more the
slave of Time than anyone not so fanatically indoctrinated.8
The vagaries of changing fashion, too, whether in art movements or in
ladies' clothes are likewise allied to the Spenglerian theories of
periodicity:
An obsession with the temporal scale, a feverish regard for the
niceties of fashion, a sick anxiety directed to questions of time
and place (that is, of fashion and of milieu), appears to be the
psychological concomitant of the possession of a time-theory that
denies time its normal reality. The fashionable mind is par
excellence the time-denying mind - that is the paradox. 9
From this idea, Lewis is seen to develop the theoretical basis of his
analysis of romantic culture in 'The Revolutionary Simpleton'. 	 For
the purposes of my thesis, in attempting to trace the aesthetic
origins of Lewis's reaction to the time-cult, and in the context of my
characterisation of his Apollonic romanticism, it is necessary to take
into account the type of 'romantic' Intellectual from which Lewis
wished to distance himself, and why he found it essential to do so.
In an aesthetic context, Lewis's nineteenth century precursors were
perhaps most notably Ruskin, Morris and Arnold, in whose precepts and
ideas early twentieth century English artists were inevitably
schooled. In 'The Revolutionary Simpleton' one of the meanings of
'romance' for Lewis describes the 'dreamer', one who yearns
nostalgically for lost eras, and who would wish to encourage
present-day adoption of the values, ethics, aesthetics and morals of a
past life°. Such a 'dreamer' was William Morris, and indeed Ruskin,
his master; although Lewis had a far greater intellectual respect for
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the latter, acknowledging his importance to English art and
criticism, and sharing his devotion to the vision of the artist and
his belief in an ultimate metaphysical function for art, there could
be no mistake that their fundamental beliefs must inevitably prove to
be incompatible.
The clear basis of that temperamental and aesthetic incompatibility,
to be hardened later into a theoretical and philosophical response to
a particular manifestation of the 'romantic', had emerged at an early
stage in Lewis's artistic career. Before he left the Slade in 1901,
Lewis, who was known as the 'best draughtsman' there since Augustus
12
John , had already discovered that stylistically, morally,
politically and socially, he was unable to tolerate as the basis for
his own art, any version of aesthetics which was indebted to a rigid
and fossilized academicism inherited directly or indirectly from the
Royal Academy. This included that which he regarded as the equally
13
stale academic impressionism of the Slade , an art which depended on
weak and utopian sentimental-romantic progranines of nostalgic
medievalism and slavish devotion to opticality or 'nature', in the
spirit of Ruskin and his followers 14. The increasing tension between
Lewis and those in authority at the Slade did not testify only to the
extent of his fierce individualism and the iniBinent development of a
distinctive hard-edged style, but it also reveals the stirrings of a
revolt against certain 'romantic' attitudes and aesthetic beliefs
transmitted and perpetuated through orthodox academic training
establishments such as the Royal Academy and the Slade, which in his
view remained essentially conservative in teaching methods and
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attitudes, although originally conceived as an alternative to the
official Academy salon.
Ruskin, as the first (Oxford) Professor of Fine Art at the Slade15,
had exerted an enormous influence on the teaching methods of the
school, originally founded in 1871 to counter the traditionalism of
the Royal Academy of Arts. As the latter represented the English
equivalent of the Paris Royal Academy of the period, its members were
influenced by, but far less tightly bound to, the demands and
16
strictures of hierarchical subject matter and history painting 	 and
the French methods of teaching drawing. Students who sought a French
academic training began, not by drawing from 'life' in the first
instance, but by copying from antique sculpture and plaster casts.
However, the strong 'naturalist' line of tradition in landscape and
portraiture had prevailed in English art through the Academy, and had
remained unbroken by the formation of the Slade, but it latterly had
become more aligned with naturalist-romantic models of inspiration and
procedure than on neo-classical frames of reference. Ruskin's stress
on the close observation and accurate, detailed rendering of natural
objects in art was internalized by many Slade teachers and their
pupils; notably, Henry Tonks and Frederick Brown, who were both on the
teaching staff at the Slade during Lewis's studentship, who may be
said to have owed their allegiance to Ruskin and the Pre-Raphaelites
rather than to Courbet and Monet, and that this was the specifically
English tradition which inspired their own 'reverence for nature'17.
In relation to Ruskin, regarded perhaps as the most prominent
aesthetician of his age, the nature and extent of Lewis's reaction at
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a formative point in his career indicates the prior importance of
unsystematized but already deeply-held aesthetic beliefs.
Like Lewis was to do later, Ruskin had proposed a practical programe
for art, but he imbued his aesthetic with an attendant moral, social
and religious aspect that subordinated the 'truths' of the artist to
the 'truths' of nature. The doctrinaire naturalism which emerged,
along with the belief that an artist is a recorder, not a creator, of
nature, would not have endeared itself to the young Lewis who,
although ready to submit to the discipline of draughtmanship and
design in order that his fertile talent might be given clear, powerful
form, had perhaps a1ready begun to gravitate towards an altogether
different, but still romantically-inspired idea about the importance
of art as a means of communication and a vehicle for the expression of
complex, even philosophical ideas, coupled with the role of the
individual and more particularly, the artist, as innovator, and
essentially, an outsider. The image of a mysterious, cultured, and
independent artist-bohemian which characterizes the familiar
inclinations of a dyed-in-the-wool romantic could be fully exploited
in the continental setting, and provided a model for the persona which
Lewis could adopt and develop in the course of mounting his 'assault'
on the English art establishment.
The artist might well be a prophet and teacher, as Ruskin envisaged,
necessaril y and closely involved with the theory and practice of his
profession in connection with its wide-ranging human implications, but
the fusion of art with social and economic life that Ruskin advocated,
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and an underlying religious pantheism were clearly, in sum, to be
found highly unacceptable by Lewis. A writer who could declare, in an
uncanny, and totally unwitting anticipation of Futurist aesthetics,
that the ultimate 'play and power' of imagination'depend altogether on
our being able to forget ourselves and enteç like possessing spirits,
into the bodies of things about us' 18, would inevitably have been
ranged by Lewis alongside the particular brand of romantic gratuitous
emotionalism and timeist thinking he opposed. The 'penetrative'
imaginative faculty that Ruskin identifies here was to become all too
familiar to Lewis in his later philosophical investigations, and which
was to lead to the naming of Ruskin as a 'naVf', a dreamer, and an
abberant romantic 19, at home amongst the more doctrinaire specimens of
the time-mind. Ruskin's theories of the 'unity' of matter and spirit
and his stress on the organism of creation, read in the light of
Bergson's 'creative' and Alexander's 'emergent' evolutions, appear
strikingly pertinent to Lewis's assessment:
...there is not any matter, nor any spirit, nor any creature, 20
but it is capable of a unity of some kind with other creatures.
Not only may creatures and spirits participate in a coninunal unity,
but matter also is explicitly attached to a notion of its 'purity'
which for Ruskin is bound to 'vital and energetic connection among its
particles', an 'active condition of the substance':
Thus the purity of the rock, contrasted with the foulness of
dust or mould, is expressed by the epithet 'living,' very
singularly given to rock, in almost all languages (singularly,
because life is almost the last attribute one would ascribe to
stone, but for this visible energy and connection of its
particles); and so to flowing water, opposed to stagnant. 21
From Lewis's point of view, it would be hard not to associate these
ideas with animism, the imbuing of 'dead' matter with 'life' in the
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manner of Bergson, Alexander et al. Art too, for Ruskin, as in
Bergson's schema, Is ultimately subject to 'life' and to a view of an
energizing force; for the alan vital of the Bergsonian, we read a
specific, 'ineffable' deity - God - in Ruskin 22. Drawing, as
Whitehead does, on the romantic poets for his illustrative material,
Ruskin, in a treatise on the visual arts - which he, unlike Spengler,
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, regarded as supreme - would seem,
nevertheless, to be treading the same path as those timeist adherents,
led by a sentimental medievalisru that would impose the myths of one
age upon another.
Despite all this, Lewis publicly objected far less to Ruskin's
aesthetics than to the ideas perpetuated by his followers. He would
have agreed most strongly with Ruskin about the professional status of
art, and endorsed wholeheartedly his stern exhortation:
Art, properly so called, is no recreation; it cannot be
learned at spare moments, nor pursued when we have nothing
better to do. It is no handiwork for drawing-room tables, no
relief for the ennui of boudoirs; it must be understood and
undertaken seriously, or not at all. 23
24
The William Morris world of the amateur , where all are encouraged to
act the artist, was anathema to Lewis, and represented all that was
vulgar and vague in popular romanticism, directly responsible in art
for the 'merging' process that encouraged audience to become artist, a
'utopist dream' in which everyone becomes a 'genius', the 'Feudal Age'
of the 'romantic craftsman' in which a 'light-hearted communism"
an	 25
should reign in the midst ofidy1lic plenty' . Morris, inspired by
Ruskin's vision, nonetheless envisaged a socialistic, democratic role
for art, and reacted against the plea for professionalism where this
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would extend to the separation of the fine arts from craft and its
social and historical roots; for Morris, such categorizations were
false and harmful to a practice which is most adequately expressed in
terms of the usefulness of what is produced. The implications of this
background for the young Lewis, convinced of the intellectual
profundity of his chosen profession, and of his personal commitment to
it, would have been striking. What he was to later describe as the
'unreality' of the Victorian milieu is given added significance in the
philosophical context, the 'unreality' of the time-doctrine and its
artistic manifestations.
The line of descent into what Lewis increasingly regarded as a
vulgarized tradition of English art, which had begun nobly if
misguidedly with Ruskin, was vulgarized and distorted by late
Victorianism, 'saturated with William Morris's prettiness and
fervour,' and 'Art for Art's sake' aestheticism26 , and had been
intellectually supported by such as Matthew Arnold, whose notion of
'philistinism' had rooted itself in popular romantic culture and had
found a renewed continuity in the Bloomsbury circle in the early
twentieth century. Although Lewis was critical of Arnold's 'deep
mentalism', his adherence to 'art for art's sake' principles, and his
advocacy of an educational system that was named as instrumental in
fostering the intellectual malaise, social snobbery, coarseness and
illiteracy27
 clearly demonstrated in the pursuit of popular 'romance',
he was nonetheless ready to quote Arnold copiously on these matters,
acknowledging with approval his criticism of Victorian insularity and
complacency, and of mindless machine idolatry. Arnold, like Lewis,
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was concerned to pinpoint the deep cultural maladies of his own age;
in a review of the Art of Being Ruled, Edgell Rickword claims Lewis's
book should stand in the same relation to his generation as Arnold's
Culture and Anarchy did to the generation of the 1870 s, since both
writers intended to arrest the 'degradation of the values on which our
civilization seems to depend... and of re-asserting the terms on which
the life of the intelligence may regain its proper ascendancy over the
emotional and economic existence'28.
In 1951 Lewis had written to Julian Symons, who was preparing a study
of Thomas Carlyle, that in his view, no writer belonged 'so narrowly
to the century of Victoria as he. I am sure you will score a goal
with this football - this windbag... ,29• Lewis's strong assessment
reflects the power of Carlyle's personality and influence, which had
been widely acknowledged by fellow Victorian critics, including Arnold
and Ruskin. Carlyle's insistence on a new intellectualism would
certainly not have been censured by Lewis, but his parallel devotion
to Goethe, to music above all arts, to Darwin's 'Progress of the
Species' theory 3° and to a dynamic interpretation of historical data
which pre-dates Spengler and other specific manifestations of timeism,
would have received the strongest condemnation. A characteristic
time-obsession and worship of 'ineffability' is thus fully revealed:
That great mystery of TIME, were there no other; the
illimitable, silent, never-resting thing called Time, rolling,
rushing on, swift, silent, like an all-embracing ocean-tide, on
which we and all the Universe swim like exhalations, like
apparitions which are, and then are not: this is for ever very
literally a miraclTa thing to strike us dumb, - for we have no
word to speak about it... Force, Force, everywhere Force; we
ourselves a mysterious Force in the centre of that. 'There is
not a leaf rotting on the highway but has Force in it: how else
could it rot?' 31
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It is not untenable that Lewis had recognized a fellow-romantic in
Carlyle, especially in view of his reputation which presents a picture
of a formidable personality who dared to think and act independently
of his peers. There is no doubt, however, that Carlyle, as with
Ruskin and Arnold, would have been judged according to Lewis's
definition of a florid romanticism which was evidently tainted with
the unmistakeable workings of the time-cult in the wider cultural
context.
At the early, pre-Omega and pre-Vorticist stage of his career, Lewis
would not have been consciously aware of the connections between the
background to his art education and the philosophical theory that was
to emerge as a result of it. However, an in-depth study of Bergson
and continental thinkers was to begin the process of alerting him to
basic equivalences of thought between the legacies of his educational
background and artistic training, and certain types of systematic
philosophical ideas, and explicit connections in this respect were
indeed made with mature reflection. I would suggest that Lewis's own
temperament, prior inclinations and his developing ideas about the
function of art meant that a rejection of certain tendencies later
acknowledged as 'timeist' was manifest long before it became possible
to locate them philosophically. A 'thoroughly British' mode of
thought to which Arnold had drawn attention in Culture and Anarchy,
closely read by Lewis, characterizes this process succinctly:
'Art is long,' says the Times, 'and life is short; for the most
part we settle things first and understand them afterwards...'32
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For Lewis, the late Victorians presented a peculiarly English,
romantic counterpart to the essentially European philosophical
tendencies and orthodoxies he had uncovered; if it were possible, it
would have been preferable for artists to bypass this period for their
models and creative precursors in order to claim the work of Hogarth,
Rowlandson and their contemporaries as more properly the arbiters of a
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healthy English pictorial tradition . The closed formula of 'art for
art's sake', heard in relation to Morris, and echoed by Roger Fry, was
an equivalent and pe jorative slogan that for Lewis was paralleled by
an equally inane and destructive 'time for time's sake', or 'sensation
for sensation's sake', which were ultimately traceable to the same
roots, and outwardly demonstrated in popular art and culture.
II.5.ii The Omega Quarrel and its Context
If it is reasonable to cite John Ruskin as one of the major English
critics of art in the nineteenth century, in the first decades of the
twentieth century, the name of Roger Fry might spring more readily to
mind than that of Wyndham Lewis. The reasons for this are revealing:
after Fry's death in 1934, the mantle was to be carried by faithful
adherents of his aesthetics and approaches to the study of art, such
as Clive Bell, Herbert Read and Kenneth Clark. The latter statement
carries with it a distinct suggestion of clique or fraternal coterie;
for Lewis, it would be put much more strongly. Writing in an
introduction to the catalogue of his 1949 Retrospective Exhibition
Lewis explicitly identifies the 'conspiracy' against him, led by Fry
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and dating from 1913, Lewis's secession from Fry's Omega Workshops.
Fry and his followers however, were seen by Lewis at that time as
'front men' for the real struggle: the conflict of the dissenting
individual and the many, the lone voice against the collective power
the
ofAestablishment , the outsider versus the insider. 'I hustled the
cultural Britannia, stepping up that cautious pace with which she
prefers to advance' he writes; 'for that one is never forgiven'
Specifically, Lewis's role in the hustling of the cultural Britannia,
by offering what to him seemed to break out of the 'English-Victorian'
mould, was effected in practice by Vorticism. More generally, his
attitude reflects his position in opposition to an art establishment
which had settled into a bastion of blind tradition and habit,
represented by the Royal Academy of Arts, which continued, in his
view, to impose its dead values on embryo avant-gardes, stifling
originality, obstructing experiment and true creativity in the name of
its own image. The Academy was for Lewis the influential force and
baneful model of an institution which dominated the local artistic
context within which Lewis began to develop his practical, critical
and philosophical responses to the 'state of the arts' in England, and
to ponder the consequences for that art in view of the European
revolution in the visual arts in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
Opposition to the domination of the Academy, and the pervasive
influence in the art world of academicians, is richly documented in
Lewis's writings on art to the extent where the reader is acutely
aware that the attack is not simply a result of 'sour grapes' on the
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part of an artist who was disowned 35, but was an important impetus for
the development of a philosophy of art which includes amongst its
concerns the cultural and social restraints, including the
perpetuation of 'traditions' which prevent and debilitate the free
operation of creativity. We are reminded of the intellectual controls
that Lewis identifies and outlines in 'The Revolutionary Simpleton',
brought about by the mechanical operations of habit and familiarity,
whereby the creative artist is deprived of his independence,
pre-programed to follow the dictates of others. Hence an Academy
Exhibition, Lewis tells us, will yield all this up to popular sight,
'translated into terms of pictorial art',
the worst insipidities of our degenerate stage,the dreary
foolishness of the novel of the month, that is sold at twopence
one year later on the dusty bookstalls, or the cheap and sugary
music concocted for the palate of the servant girl....
And yet this official State-endowed affair, it is claimed, is the
guardian of tradition! What tradition, in heaven's name, may we
ask? 36
The connection between Fry's progressive circle, his vigorous
championing of modern European art and the conservatism of the
'cultural Britannia' as represented by the Royal Academy, may still
not be fully sketched, but continues to emerge more clearly as a
consequence of analysis which examines the circumstances and effects
of the Omega quarrel both on Lewis's personal artistic career, and the
subsequent development of ideas about aesthetics and the role of the
artist in society which were later systematized and placed in
philosophical and theoretical context. These ideas were thus
profoundly affected by an explicit aversion to coteries,
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collectivities, or socially restricted groupings which closed ranks
when attacked, conferred power and status on favourites, and
ruthlessly outlawed their critics: thus the 'Enemy' was first
conceived.
On 14 June 1913, Roger Fry wrote a letter to his mother which included
the following coments:
My Omega Workshops are hard at work and keep me at it pretty
continuously. There's a great deal of interest shown everywhere
in the scheme and I hope I may be able to pull it through. If I
do I shall I think have done something to make art possible in
England. It would be of course almost to accomplish a miracle,
but I have hopes. Certainly the people I have got have an
extraordinary amount of talent. My problem is now to harness it
to practical purposes. There's no doubt that it is a difficult
thing to do and perhaps that is why almost all manufacturers give
it up and o to the patient hack instead of the artist for their
designs. 3/
The 'people' Roger Fry had working with him at the Omega included the
founder members 8 Duncan Grant, Clive Bell, Frederick Etchells and,
until October of 1913, Wyndham Lewis. Lewis's breaking of a close
association with Fry and the 'Bloomsburies' was initially occasioned as
a result of the acrimonious exchange over the work commissioned for the
Ideal Home Exhibition of that year. The exact details - and
interpretations - of the causes and outcome of the quarrel remain
obscured by the individual bias of those involved in reporting them,
but it is clear that its effects included a virtual schism in the
English artistic avant-garde. There are various accounts which attempt
to reach the 'truth' of the dispute on the 'facts' of the matter from
contemporary accounts 39, but as Jeffrey Meyers points out in his
biography of Lewis, whoever was at fault, the outcome was to be judged
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purely in terms of 'character' and 'integrity', not on evidence or
scrutiny of 'fact'. Fry had power, influence, funds and a fiercely
loyal band of Bloomsbury allies; Lewis had none of these, but possessed
instead the added misfortune of an intransigent temperament.
Since it was Lewis who took the aggressive stance in the affair,
publicly denouncing Fry as dishonest, it is perhaps inevitable that the
decision Fry and his Bloomsbury associates took, to ignore the
possibility of libel action against Lewis, and to resist retaliation
and refutation, would lead to a measure of moral ascendency, actual or
imagined. In Quentin Bell's partisan account of the origins and
character of Bloomsbury, he notes the pacifism of the group which was
'not merely uncharitable but positively insulting'. The 'wounding
contempt in the refusal to return blow for blow' was evidence of a
'conscious superiority' 40 which to Lewis would have been unbearable.
The charges made against Fry were detailed in the 'Round Robin' letter,
composed by Lewis, and co-signed by Etchells, Wadsworth and Hamilton.
This was sent to the press and to those connected with the Omega, with
the intention of maximising public awareness of the dispute, the
discreditation of Fry and the exposure of the 'shabby trick'. The main
charge against Fry was
...That the Direction of the Omega Workshops secured the
decoration of the 'Post-Impressionist' room at the Ideal Home
Exhibition by a shabby trick, and at the expense of one of their
members - Mr. Wyndham Lewis, and an outside artist - Mr. Spencer
Gore. 41
Meyers details the facts which were not ultimately disputed by either
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of the parties; firstly, that the Ideal Home comission was originally
intended for Lewis and Gore, with Fry responsible for furniture
decorations. The coninission itself was inspired by the much-admired
work for the Cave of the Golden Calf, on which Gore and Lewis had
worked together. It is accepted that a message asking Lewis and Gore
to do the work was left at the Omega Workshops for Lewis42 . That Fry
received the message, and Lewis did not, was also evident. It is at
this point that interpretations differ as to the intentions behind
actions; Lewis imediately accused Fry of appropriating the lucrative
coninission for himself, employing deceit and dishonesty in doing so,
resulting in an angry scene and a walkout by Lewis and those artists at
the Omega who supported him.
In reply to a letter from Gore, Fry gave his own version; that the
sponsors for the exhibition, The Daily Mail, had approached him
directly, and had not mentioned Lewis's name43 . A slightly different
slant is taken in another letter to Gore where Fry obliquely admits a
message reached him but that he 'never got it with sufficient
clearness'. Fry made little effort to answer the charges fully and
with precision, but turns it into a matter of personality, prestige and
'respectability';
Of course, if you really believe the fantastic and gross nonsense
that Lewis and Co. have written about me... But ask yourself
honestly which theory is more likely: that I am an almost
incredible monster not only of iniquity but of folly (for what the
devil have I to gain by it?), or that there has been a quite
absurd misunderstanding produced by Lewis's predisposition to
believe himself the object of subtle antagonistic plots. 44
The reference Fry makes to a paranoid and unstable Lewis is remarkable
in its complacency, particularly as Jeffrey Meyers points out, even
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Fry's closest friends and associates were prepared to coninent freely on
the major flaws they had observed in Fry's character. Clive Bell, for
instance, Fry's most loyal and avid personal supporter, in the Omega
affair and in theoretical matters in art, wrote of his friend:
He was open-minded, but he was not fair-minded. For though... he
was magnificently unprejudiced, he was not unprincipled; and he
had a way of being sure that while all his own strong feelings
were principles those of others, when they happened to cross his,
were unworthy prejudices.
...But suspicious he was, and In his fits of suspicion unjust. He
could be as censorius [sic] as an 111-conditioned judge:45
Leonard Woolf, too, noted Fry's 'ruthlessness' and 'unscrupulousness'
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In business . The eagerness of Lewis to court libel action, and the
refusal of Fry to respond, proved to be, not the triumph of the
injured, but provocative in the extreme, thereby casting the volatile
Lewis as villain and outsider. The Omega affair was to be the first,
or at least most serious symbolic skirmish between Lewis and the
established avant-garde, for it was the only time when Lewis was in a
position to attack as an insider. Following on from this incident, the
aftermath of 'moral superiority' affected by the Bloomsbury group
provided some protection from the broadsides directed by Lewis, at
least until the publication of his novel, The Apes of God in 1930,
which succeeded in denting the sensibilities of those who claimed to
recognize themselves as objects of satire.
Apart from a public statement of grievance and a concerted personal
attack on Fry, the 'Round Robin' is a statement of intent on the part
of Lewis which is of particular interest in this context, as it clearly
prefigures and prefaces the development of an aesthetic polemic
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tangentially opposed to that adopted by Fry and those who remained
loyal to the ideals and traditions actively encouraged in the Omega
Workshops. Already Lewis had made links between certain trends and
tendencies in art, and was anxious to strongly dissociate himself from
the sentimental-romantic traditions of Ruskin, Morris and 'art for
art's sake' aestheticism, amateurism and dilettantism that he now
recognized at the Omega Workshops. 'As to its tendencies in Art',
Lewis wrote,
they alone would be sufficient to make it very difficult for any
vigorous art-instinct to long remain under that roof. The Idol is
still Prettiness, with its mid-Victorian languish of the neck, and
its skin is 'greenery-yallery', despite the Post-What-Not
fashionableness of its draperies. This family party of strayed
and Dissenting Aesthetes, however, were compelled to call in as
much modern talent as they could find, to do the rough and
masculine work without which they knew their efforts would not
rise above the level of a pleasant tea-party...
The reiterated assurances of generosity of dealing and care for
art,... (have been) conspicuously absent in the interior working
of the Omega Workshops. This enterprise seemed to promise...
emancipation from the middleman-shark. But a new form of fish in
the troubled waters of Art has been revealed in the meantime, the
Pecksniff-shark, a timid but voracious journalistic monster,
unscrupulous, smooth-tongued and, owing chiefly to its weakness,
mi schious.
No longer willing to form part of this unfortunate institution,
we the undersigned have given up our work there. 47
For Roger Fry, his colleagues and apologists, it was Lewis himself who
was to become their 'Pecksniff-shark'; Lewis's subsequent career as
painter, novelist, critic, philosopher and polemicist was centrally
dedicated to the cause of making 'art possible in England', a wish
complementary to Fry's, but with diametrically opposed means and goals.
Lewis's art criticism, in all its forms, whether it was concerned with
general aesthetics, speculative polemic, specific works of art and
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movements, or the social and economic conditions for art production,
was founded and informed in the light of multiple and complex concerns
and viewpoints. His background, of travel and study in Europe in the
decade prior to Vorticism, enabled him to speak and operate both as
cosmopolitan European and English artist, writer and intellectual.
This multiplicity of concern and vision, whilst broad and
comprehensive, was wielded critically, and too often negatively by
Lewis in support of his beliefs, which in itself would have been enough
to have precluded sustained involvement with any one movement, faction
or institution.
Whatever discrepancies and disputes arise over the details of the Omega
quarrel, it is at least evident that the self-effacing anonymity of the
medieval-style craftsman would not have suited Lewis for long in any
event, and a split was therefore made inevitable. I would suggest,
however, that in the symbolic and actual reaction to certain
'Bloomsbury' positions, both in the areas of ethics and aesthetics,
Lewis had found an ideal catalyst and target for his energies, both
creative and critical. Although it is accepted that the feud which
resulted must have limited Lewis's status and reputation, this
situation in itself, and the reaction to Fry's aesthetics and the
'popular chronologism' of the Bloomsbury set 48 provided an ideal
oppositional impetus for Lewis in the task of defining his own beliefs,
proving to be an enabling factor which led to the multi-media formation
of an individual vision of the world with plastic art at the centre.
Lewis himself, however, recognized that his 'vision' would very likely
be unacceptable in the artistic - essentially timeist - climate which
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prevailed. 'Without immodesty' Lewis was to write in 1947,
I substituted for what Roger Fry proposed that England
should have (a diluted and sentimentalised 'post-impressionism')
something so much more severe as to be as a matter of fact out of
its element in England. This action of mine naturally displeased
Fry and his 'Bloomsbury' friends. 49
Fry's dual and powerful role as critic and dealer had, Lewis claimed
in 1937, directly militated against his pictures being bought
institutionally in the past, but that he found himself still
'completely unrepresented' after Fry's death 50 . The prevailing
influence - or less charitably, the stranglehold - on art criticism
and history became the province of Roger Fry and his followers.
II.5.iii The Aesthete and his Own; Chronologism, Fry and a 'Utopia of
the Amoeba'
So it does appear that 'truth,' like Alexander's God, is
variable... But it comes about in the opposite mannerto that
involved in the 'collective' doctrine of Alexander. It is always
'heretical': and it is always the truth of a minority, or of an
'isolated mind,' that to-day is regarded as 'a victim of error,'
and is found to-morrow to have been possessed, against the
general belief, of the purest truth.., the truth-bearing
individual is always ahead of the rest of the world, although no
one could claim that they willed him, and strained towards him,
in order to reach his higher level. Rather he drags them up by
the scruff of the neck. 51
Lewis's role in the Omega affair had opened his career as the kind of
'isolated mind' that struggles against the contingent 'truth' of the
majority. That the 'majority' in this case was also a radical
minority in the eyes of the general public, meant that Lewis had
effectively removed himself even further from mass interests, and had
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sacrificed any vestige of support that he might have expected from an
'official' avant-garde. But the active cultivation of personal
detachment from the narrow circle of the then English avant-garde had
served the purpose of clarifying some crucial matters with regard to
his own attitudes and aesthetic beliefs upon which a philosophy was
based. The quarrel with Fry, and Lewis's self-imposed ironic
detachment both from the 'official' avant-garde and the wider society,
led him to certain conclusions from the standpoint of an artist
concerned for the character and practice of his profession. These
became centred around the interests and pursuits of bourgeois
intellectuals like the Bloomsbury set, and the popular effects of such
activities, especially in the arts, as developed in 'The Revolutionary
Simpleton'. The connecting link, for Lewis, is the time-mind.
Therefore, in this section, I want to outline the genesis of his
analysis as it is seen to develop in reaction to important aspects of
Fry's aesthetics and his social-cultural personality, as mirrored in
the artistic and philosophical enthusiasms of the Bloomsbury group and
their associates, drawing attention to the wider context of the
legacies of Victorianisni, romanticism and 'Englishness'. That
Victorian context, which in Lewis's eyes became provocatively
conspicuous in the person of Roger Fry, was crucial to Lewis's later
explicit recognition of the cult of 'timeism', and in practice the
revolt against the time-mind was effectively initiated in the light of
particular social, artistic and aesthetic differences which were
brought to a head as a result of the Omega quarrel itself.
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Prior to the final split with Fry, relations had been at times quite
genial, if never entirely cordial. It is evident that Lewis and Fry
had entered into deep discussions on matters of aesthetics, on which
Lewis had apparently led the way. In a letter to Lewis in April 1913,
Fry had written:
I'm very much interested by what you said about the need of
some big belief outside of art. I must talk it over with
you. The situation of the artist becomes more and more
hopelessly paradoxical the more one gets to some idea of what
art is. 52
Both Fry and Clive Bell had expressed profound regard for Lewis's
art53 , and without doubt respected his searching intelligence, but it
became increasingly clear that the Omega Workshops and its ethical and
aesthetic roots in the craft system and Victorian sentimentalism,
could never have satisfied the 'imperious longings' of Lewis54.
In the years following the Omega split, public hostilities towards
Lewis were not sustained by Fry, who, in keeping with his chosen
stance, maintained a silence which had the effect of enraging Lewis
even further. The tone of Fry's attitude had rapidly changed from 'My
Dear Lewis' 55 to 'I suspect that Lewis has never been in the Omega
except for what he could get out of it' 56, and 'Lewis's vanity touches
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on insanity' . Fry, for whatever reason, soon refrained from any
direct references to Lewis in his writings 58, preoccupied with his own
interests and problems at the Omega and the war59.
In order to assess certain baseline differences between the version of
aesthetics proposed by Fry and those advocated by Lewis, and in order
to locate those differences in relation to the philosophical
principles later developed by Lewis, we must have recourse to general
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collections of writings, some of which were published long after the
immediate period of the Omega affair. This is advantageous in the
sense that a certain distance from the personal animosities prevailing
at the time is thereby made possible, and the examination of each
writer's mature reflections on art and aesthetics is more likely to
uncover the seeds of diverse theoretical predilections and beliefs
that were perhaps obscured at the time in a welter of personal
recriminations.
Roger Fry's Vision and Design consists of a collection of essays,
either given as lectures or published in various journals between 1901
and 1920. Presenting, as it does, a wide selection of Fry's writings,
it has come to represent the essence of his contribution to the study,
history and aesthetics of art. The scope of Fry's concerns, from the
- consideration of general principles involved in the encounter with
works of art, to discussions of culture and time-specific
manifestations, revealed in primitive/naVf, ancient, oriental, 'Old
Master' and modern art, would have placed his art criticism, as far as
Lewis was concerned, securely within the compass of an implicit
chronologism as it applies to methodologies that naturally gravitate
towards an untheorized pragmatism and contingency as guiding
principles.
Whilst Lewis did find for himself the basis for 'big ideas outside
art', Fry could only take his tentative cue from a peer group which
attached itself to 'fashionable' - timeist - philosophies conceived
and sustained by relativism. In the 'Retrospect' on his essays in
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1920, Fry coninented that he felt he had been always 'groping...
towards some kind of a reasoned and practical aesthetic' 60. The
implications at the time this was written seem to indicate that such
an aesthetic was, for Fry, far from fully developed or systematic, and
would never be so, since by definition it attempted to find guiding
principles for the history of art in toto, and those principles would
always be vulnerable, shifting according to the variable nature of the
phenomena they attempted to encompass. The impulse towards
generalizations and 'logical co-ordination' is attributed by Fry to
his own personality and 'scientific curiosity' 61 , and a 'desire for
comprehension'. 'On the other hand', he writes,
I have never worked out for myself a complete system such as the
metaphysicians deduce from a priori principles. I have never
believed that I knew what was the ultimate nature of art. My
aesthetic has been a purely practical one, a tentative expedient,
an attempt to reduce to some kind of order my aesthetic
impressions up to date. 62
Fry's 'tentative expedient', and the resulting 'mobile' aesthetic is
replete with the language and assumptions of a faithful Bergsonist;
even whilst he acknowledges that nevertheless, despite his efforts to
remain open and receptive, a 'system' of sorts, a 'provisional
induction' had in fact arisen from his speculations, but that even
this required a particular vigilance lest it form 'too solid a crust
to 'stop the inlets of fresh experience'. Fry will therefore not
concede to the naming of any rigid or systematic principles on the
grounds of impropriety of subject-matter, nor will he allow himself to
be driven to the kinds of extremist subjectivism which, he feels,
lends itself ultimately to a form of mysticism. 'On the edge of that
gulf', he insists, 'I stop'. By openly entertaining neither
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metaphysical nor mystical criteria in the characterization of his
formulae for critical analyses of works of art, Fry, in Lewis's view,
would have laid himself increasingly open to the persuasions of
relativism, where nothing may be affirmed with any degree of
conviction.
The extent of Fry's latent chronologism in matters of aesthetics may
be approached directly in respect of a central thematic basis
to which other important ideas and resonances are related. In
establishing the Omega Workshops in deference to the ethics and
aesthetic principles of Ruskin, and the practical example of William
Morris, Lewis considered that Fry had inevitably succumbed to a
version of vitalist dogma that would spell doom for the visual arts as
a distinct practice and profession. Morris's craft system, and the
political and social naVvety of 'art for art's sake', perpetuated by
Fry at the Omega, embraced for Lewis a complex myriad of 'soft' or
vague values that would trivialize art to the status of a pleasant
pastime, a children's game. In Morris's utopia, Lewis notes, all
would be artists, all would be capable of genius:
...no one would have to work too much;.., every one would 'have
scope to develop his personality,' everybody be a 'genius' of
some sort;... every one would be an 'artist' - singing, painting,
composing or writing, as the case might be, and in which a
light-hearted 'communism' should reign in the midst of an idyllic
plenty. 63
Thus Fry's devotion to what Lewis regarded as the romantic medievalism
of a rejuvenated craft system was directly linked with the
encouragement of amateurism in art and the merging of the spectator!
performer that for Lewis was a central facet of time-cultism. In
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Fry's view, artists would ideally hang up their individualist hats and
succumb to a cosy anonymity in a collective group system. As an
amateur artist himself, Fry's aversion to 'hard-nosed' professionalism
was indeed personal, and perhaps a symptom of social and moral
snobbery as Lewis maintains, but most importantly, as Lewis was to
show in his analyses of chronologism in its various forms, the
practical implications of amateurism and collectivism were profoundly
linked to theoretical and philosophical positions, such as Bergson's,
which threatened the survival of art as a distinct, specialist
discipline. The return to a 'Feudal Age' as a 'romantic craftsman'
was a return to a primitive past, where simple, childlike, innocent
values would prevail; no one would need to think hard, or to reason
out, logically and rationally, one's difficulties, since
responsibility ideally would pass from the individual to the
supporting group. This, for Lewis, meant that inevitably, no absolute
responsibility would be shouldered at all. Worse, the instruments and
functions of the intellect would not be needed once the individual is
cosily embraced in mass warmth, and could be discarded, rendered
obsolete.
Although Lewis, at the time of the Omega quarrel, would have naturally
been arguing his case from a highly 'interested' standpoint, in
seeking to carve out a distinctive career for himself, he was soon to
discover that his personal objections to Fry's position conjoined
closely in theoretical and philosophical terms. It became
increasingly clear to Lewis that Fry's aesthetics, emotionally
modelled on the theoretical, ethical example of Ruskin and the
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practical collectivism and medievalism of Morris's ideas, were part of
a continuously related historical chain anchored in what he regarded
as the sentimental romanticism of the late Victorian period, and which
was represented contemporaneously by the active relativism of the kind
flourishing in Bloomsbury intellectual and artistic circles long after
Fry's death. The issues which arose as a result of 'Victorian'
allegiances were also those most likely to have alienated Lewis from
Fry's position most strongly during his brief time at the Omega.
Variously conceived ideas which attempt to articulate the nature of
relationships between notions of 'art' and 'life' were a constant
preoccupation of modern art theorists such as Fry. It was clear that
such ideas had also engaged the interest of Lewis from the earliest
stages of developing his theories about art and are recognizable as
the opening priorities for his own serious philosophical
investigations. What Fry and Lewis each understand and define as
'life' determines the total thrust and direction of their general
aproaches to art and matters of aesthetics. Fry's 'life', articulated
in his essay, 'Art and Life' is, like Spengler's 'life', predominantly
historical-chronological; it refers to specific periods and 'turning
points' in history, the 'general atmosphere' and 'ethos' of an age. 64
For Fry, the 'historical motive' is that which can interest those with
little • aesthetic feeling' for art in itself. He thus corners at once
the basic emphases of the time-cult: 'life' is self-consciously
time-specific and the functions of art are to be best grasped by
emotion, instinct and sense-perception, not cognition, or the
operations of reason and intellect. The 'imaginative life' which is
213
the province of art, is clearly emotional and instinctive: art, he
states, 'appreciates emotion in and for itself' 65 , it is an
'expression of emotions regarded as ends in themselves' 66 and we are
therefore, in our perception of art, 'not at all interested in
knowledge' 67 . Fry advocates, as Lewis does, a separation of 'art'
from 'life', but his lack of theoretical systematization in this
matter, and the influence of sensationalist ideas enthusiastically
embraced and disseminated by his Bloomsbury friends work together to
render this proposal logically inconsistent. For Fry, the
non-identity of what he calls the 'animal', or 'actual' life, and the
'imaginative life', to be enjoyed in and through art, are to Lewis but
two sides of the same coin. Openly, Fry affirms such an assessment in
accepting the contemporary sensationalist, Bergsonian view of man's
nature:
The assumption that man is a mainly rational animal has given
place to the discovery that he is, like other animals, mainly
instinctive. 68
This 'discovery', claims Fry, has immensely modified the attitude of
the rationalist, giving him a 'new charity and a new tolerance'. But
for Lewis there can be no such compromise if the leading principle is
subordinated to 'instinct'. Fry's conviction that art, led by
'science', which has 'turned its instruments in on human nature and
begun to investigate its fundamental needs' has encouraged art to turn
'its vision inwards' and is clearly reminiscent of Whitehead,
Alexander, Russell and Freud, whilst an insistence upon 'internal
forces', the parallel movement of the 'rhythms of life and of art',
and the 'rhythmic sequences of change' 69 recalls Spengler's
'world-as-history' analyses.
If Fry's tentative distinction between 'life' and 'art' is to be
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challenged by drawing attention to its overall stress on emotionalism
unmodified by reason, then his emphasis on the 'amateur' status of the
artist compounds that challenge, as a concept which is bound up
irrevocably for Lewis with the idea of a 'primitive', 'innocent',
'naVf', 'collectivist' and non-intellectual approach to art. In its
extreme form, a sentimental attachment to the idea of the amateur
craftsman is indicative of the attempted erosion of distinctions
between ' 'performer' and 'audience' characteristic of adherents of the
time-cult, and of Fry's Bloomsbury acquaintances, the Sitwells and
Gertrude Stein, the true 'children of time' pilloried in 'The
Revolutionary Simpleton' and The Apes of God.
This 'merging' of specialist functions in a society where art is the
province of everyone, all are capable of genius, regardless of age,
sex, class, or mental condition reflected Bergson's philosophical
subordination of art to the 1an vital. The enthusiasm for the art of
children and of the mentally infirm, and a nostalgic yearning for a
'return to the past' is symptomatic for Lewis of a similar longing by
beleaguered modern man to return to the relative safety of the womb,
the fluidity and darkness of Schopenhauer's animal life of the soul,
relieved from intellectual duress. Childhood, sought again vainly by
those who had physically and intellectually left it behind, was a
fool's utopia built on pretence and self-delusion; for Lewis, the
hankering after lost 'innocence' was symptomatic of a profound
cultural malaise which had lost faith in the power of intellect and
individual courage. The true image of the child which would be
defiled and destroyed by the misappropriation of its fundamental
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characteristics was explicitly joined to the similar fate of the
artist. The 'privileges' of childhood and those of the artist,
'coveted by the mature and the rich' were in danger from a widespread
doctrinaire primitivism which threatened to erode the status of the
painting professional. Philosophically, the child and the primitive
or amateur artist were related to Alexander's God as a symbol of the
'Becoming', representing the continuous struggle to 'be', and to
develop towards a goal, although that goal may never be reached.
Fry's central role in the introduction and dissemination of modern
European - 'Post-Impressionist' - art in England, and his function as
critical spokesman for the new tendencies in style and technical
interests exhibited in the work of Czanne, Matisse, Rousseau, Picasso
and Braque, ensured a prominent place for the interpretations he
offered in explanation of that art. Fry, like Bell, wasted no time in
stressing the essentially 'primitive' nature of this work in outlining
its 'expressive' effects; this was not confined to the use of explicit
imagery, such as African masks and sculptures, but ranged over 'a
variety of interests and values, both formal and emotional, that would
be seen to open up man's buried 'inner' or 'imaginative' life, his
repressed longings and desires. Since connotations of the 'primitive'
and the 'childlike' had been already securely attached to the new
formal conceptions in modern art, it was not unexpected that Fry and
Bell should continue to emphasize these connections.
Lewis's early rejection of the tenor of Fry's aesthetics was thus in
part a rejection of certain dominant ideas in modern art criticism,
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which were explicitly related to the operations of the time-cult, and
for which viable alternatives had to be sought. Fry's personal
support for exhibitions of 'primitive' and children's art - at the
expense of 'professionals', as Lewis was quick to note - demonstrated
conclusively to Lewis that Fry had concurred with the philosophical
collectivism of many of his peers, and thus represented the core of
English art criticism: 'child and n&ifu art', he claimed, 'are two of
the principal mainstays of dilettante criticism in this country'. Fry
was therefore dubbed by Lewis as the 'great apostle of British
amateuri sm',
who was all for the amateur, all for the eternal Child,
and who wished to make of the painting-world of London a
tight little right little world, safe for the amateur to live
in. 70
All manifestations of amateurism were thereby equated directly with
the phenomenon of the 'gifted eternal-child' 71 and the 'merging' of
spectator and performer that for Lewis is a kind of technical
definition of 'amateurism'. In this, Fry's 'progressive' Omega set-up
and the Royal Academy had more in common than was immediately
apparent, for the latter, judged Lewis, relied overwhelmingly on
exhibits submitted for exhibitions by amateurs, with a 'sprinkling of
"professionals" to make it look a real and serious affair'72.
The case with regard to Fry's aesthetics in relation to Bergsonisrn
need not be laboured; the ultimate test for Lewis is simply
understood: Victorianism and the romantic sentimentalist mind may also
provide equivalents for particular manifestations of a 'primitive', or
'naVve' mentality; the equation produces 'unreality' as he defines it.
If intellect, knowledge and reason are not predominantly brought to
217
bear in our theoretical equations, the resulting analysis is thereby
bound to fall heavily within the compass of the attitudes and
influences instantly recognizable as characteristic of chronological
modes of thought. A 'dilettante' critic such as Fry may well be
'entirely engrossed with himself, and his own sensations' 73 , but in
matters of aesthetics, he is betrayed as the willing pawn of the
wider, collectivist orthodoxy.
Art, under the conditions suggested by Fry, was for Lewis, impossible;
recognizing the artist's strength in his whole-hearted professionalism
even at the time he left the Omega, Lewis later concluded that a
craft-based amateurism of Omega proportions was indeed no art at all.
In Lewis's view, the 'true' professionals were soon to realize the
effect that continued association with such a group would be likely to
have on their careers, and thus fled from the taint of amateur status.
It was left to Lewis to characterize a practical expedient in
theoretical and philosophical terms.
If Fry's aesthetics were not explicitly advertised in the notional
context of the time-cult at the time of the quarrel, the ideas that
were put into practice at the Omega were sufficiently contrary to
Lewis's inclinations that a rival systematic aesthetics in the form of
Vorticism became a priority. In the wake of the active encounter with
the core of Bergsonist philosophy in Futurism, it was later to become
clear to Lewis that Fry's beliefs were indeed strongly reminiscent of
the popular sensationalism, emotionalism and anti-intellectualism
'endemic' to timeist thought. Lewis thought that what was ultimately
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damaging for the artist was a situation where 1 diabolics' were seen to
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be 'locked up in the edifice of 'morals'' : the passion of a
Dionysiac romanticism that flourished under a Victorian claim to
propriety and restraint: and specifically in the case of Fry, and in
respect of the Omega dispute, a similar claim to 'ethical' right
despite, as Lewis shows, an adherence to the emotional chaos and
fluidity so representative of a thorough-going relativism.
A centrally posed criticism of Fry's thought raised the question of
the dangers of an aestheticism divorced from art practice, an
aestheticism which trivializes and renders impotent the creative
intelligence of the artist himself. Fry's advocacy of a modern craft
and guild system, whereby the artist would essentially be a humbled
amateur, working in spare hours from his main occupation of clerk,
critic, civil servant or postman 75 , would produce, according to Lewis,
,76
a giant amateurism and carnival of the eclectic sensibility 	 . Thus
in his brief association with Fry and his circle as an 'insider',
Lewis had evidently discerned a particular virulent devotion to old
versions of the sentimental romanticism 'saturated with William
Morris's prettiness and fervour, "Art for Art's sake, late
Victorianism' ', that had already been rejected by the young artist at
the Slade, however 'modern' and 'progressive' those interests had
claimed to be.
There were perhaps in this context two major consequences of the split
with the Omega and the mainstream. The first was a realization by
Lewis that art in England ('English' being equated directly with
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'Victorian'), to all appearances, was being practised as a dual
concern. It possessed a vital avant-garde, as evidenced by Fry's
introduction of modern European art in the Post-Impressionist
Exhibitions, and the equivalent of the French official salon, the
Royal Academy, where artists might choose to either measure their work
against that produced by academicians, or to react against that
tradition. An adjunct to this system was of course provided by the
annual Summer Exhibition where budding amateurs might hang and sell
work. Lewis, on the contrary, saw no dualism; nothing but variations
of the same Victorian institutionalism and social snobbery that had
persisted, via the Academy, into the twentieth century, and which had
quickly absorbed the 'new' into the system, sanitizing it in the
process. Even modern continental art when it arrived, steeped in the
traditions of European philosophy and aesthetics, was somewhat
overlaid and transformed by the 'Victorian Englishness' of its
adoptive parents. Hence Fry's 'Post-Impressionism', which proved
to be 'shocking' and 'new' to a general public who had been indulged
for generations on Victoriana, nevertheless was quickly allowed to
occupy the allotted place for an 'official' avant-garde. For Lewis,
the terms 'official' and 'avant-garde' were both logically and
aesthetically incompatible; it followed that the differences between
Academy and Omega art were describable as differences of degree, and
not of kind.
In addition, the secession had initiated the process of self-isolation
that was to characterize Lewis's subsequent career. Since it was
demonstrated in the local context of English art that an art
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establishment could live in reasonable accord with the 'right kind' of
avant-garde, and specifically, in view of his reaction against the
view of aesthetics perpetuated by Fry, Lewis began in earnest a search
for the deeper causes of the 'orthodoxy' he felt was emerging in all
facets of the culture in which the visual arts were embedded.
Although 'modern' on the surface, Lewis had discovered in Fry a direct
line to romanticism, Ruskin, Morris and Victorianism, and thus to the
'unreal' as it was defined in respect of timeism. A corollary of this
was that this 'direct line' existed in the most up-to-date and
radical, progressive European art via notions of primitivism,
expressionism and the 'inner struggle' that demanded an emphasis on
emotion, and not intellect. Like Fry and his contemporaries who
offered analyses of the new styles in modern art, Lewis attached a
whole range of different values to the idea of the 'primitive', but
for him those values were negative, posed within a false, n&ive and
romantic optimism that must be exposed.
Thus not only is Lewis's reaction to Bergsonism traceable in the
context of past art and culture, but is contained in his attitude to
the kinds of modernism perpetuated at the Omega. He therefore
attacked initially from a general position calculated to expose
various related ideas centrally attached to a regressive 'primitivism'
taken as a panacea for the ills of modern life and art; but this was
soon revealed as the 'utopia of the amoeba' once the insidious
chronologism inherent in notions of 'returning to' a prior, primal and
essentially non-cognitive and anti-individualist state was recognized.
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portrait of T.S. Eliot (illustrated as the frontispiece of
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CHAPTER 6
VORTICISM
In postulating the notion of the vortex as a central, guiding
principle of Lewis's mature philosophy, and in the light of an
interpretation of Time and Western Man which stresses its function as
essentially an elaboration of a system already worked out in terms of
art practice and theot'y, It is essential, in order to lend support to
this thesis, to examine the theoretical provenance of Vorticism as it
was defined and developed by Lewis, in response to rival ideas and
movements. This is not the place to seek a generalized, historical or
art-historical characterization of an art movement which, although led
strongly from the front by Lewis, was nevertheless ostensibly a
collective enterprise; this task, and the overall assessment of the
part played by others in shaping Vorticist aesthetics, has been
undertaken elsewhere 1. The primary objective here is to identify the
specific sources and influences which encouraged Lewis to formulate
and refine the aesthetic principles which informed his first writings
on the theory of art, and to specify and explain, in the philosophical
context of the vortex, those elements he came to reject so vehemently.
Lewis's Vorticist principles, despite advertizing in no uncertain way
his readiness for aesthetic combat, nevertheless laid positive
foundations for a set of beliefs which In essence were deepened and
refined, long after the demise of the organized movement itself.
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11.6.1. A Prime Mover; Marinetti and Automobilism
The influence of Italian Futurism on the embryo Vorticist movement has
been widely acknowledged by Lewis himself, and has been explored In
depth in later critical studies. Some accounts have tended to focus
on the marked similarities of presentation, style and approach, in
terms of the visual work produced, the literary manifestoes which
announced a 'new art' with such an excess of verve and energy, and
have concentrated on identifying links between the clearly unorthodox
personalities of the 'front men', Marinetti and Lewis.
There is little doubt that, In the wake of Marinetti's first visit to
London and the showing of Futurist work 2 , artists like Lewis, who were
already straining hard against the legacies of Victorian taste and the
'flaccidity' of contemporary Impressionism, would be inspired by the
example of a vibrant, iconoclastic and anti-passeist movement, loudly
and 'vulgarly' proclaimed in Marinetti's lectures and 'Futurist'
evenings. In an early article, 'A Man of the Week. Marinetti', Lewis
openly applauds Marinetti as 'one of the personal landmarks...'
• ...the intellectual Cromwell of our time' 3. His 'witty and violent'
demonstrations are seen as a much-needed tonic to modern English
artists and a fine antidote to 'Victorianisin' in 'this home of
aestheticism, crass snobbery, and languors of distinguished
phlegm...'. Lewis was perfectly able to recognize and welcome
Marinetti's antics as a means by which an initial stirring of activity
might be accomplished, and was initially ready to embrace -
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temporarily at least - the 'genial tag' of 'Futuriste' in so far as it
may be adapted to an 'Anglo-Saxon' concept of modernity. In regarding
Marinetti and the Italian Futurist painters as 'foreign auxiliaries'
In the already uncompromising fight to overcome the English artistic
and cultural 'establishment' however, Lewis is still careful to
distinguish between the Iconoclasm which exists at the level of
attitudes and methods, but clearly distances himself from any practice
which would, in his view be ultimately harmful to the continuing
practice of art; the Museums and 'past art', a high-profile target for
Marinetti, should not be destroyed, but seized, and 'kept as the
private property of the Artists'. The true 'Futurist', claims Lewis,
'will not destroy fine paintings in Museums, because they will belong
to him exclusively one day'.
Clearly, whilst accepting - gratefully - the positive example of
Marinetti's energy, Lewis at this juncture was evidently far from
being 'bowled over' by the entire package of Futurism, but was
concerned to Identify a specifically 'English' or 'Anglo-Saxon' strain
of modern art that would accord more closely with the 'Northern
character'. Once Marinetti's 'ice-breaking' was accomplished however,
his usefulness was limited; Lewis preferred to lead, not to be led,
and was aware that If a new English art movement was to establish
itself, a separate identity and aesthetics must be outlined, distinct
from Fry's Omega operations and the European manifestations of Cubism
and Futurism. This required careful thought, planning and promotion,
and to this end the Rebel Art Centre, opened in March 1914, was
dedicated.
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The months following the Omega split, and prior to the publication of
Blast on June 20 (which Lewis had begun to plan in December),
constituted a crucial period of experiment and consolidation for Lewis
as an artist and writer. The hard core of the rebel group of artists
included Etchells, Hamilton and Wadsworth, who had left the Omega in
support of Lewis, and associations were quickly formed with those
broadly sympathetic with the need to revivify modern English art.
Nevinson had been invited into this circle following the Omega affair,
and T.E. Hulme had joined with Lewis and his group in first welcoming
Marinetti on his return to London in November, but the constant
barrage of the Italian's noisy and attention-seeking rhetoric soon
palled and united the group in action.
In Blasting and Bombardiering, Lewis describes one 'counter-putsch'
whereby a 'determined band of anti-futurists', including Epstein,
Hulme, Gaudier-Brzeska and Wadsworth contrived an energetic heckling
of Marinetti at his lecture at the Doré Gallery; on that occasion,
claims Lewis, the 'Italian intruder' was worsted 4. The decisive
distancing from Marinetti was accomplished in response to the
provocative article, 'Vital English Art. Futurist Manifesto'
published jointly by Nevinson and Marinetti, which pledged the
allegiance of modern English art to Italian Futurism5. The final
outrage, as far as Lewis was concerned, was that Nevinson had seen fit
to write this document using the Rebel Art Centre address, and had
actually named Atkinson, Bomberg, Epstein, Etchells, Hamilton,
Roberts, Wadsworth and Lewis himself as co-signatories - and by strong
implication, as faithful satellites - of Marinetti's Futurist
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movement. If Lewis had been content to be loosely described as
'Futurist' prior to this act, it was now emphatically no longer the
case. Nevinson, who had been invited by Lewis to join his circle
following the Omega affair, was considered evidently traitorous, and
thus another splinter group was formed, for although Lewis had been
planning and working towards the definition and announcement of
Vorticism as a specifically English phenomenon, clearly
distinguishable from Futurism and Cubism, a strong and public reaction
was precipitated by the publication of this Manifesto. This was most
effectively accomplished by the publication of Blast 6 , but in a
coldly-worded letter to the press a disclaimer was made:
There are certain artists in England who do not belong to the
Royal Academy nor to any of the passêist groups, and do not on
that account agree with the futurism of Sig. Marinetti. An
assumption of such agreement either by Sig. Marinetti or by his
followers Is an impertinence. 7
There Is little doubt that Marinettis behaviour and attitude, and
Nevinson's actions in supporting him, rankled deeply with Lewis, and
necessitated an unequivocal response. But, as Lewis's article on
Marinetti as 'Man of the Week' illustrates, Futurist methods could be
found congenial and useful, but an acceptance of vital aspects of
their aesthetics was already beyond him, even prior to the publication
of Blast 1. In the heat and heady excitement of the Futurist assault
on London, Lewis had perhaps neglected to think too seriously, or to
look closely into the personal ramifications of assuming too close a
connection with Bergsonian or vitalist aesthetics, at the root of
Futurist painters' manifestoes. At this stage in his career, Lewis
was centrally concerned with developing his style as an artist, and
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producing work which would justify the declaration of a new direction.
Lewis had written very little on art prior to the publication of
Blast, but from the evidence of the art produced, it is clear that
the theoretical principles which were articulated later were already
prefigured in visual form.
Unlike Marinetti's Futurism, which had outlined an aesthetic programme
to be carried out, much of Lewis's Vorticist work preceded Its theory,
and had thus determined its general character based on spatial values,
stillness, definition and outline, and not, as in Futurism, a
celebration of dynamism, Interpenetration and the 'insides' of things.
As a consequence of his art training and studies, and in view of his
experience at the Omega Workshops, Lewis knew which elements and ideas
he wanted to be associated with his art, and which should be avoided
at all costs. Futurism, arriving in the guise of its most vigorous
ambassador, Marinetti, was accordingly applauded by Lewis and his
English colleagues for its vitality, but in the course of shaping a
coherent and distinct Vorticist aesthetics, Lewis became increasingly
aware of a glaringly obvious mis-match between his practice and
Futurist theory which was not formally articulated until the summer of
1914. Nevinson, who, prior to the Observer manifesto, had worked
closely with Lewis throughout the planning stage of Blast8 , had
protested in his own defence that Lewis had described Futurism as a
'vital form of art', and that he had 'no idea' that Lewis had 'felt so
strongly' about it 9. 'Vital', it certainly was, to those involved
with the rebel artists at this time, in providing a model example of
art promotion, polemic and propaganda: but the unacceptability of its
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'vitalist' theoretical implications became evident to Lewis as a
result of closer investigation.
In a short article, 'AutomoblIism' 10 , the substance of an attitude
which was to become a distinctive feature of Lewis's Vorticist
aesthetic was clearly outlined against the challenge of Futurism. In
stating his depth of regard for Marinetti (he tended to blame Nevinson
for the Observer article), Lewis nevertheless publicly deplores the
Italian's sentimental and 'childish' attachment to a romantic notion
of 'machinery' and the 'mechanical', the element of 'automobilism'
which renders Futurism obsolete. Indignant that Marinetti should
'presume to advise' the 'English nation.., in the matter of Art',
Lewis aims to point out Marinetti's error in assuming that the English
had failed to notice the 'virtues' of a material civilization in a
country which had 'practically invented' that civilization, whilst
Italy was still a 'Borgia-haunted swamp of intrigue'. Nor, he
observes, are Marinetti's automobilist enthusiasms unique either, for
England's 'black years of overblown Victorianism' produced arch
machine-sentimentalists such as Wilde and H.G. Wells, who had 'out
-Marinettied our automobilist friend in his Melodramas of Modernity'.
The clear link Lewis establishes between Marinetti's attitude and late
Victorianism is early evidence of how his own ideas began to be
systematized and clarified; it is also apparent that Lewis had already
worked out an idea of 'Reality' that he wished to distinguish from the
contingent, vitalist properties of 'Romance'. This passage from
'Automobilism' of 1914 would not be out of place, or inconsistent
with, the mature analysis of the 'Revolutionary Simpleton':
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Sentimental consciousness of our surroundings is a diagnostic of
indigestion. It is Romance and not realisation; dreaming and not
living. We want to-day the Realism and not the Romance of our
peculiar personal life. Marinetti is a Romantic and not a
Realist... He appeals essentially to just the romantic and
passêiste sensibility he chiefly abuses.
Although Lewis obviously admired Marinetti's skill as an effective
operator, the public exposure achieved by Futurism and the level of
media attention that Marinetti attracted had the effect of subsuming
all 'new' English art under that category. This suited Lewis's
purposes until he was ready to launch Blast. On June 20, the
projected date for its publication, 'Autoruobilism' announced his
purpose: 'it is time' wrote Lewis, 'for definition'.
II.6.ii Attraction and Antipathy: Hulme's Theory of Art
One of the main reasons for the existence of philosophy is not
that it enables you to find truth.., but that it does provide you
a refuge for definitions.., a fixed basis from which you can
deduce the things you want in aesthetics. The process is the
exact contrary. You start in the confusion of the fighting line,
you retire from that just a little to the rear to recover, to get
your weapons right... it provides you with an elaborate and
precise language in which you really can explain definitely what
you mean, but what you want to say is decided by other things.
The ultimate reality is the hurly-burly, the struggle; the
metaphysic is an adjunct to clear-headedness in it. 11
I.E. Hulme's statement on the relation between philosophy and
aesthetics accurately characterizes Lewis's experience of the
'process' of working out the 'definitions' that he sought to outline
in Blast and which were revised and refined later. Instead of
starting, however, as Hulme did, from the standpoint of philosophy,
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Lewis takes his stimulus from the process of making art. In the
encounter with Hulme's ideas, the metaphysical implications which
began to emerge for Lewis were indeed an adjunct to aesthetic
principles, but in the characterization of Vorticism, his 'ultimate
reality', unlike Hulme's, is the permanence and iniiobi1ity of art,
ideally able to transcend the 'hurly-burly' and struggles of 'life',
which for Hulme, remain fundamental.
Lewis's 'definitions' were rooted and reflected in the on-going
debates which occupied the rebel artists from the Omega secession. In
particular, Hulme's ideas had a profound formative effect on Lewis,
for he had delivered some highly influential public lectures on art
from a philosophical viewpoint early in the new year, and had already
worked out in detail his version of the main principles of 'rebel'
aesthetics before Lewis published in Blast. Despite a promise to
Lewis to pen an article for Blast 12 , this never materialized. By the
time the 'puce monster' appeared, Hulme had dissociated himself from
the rival aesthetic of Lewis 13, since it was evident that fundamental
14
differences in their beliefs 	 rendered further close association
untenable.
In this section, I propose the notion that the relation between Hulme
and Lewis is central to an understanding of vital aspects of the
theories and ideas which underpinned Vorticism, and to the
contextualizatlon of views expressed in Blast. Not only can
fundamental points of contact be deduced, but the differences between
them strongly suggest that it was in the encounter with Hulme's
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aesthetics and philosophy that spurred Lewis specifically
into action against Bergsonlsm in all its forms, and which achieved
formal expression for the first time in Blast. Art, for Lewis,
determined his philosophical principles, and it is thus not unexpected
that these were initiated by his critique of Futurism: Bergson's
philosophy in practice. Before embarking on an analysis of the
relevant articles in Blast, however, it is instructive to examine the
main substance of Hulme's aesthetics, and the essential points of
agreement with Lewis in order that important variations may be
identified.
Hulme's writings on art and philosophy are largely confined to a
series of papers which he published between December 1913 and March
191415. One of these, published in Speculations as aModern Art and
Its Philosophy' delivered as a lecture before the Quest Society on
January 22, 1914, is described by Richard Cork as an 'astonishingly
accurate forecast' of Vorticism 16. As a response to this assessment,
and bearing in mind Lewis's open acknowledgment that Hulme's ideas
constituted a much-needed theoretical impetus for what he was trying
to do in practice, the analysis of Hulme's aesthetics as they relate
to Lewis and Vorticism is centred on this important text, and other
writings are drawn upon where it is necessary to illuminate or expand
further.
It appears that Hulme and Lewis had met in 1912 through the mediation
of Pound 17, but contacts between them were intensified after the Omega
affair, as like-minded individuals joined forces against what they
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regarded as the light-weight dilettantism and 'romantic'
sentimentality of Fry and his colleagues. The depth of Hulme's
contempt for the Bloomsburys, whilst emanating from a different source
of irritation, bears comparison with Lewis's tirades against Fry:
Clive Bell's attack on Epstein in the Athenaeum is censured as merely
spiteful', and Fry and his group are ruthlessly pilloried in the wake
of the Omega secession:
But the departure of Mr. Wyndham Lewis, Mr. Etchells, Mr.
Nevinson and several others has left concentrated in a purer form
all the worked-out and dead elements in the movement. It has
become increasingly obvious that Mr. Fry and his group are
nothing but a kind of backwater,... 18
Hulme's description of the kind of work produced at the Omega could
have indeed been written by Lewis:
As you enter the room you almost know what to expect, from the
effect of the general colour...pallid chalky blues, yellows and
strawberry colours, with a strong family resemblance between all
the pictures;... (an) anaemic effect showing no personal or
constructive use of colour...the whole familiar bag of tricks -
the usual Cezanne landscapes, the still lifes, the Eves in their
gardens, and the botched Byzantine.
In a landscape painted by fry, Hulme notes that the colours, which
are 'sentimental' and 'pretty', accomplish the 'extraordinary feat of
adapting the austere Czanne into something quite fitted for chocolate
boxes'.
In this matter alone, Lewis had found an ally' 9 ; in addition, the
distinction between Omega work and that of the rebel artists was
mirrored in Hulme's aesthetic theory, his strongly couched
anti-romanticism and anti-humanism, and in his adoption of Worringer's
analysis of 'abstraction' and 'empathy' as opposing tendencies in
20	 ,	 ,	 .
art . Thus Hulme s abhorrence for any form of feeble romanticism'
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and Rousseauism would have attracted Lewis's interest, and his
championing of 'abstract' art, stressing its latent permanency as
compared to humanistic, contingent or naturalistic art, was perfectly
in accord with Lewis's. aims as an artist. 'Hulme and myself' wrote
Lewis, preferred
something anti-naturalist and 'abstract' to Nineteenth Century
naturalism.., both he and I preferred to the fluxions in stone of
an Auguste Rodin (following photographically the lines of nature)
the more concentrated abstractions-from-nature of the
Egyptians. 21
'We were', Lewis concedes, 'a couple of fanatics', wanting art to be
'metallic' and 'resistant', preferring a 'helmet to a head of hair'
and a 'scarab to a jelly-fish'. There was no other of whom Lewis
could write:
My contacts with this contemporary is one of the best ways of
reflecting myself. I am describing myself in describing
him... 22
We find in Hulme therefore, the most complete, coherent general
exposition of the emerging principles of a 'new art' which Lewis was
to develop and refine in the guise of Vorticism. Hulme's own reaction
against Bloomsbury artists was a symptom of his anti-romantic
convictions, roused against the 'state of slush in which we have the
misfortune to live' 23. In opening a general theoretical and
philosophical account on modern English art of a particular type and
intent, Hulme recognized he was breaking new ground, and had hoped to
correct misguided, 'muddle-headed' attempts to provide a clear
schematization of the philosophical basis of artists' efforts.
The 'new art', for Huirue, differed in kind, not degree, from the art
which had preceded it: not only does he follow Worringer's
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categorization of art, he concedes his account is 'practically an
abstract of Worringer's views' 24. Hence Hulme defines the difference
as that between 'geometrical' and 'vital' or 'organic' art. He makes
an absolute distinction between the two types of art which, he claims,
'pursue different aims and are created for the satisfaction of
different necessities of the mind' 25. Alongside 'vital', Hulme places
a general attitude which for him culminates in the concept of
humanism, characteristic of the deification of the human body, the
'soft' and 'vital' lines to be found In Greek Classical art, the
Renaissance, and the 'Age of Reason'. Such is 'naturalist' or
26
'realist' art
'Geometrical' art, accordingly, posits a clear opposing tendency:
present in Archaic, pre-Classical Greek art, the hard, angular lines
of Egyptian, Indian and Byzantine work where 'curves tend to be hard
and geometrical', representations of the human body are 'often
entirely non-vital, and distorted to fit into stiff lines and cubical
27
shapes of various kinds' . Most obviously, Hulme notes, this art
'exhibits no delight in nature and no striving after vitality. Its
28
forms are always what can be described as stiff and lifeless' . For
Worringer, as Hulme explains, this tendency towards 'abstract' or
'geometric' art may be a positive response in the need to counter deep'
states of anxiety that are occasioned by a powerlessness In the face
of the 'varied confusion' of existence and the 'feeling of separation
in the face of outside nature' 29. In a statement which clearly echoes
Schopenhauer, and which accurately anticipates Lewis, Hulme outlines
the aesthetic ramifications:
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In art this state of mind results in a desire to create a
certain abstract geometrical shape, which, being durable and
permanent shall be a refuge from the flux and impermanence of
outside nature. The need which art satisfies here, is not the
delight in the forms of nature, which is a characteristic of all
vital arts, but the exact contrary. In the reproduction of
natural objects there Is an attempt to purify them of their
characteristically living qualities in order to make them
necessary and inniovable. The changing is translated into
something fixed and necessary. 30
The 'necessity', in Hulme's judgement, is contained in 'rigid lines'
and 'dead crystalline forms', which are remote from the 'messiness',
'confusion' and the 'accidental details of existing things'. The
difference, therefore, between 'naturalist' or 'vital' art and
geometric art is the difference which arises from either man's
acceptance of the prevailing 'spirit of the age', giving rise to
harmonious relations (cohesion), or a reaction to it: challenge and
disharmony, 'separateness'. Vital art, which is the result of a
31
'happy pantheistic relation between man and the outside world'
constitutes a superficial, harmonious acceptance of that relation,
however it Is defined at a particular juncture. Geometric art, on the
contrary, attempts to subvert and minimise the anxieties of existence
through the permanence of art.
In defence of the new modern work, which Hulme connects with the idea
of a re-emergence of non-vital art, he outlines a basic premise: that
the creation and perception of works of art depend ultimately on a
coniionly understood, particular view or attitude to the world and an
'interpretation of life'. The 'desire' or 'need' for a particular
kind of art is stimulated by this world-view, prevailing
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Weltanschauung, or interpretation of life 32. Thus, certain periods
associated with the Renaissance or Classical Greece fostered
particular 'expectations' in art, and that if these were violated, if
'desires' were unfulfilled, then new art would have been rejected - at
least until expectations had changed.
Hulme's claim is that the emergence of the new geometrical art is
symptomatic of a change in general attitude and sensibility, the
Weltanschauung that will supersede the intimate, optimistic and
harmonious humanistic tendencies which have dominated since the
Renaissance, replaceable by a kind of inhuman, pessimistic world view
which acknowledges the burdens of existence and the inescapable sins
of man, finding partial solace not in a rejection of the world, but in
art. The grounds for this view in contemporary art are found in the
strong move away from existing, established modes of artistic
expression, a negative reaction which fosters 'a new direction, an
intenser perception of things striving towards expression' 33 . Such an
intensity is for Hulme paralleled in 'certain archaic arts',
characteristic of pre-Classical Greek art and oriental manifestations,
which offer permanent formulae to the seeking artist. Cezanne's
'solid' and 'durable' art provides an obvious point of reference for
Hulme in the task of tracing to its roots the 'tendency to
abstraction' which he sees in the reaction to the 'fluidity' and
'impermanence' of impressionism. In addition, it is claimed that some
form of 'archaism' is an 'almost necessary stage In the preparation of
a new movement', no matter if the artist himself later rejects it.
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In thus defining the new, austere, clear cut 'modern art', Hulme was
careful to insist on clear distinctions:
I don't want anyone to suppose... that I am speaking of futurism
which is, In its logical form, the exact opposite of the art I am
describing, being the deification of the flux, the last
efflorescence of impressionism. 34
Hulme also excludes from his characterization those aspects of
'cubism' which, like futurism, depend on theories of
'interpenetration' 35 and the celebration of machine forms. Cubism,
which Hulme sees as 'experimental' and 'embryonic' 36, constitutes a
promise, not a culmination. The development out of Cubist analysis
was currently illustrated for Hulme in a comparison of Metzinger's
work with that produced by Epstein and Lewis. Cubism, in their hands,
'ceases to be analytical, and is transformed into a constructive
geometrical art' 37. The emphasis thus lies with a clean, clear line,
which eschews the messy, organic or indistinct, and expresses
pleasure, not in the vital or anthropomorphic, but in the mechanical,
and machine-orientated structures and constructions. In a description
of one of Lewis's works, Hulme writes:
It is obvious that the artist's only interest in the human body
was in a few abstract mechanical relations perceived In it, the
arm as a lever and so on. The interest in living flesh as such,
in all that detail that makes it vital, which is pleasing, and
which we like to see reproduced, is entirely absent. 38
Hulme is aware however, that despite his 'absolute' distinction
between abstract/geometrical and 'vital' art, the relation is perhaps
not so clear-cut, and it is significant that the problem is
crystallized in front of a Lewis work.
What you get in Mr Lewis's pictures is what you always get
inside any geometrical art. All art of this character turns the
organic into something not organic, it tries to translate the
changing and limited, into something unlimited and necessary...
However strong the desire for abstraction, it cannot be
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satisfied with the reproduction of merely inorganic forms. A
perfect cube looks stable In comparison with the flux of
appearance, but one might be pardoned if one felt no particular
interest in the eternity of a cube; but if you can put man into
some geometrical shape which lifts him out of the transience of
the organic, then the matter is different. 39
In this essay, Hulme is unsure what the relationship between 'machine
forms' and the new art is likely to be, since the nature of that
relation must be left with the 'creative capacities' of the artist,
but he is certain that it will be distinct from the Futurist tendency
to 'beautify' or to 'reflect' machine forms 40, and will place the
artist in an active, defining role, rather than a passive, admiring
one.	 The inevitability of this art, represented in Lewis's and
Epstein's work, was for Hulme not in doubt. The implications,
however, went much further than a new 'style', for Hulme had preceded
Lewis in strongly articulating what he saw as the fundamental,
determining relation between art and modes of thought, believing the
new artistic direction to be 'the precursor of a much wider change in
philosophy and general outlook on the world'41.
In the act of recognizing the formative influence of Hulme's
theories in a characterization of Lewis's Vorticist aesthetic it may
be the case that the profound differences between their positions are
unexplored. Whilst agreement on certain aspects of aesthetics was
ensured, Lewis's reaction - as an artist - to what he saw as Hulme's
ultimately passive acceptance of art dominated by the Bergsonian
notion of flux, generated the beginnings of a lifelong philosophical
struggle. Huirne's lecture on 'Modern Art and its Philosophy', when
placed in parallel with Lewis's later writings, is seen to contain the
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substance of an insurmountable contradiction for Lewis.
At the time when Hulme's writings on aesthetics were formulated and
presented to the public in lectures and published papers, Lewis was
actively and deeply concerned with developing his own theoretical
perspectives on art, and that although he found many of Hulme's
discussions highly relevant and worthy of careful study, on close
inspection he found a deeply troubling disjunction. 	 Despite Hulme's
attraction for 'geometric' or 'abstract' art, 'which, being durable
and permanent shall be a refuge from the flux and impermanence of
outside nature' and functions to translate that which changes into
something fixed and necessary 42, he nevertheless persists in a strange
adherence to Bergson's theory of art and philosophy which does not
give credence to such a possibility. Lewis had keenly recognized a
head-on theoretical collision threatening when he saw one; Hulme's
attachment to the modern, Bergsonian notion of a fundamental
Heracletian flux and his contradictory, Thomist yearning for
permanence had condemned him, Lewis felt, to 'suffer perpetually, to
all appearance. This awful stability of things appalled him'43.
In providing a philosophical analysis of modern art at all, Hulme of
course lays himself open to an imediate logical inconsistency, which
would not have been lost on Lewis. If the 'romantic' in any loose,
but characteristic interpretation, may stand for 'slush', 'sentiment',
'self-expression', 'creativity', 'intuition', the 'irrational', then
Hulme's corrective, which is an intellectual exercise in itself, runs
counter to such values. Hulme also accepts - unreservedly - the
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Bergsonian philosophy which celebrates intuition as prior to
intellect 44. This view identifies intellect, or 'extensive
multiplicity' as severely limited, able 'only' to analyse in a
mechanical way, baffled when faced with a need to formulate syntheses,
45
and functions fully only when directed by intuition . Hulme,
following Bergson, sees reality ultimately as flux, which intuition
alone may grasp; conceptualizations, and the operations of intellect,
which separate and analyse, cannot approach the elan vital, and thus
distort what is known as 'reality' 46. The 'romantic' values censured
by Hulme were equally resisted by Lewis, but it became evident to him,
as it apparently did not to Hulme at this time, that they were
intimately related to Bergson's philosophy in a popular guise.
The tribute paid by Lewis to Hulme in Blasting and Bombardiering47,
despite his somewhat volatile relationship with the brawny and
aggressive philosopher, testifies to their closeness: 'his mind' wrote
Lewis, 'was sensitive and original... but that 'he was a journalist
with a flair for philosophy and art, not a philosopher'. As to
Hulme's prowess in philosophy, Lewis finds himself in agreement with
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Bergson's testimonial , that 'Mr. Hulme should do useful work in the
field of art-criticism'. He continues:
It was mainly as a theorist in the criticism of the fine arts
that Hulme would have distinguished himself, had he lived. And I
should undoubtedly have played Turner to his Ruskin.
All the best things Hulme said about the theory of art were
said about my art.., The things to which his pronouncements would
not apply - or to which my own pronouncements, which influenced
him, would not apply, may quite well be more important. We
happened, that is all, to be made for each other, as critic and
'creator'. What he said should be done, I did. Or it would be
more exact to say that I did it, and he saiTTt. 49
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Lewis is understandably keen to claim priority as a 'creator' and
practitioner of the new art; after all, Hulme was comenting on
the work he had already seen, and whilst Lewis accepts Hulme's
personal preference for Epstein's work to that of his own,
he nevertheless measures his own art against Hulme's characterization.
It is clear that he is less ready to acknowledge any extended
precedence in matters of aesthetics, insisting that his own
'pronouncements' had in fact, influenced Hulme. Lewis's reticence in
this matter, and his statement that the differences of opinion between
them 'may quite well be more important' does not effectively obscure
the evident complexities of a theoretical debt to Hulme. He accepted
the 'best things' Hulme said as applicable to his own work and
inclinations, but strongly rejected aspects of his aesthetics which
necessitated an explicitly self-contradictory allegiance to Bergson's
philosophy. For Lewis, however, the rejection of Hulme's world-view,
derived from Bergson, was a consequence of his reaction to, and
challenge of, key points in Hulme's art theory, and was not initially
asserted on philosophical grounds. This point can be demonstrated by
reference to aspects of Hulme's criticism in respect of Lewis's
art, and to important departures from Hulme's aesthetics that had
surfaced in Blast, and which were later refined.
In a review of the London Group Exhibition on March 26, 191450,
Hulme's criticism of Lewis's art illustrates clearly enough the
ambivalence of the position he attempted to maintain, and how the work
itself, and Hulme's interpretation of it, led to the formation and
recognition of a strong philosophical divergence of approach and
246
opinion which had previously been submerged in the interest of joint
ventures. In this context, it is possible to justify some speculation
about the effect Hulme's analyses would have had on Lewis, since they
would certainly have been read with close attention. Of Lewis's
canvases, the overwhelming judgement by Hulme was that they lacked
'coherence', 'wholeness' and 'completeness'. 'In Mr. Lewis's work'
writes Hulme,
there are always certain qualities of dash and decision, but it
has the defects of these qualities. His sense of form seems to
me to be sequent rather than integral, by which I mean that one
form probably springs out of the preceding one as he works,
instead of being conceived as part of a whole. His Imagination
being quick and never fumbling, very interesting relations are
generated in this way, but the whole sometimes lacks cohesion and
unity. 51
It would not be difficult to outline the kind of rejoinder Lewis might
have made in response to such a criticism of his work. Fully in
agreement with Hulme's earlier call for a 'permanent', 'rigid' and
'hard-edged' art, Lewis might indeed have been surprised by what would
have seemed to be an 'obsession' with vaguely expressed ideas about
'unity', 'wholeness' and 'coherence'. If such terms applied, the
notions of 'sequential' and 'separateness', used perjoratively by
Hulme, would for Lewis, on the contrary, constitute a positive
description of the particular qualities he sought in his art. It was,
after all, the notion of a 'separation in the face of nature' that had
for Hulme, encouraged the artist to seek solace in the permanence and
isolation of the geometric art which he so energetically supported.
Lewis also might well have been puzzled to find Hulme looking for the
approximation of elements which, they would have both agreed, were
counted as undesirable in Futurism and Cubism: 'interpenetration', by
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which means objects lost their distinctness, and the 'insipid'
impressionism which sought to capture 'wholes', rather than explicit
details. 'Integration' and 'Interpenetration' were like terms in
Lewis's vocabulary, and Hulme's insistence on this anomaly highlights
with clarity some of the reasons why Lewis, driven by what he regarded
as artistic necessity, embarked on his campaign of anti-Bergsonism.
As an artist, Lewis was jealous of his professionalism, and believed
that no non-artist could speak authoritatively about the inception and
creation of a work. Hulme's assumption, that 'one form probably
springs out of the preceding one as he works' may or may not have been
accurate, but it would have been the assumption itself that would have
rankled with Lewis. No uncritical supporter of 'form for form's
sake', Lewis would nevertheless have insisted that, whatever the
origins of a creative process were seen to be 52, the control of the
process nonetheless lies with an artist's intellectual capacities, and
does not spring, 'unconceptualized' from the 'general haze', as Hulme
maintained
Hulme's 'absolute' distinction between 'geometrical' and 'vital' art
would have been roundly challenged by Lewis on grounds which penetrate
deeply to their differences. Hulme's anti-humanism, mirrored in the
distinction between pre-Classical, Archaic and certain Indian and
oriental arts as 'geometric' and Classical Greek, Renaissance and
those forms dependent on a deification of the human body as 'vital',
was not shared by Lewis where that distinction was derived from a
rigid separation between 'abstract-geometrical' and anthropomorphic
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forms. Also, Hulme's argument that one kind of art stems from
cohesion, and the other from disharmony, was an over-simplified
account, since the history of art was peppered with innovators and
those who challenged prevailing styles and standards, Leonardo being a
54
particular favourite of Lewis's . Unless artists tested out the
limits of popular tolerances, Classical Greek art could not have
evolved from the Archaic, nor the Renaissance from Cimabue and Giotto.
Hulme's period-specific concept of Weltanschauung that underpins his
analysis of Classical Greece and the Renaissance would have held
comparison in Lewis's analysis with Spengler's notion of
world-as-history and the wider implications of chronologism. But
types of subject matter, for Lewis, unlike Hulme, were not fundamental
in an analysis of artistic precedents. No form or type of subject -
whether it becomes 'abstract' in practice, or declares 'natural'
origins - is the exclusive recourse of one type of artist or another.
Hulme himself is aware of the problem:
I admit that the artist cannot work without contact with, and
continual research into nature, but one must make a distinction
between this and the conclusion drawn from It that the work of
art itself must be an interpretation of nature. 55
Hulme clings precariously to the notion that 'abstract' art somehow
springs from a different 'source' to the 'Neo-Realism' of Ginner which
he censures here. For Lewis, Hulme's difficulty would have persisted
as a corollary of his non-practitioner status. The hole which Hulme
digs for himself is unnecessary and misguided, for his 'problem' rests
with a mistaken, rigid distinction 56
 between the 'representational'
and 'non- representational', or between 'naturalism/realism' and
'abstraction/geometrical'. Art, Lewis insists, always represents, and
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representational implications may not be avoided, however 'abstract'
57
the work may appear
The key difference between Hulme's view of 'interpretation' and
Lewis's acceptance that an artist's work will always represent
something can be further explained in terms of their radically
different attitudes towards artistic creation. These are clarified by
analogous reference to the kind of philosophical gulf which emerges in
a comparison of Bergson and Berkeley. Hulme's theory of artistic
creativity follows Bergson most closely; the function of the artist
accordingly, is to pierce through to 'reality' - the flux -, to break
down by means of intuition the spatial barriers which prevent an
immediate, direct access to that reality. It is a process of
discovery for Hulme, and what there is to be 'discovered' by the
artist is already pre-determined. If we could indeed 'break through
the veil which action' (intellect) 'interposes, if we could come into
direct contact with sense and consciousness, art would be useless and
unnecessary' 58
Lewis's view is, on the contrary, based securely on what Hulme and
Bergson would take to be the main stumbling block to this process of
discovery. Whilst Hulme's understanding of artistic creation is
largely passive, Lewis, who was almost certainly already attuned to a
Berkeleyan concept of reality, stresses the active role of the artist
in organizing and re-creating stimuli through art. The artist does
not render 'unorganized life'; although his material may derive from
the flux, it is emphatically re-created and re-conceptualized by
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intellect in the distinct, stabilizing process of making art. 'The
best creation' Lewis was to assert in Blast 2, 'is only the most
highly developed selection and criticism', and the finest artists are
those 'who are so trained and sensitized that they have a perpetually
59
renewed power of DOING WHAT NATURE DOES' . The idea of artist as
creator, not discoverer, which was first articulated in Blast was more
fully stated later, supplanting Hulme's two kinds of art for two kinds
of artist:
There are two attitudes towards the material world that, one or
other manifesting itself in him, an artist may very roughly
be distributed on one side or the other of a creative pale... An
artist can Interpret or he can Create. There is for him,
according to his temperament and kind, the alternative of the
Receptive attitude or the Active and Changing one. 60
Hulme, who openly acknowledged his role as a mediator of knowledge,
rather than as a formulator of ideas 61 , is an interpreter, in these
terms, even though much of his work was highly respected, not least by
Lewis. Such a characterization aptly sunilarizes the major divisions
of thought between Hulme and Lewis which, whilst arising from
disagreements about the nature of art and its processes of creation,
also makes philosophical agreement impossible. For Hulme, art is a
means to an end, which could be dispensed with if direct contact with
the alan vital was possible; for Lewis, art is the end product since
it is actively creative. Although in agreement with Hulme that one's
world view is crucial, Lewis took the Berkeleyan road in his belief
that conceptualization - and in particular for him, the
conceptualization of the artist - determines that view.
It would thus be inaccurate to regard Hulme's lectures as
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substantially constituting the particularly Lewisian interpretation of
the salient aspects of Vorticism, since there are profound material
differences in their respective approaches. If a writer such as
Hulme, in a position to influence and shape the ways in which artists
thought about their art, was to be guided by what Lewis had come to
regard as an 'anti-art' philosophy, the consequences would be
intolerable. Schopenhauer's notion of art as a means to transcend the
flux has central connections with both Hulme's and Lewis's views, but
yet 1-lulme here claims philosophical priority for Bergson. His
aversion to futurism 62 was publicly declared at a time when Lewis was
reasonably content to be so amorphously described, and when
Marinetti's feats of self-publicity inspired onlookers with their
audacity and bravado. The description of futurism as the 'deification
of the flux', and the 'last efflorescence of impressionism' was a
judgement which was to be heartily endorsed by Lewis, whose art may
have been influenced by the Italian movement, but who had also
insisted - loudly - on vital differences, when the implications of not
doing so had been realized. Already becoming increasingly wary of
Futurism in its 'automobilist' machine-glorifying tendencies, and of
Marinetti's opportunism and iconoclastic, tub-thumping activities,
Lewis could not reconcile Hulme's coninitment, after the example of
Worringer, to a stable, defined and static geometric art, with his
equally strong devotion to the vitalist theories of Bergson. Lewis's
obvious respect for Hulme's thought and his flair for aesthetics would
most probably have encouraged a closer study of the implications and
ambiguities involved than if the reverse had been the case.
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Hulme had thus achieved a statement of aesthetics which Lewis was able
to partly endorse. What Hulme failed to stress, and what Lewis now
fully understood, was that Bergson's philosophy was the theoretical
lynch-pin which held Futurist aesthetics together. Lewis had found a
contradiction in Hulme of such	 proportions that if a campaign
of definition and clarification had been desirable before, it had now
become most urgent.
II.6.iii Cubism and Futurism: Blast against Bergson
Blast had promised definitions and explanations: theoretical
justification for the visual art which had already been produced, and
a progranne for the future of English art. The apparent difficulties
which attend any attempt to clearly define the tenets and principles
of Vorticism are due in part to the style and method of approach
favoured by Lewis and his colleagues, which owes much to Futurist and
Cubist precedents 63. The revolutionary impulse to severely jolt the
delicate sensibilities of the English artistic fraternity took
precedence over the need for a well-argued, 'logical' and coherent
exegesis. A liberal helping of provocation, a heavy reliance on
satire, irony, and plain rudeness ensured the magazine's combat
status, but worked against an acceptance of its content in sober terms
- at least on a surface level. But it is precisely the content of
Lewis's writings in Blast that requires analysis if the implications
are to be fully realized in relation to the apparently more systematic
texts which followed later. We should, however, always be mindful of
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the explosive context of these early articles, for their style of
presentation owes much to the character of the visual art which is
thus illuminated.
In a study of both issues of Blast, it is evident that an overridingly
serious mission for Lewis was to distinguish the new movement,
Vorticism 64, from the main European rival movements of Futurism and
Cubism. In this way - by default, almost, the principles of Vorticism
would seem to emerge. Lewis was indeed absolutely clear in his own
mind how Vorticism was to differ from its rivals. From an
acquaintance with Hulme's aesthetics, and from a basis of paintings
and drawings that were already completed, Lewis was now ready to
undertake the theoretical corrnitment and exposition that was
necessary. On a technical and stylistic level, he knew even if
critics and observers were prepared to herald a new, Innovative and
specifically English art movement, a family resemblance with Futurism
and Cubism would be obvious. For Lewis, this was accepted as
unavoidable, since he was always ready to acknowledge such influences
and cross-fertilizations as essential to art practice. What mattered
most was that the public should understand that the ideas which
underpinned, supported and sustained various forms of art were
crucially important, and that in the case of Cubism and Futurism,
these were both artistically and philosophically unacceptable.
It is in Blast 2 that we find the first most comprehensive and
systematic survey of tendencies in art by Lewis, and it is useful to
refer to this article as a base point for examining other relevant
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statements. In 'A Review of Contemporary Art', Lewis names Vorticism
as a 'certain new impulse in art' and proceeds to identify 'three
distinct groups of artists in Europe', comprising	 Cubism, Futurism
and Expressionism. The most important of these, claims Lewis, is
Cubism, mainly by virtue of containing the most 'important' and
influential artist, Pablo Picasso. If Futurism, as identified by
Lewis, is the practice for which Bergson conveniently supplies the
theory, it is not surprising to find a constant thread of resistance
in this respect recurring throughout Blast 1 and Blast 2. Yet Cubism
- in both its 'analytical' and 'synthetic' phases - appears 'static',
hard-edged, and unsentimental enough - but suffers almost as much at
Lewis's hands as Futurist 'Automobilism' does.
The case against Cubism seems inappropriate if it is not fully
understood that the early distinction that Lewis makes between
Futurism and Cubism precedes, and corresponds closely, to what later
became the distinctive characterization of the theory and effects of
the time-philosophy. In Futurism, Lewis read the attempt to render
dynamism in plastic form - a distillation of Bergson's philosophy as
applied to a programmatic formulation in the practice of art. In
Blast, Futurism and Cubism were clearly imbued with some of the
cultural values of 'Romance' that are critically examined in 'The
Revolutionary Simpleton'; Lewis had outlined elements which would
later be allied to the 'effects' of chronologism in Western Culture.
It is therefore fitting that France, and the French, should be both
'Blasted' and 'Blessed', for Lewis (an honorary Englishman), and his
English colleagues, were deeply indebted to the example of Picasso (an
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honorary Frenchman), and French expertise in 'technical' matters. Yet
at root Lewis had diagnosed a virulent cultural disease that had so
affected English art and its practitioners that it had to be
denounced in the strongest terms in the early pages of Blast 1.
The outcome of this affliction had in no uncertain terms produced a
sentimentalist, 'GALLIC GUSH', a 'FUSSINESS' and 'prettiness', 'pig
plagiarism' and 'PARISIAN PAROCHIALISM' 65. It is no accident that the
terms in which Lewis attacks French art and Cubism are precisely those
which had applied to the art and critical interests supported by Roger
Fry and his Bloomsbury friends. They were to Lewis the French enemy
within, but their weak pastiches of Matisse, Czanne and Picasso
lacked the technical credentials of the 'best' French art. The point
is explicitly made:
We assert that the extreme langour, sentimentalism and lack of
vitality in Picasso's early stylistic work was a WEAKNESS, as
definite a one as consumption or anaemia, and that therefore his
reaction, and the character of this reaction, should be
discounted as a healthy influence in modern painting, which it is
not....
The placid empty planes of Picasso's later 'natures-mortes' the
bric--brac of bits of wall-paper, pieces of cloth, etc.,
tastefully arranged,...wonderfully tastefully arranged, is a dead
and unfruitful tendency....
The most abject, anaemic, and amateurish manifestation of this
Matisse decorativeness,' or Picasso deadness and bland
arrangement, could no doubt be found.., in Mr. Fry's curtain and
pincushion factory in Fitzroy Square. 66
Whilst Lewis admired Picasso's skills and inventiveness inmensely, it
was precisely the mastery of his artistic media that rendered him
dangerous to those who would seek to break away from his influence.
The 'cloud' which is Picasso, is 'exquisite and accomplished', but
must be dispelled forthwith: 'We must' Lewis concludes, 'disinculpate
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ourselves of Picasso at once'.
The issue which lies at the heart of Lewis's exhortation is one which
exercised Hulme and many other theorists of 'modern' or 'abstract'
art, and in Lewis's thinking was to have a determining influence on
the philosophy which was adopted to support those ideas and which was
formulated primarily in response to aesthetic problems. Cubism, for
Lewis, equalled, albeit in modern format, the essence of a detrimental
naturalist approach to the object - the artist's object - which came
to be very much at stake in the struggle against the time-cultism of
Bergson. The modern version of such a naturalism followed its origins
through closely; from a basis in Manet, Impressionism and Cezanne, it
was nevertheless no more 'revolutionary' than a kind of 'cubed-over'
Impressionism. The stabilized appearance of Picasso's compositions
could not, and should not, bear any comparison to Vorticist pictures
for they were based on 'dead' nature - 'natures -mortes', on the
appearances insisted upon in Impressionist works, 'pulled about' by an
overlay of Cubist technique. The invention of Picasso was thereby
founded upon the traditional posed model, or the posed still-life
which to Lewis was admirable technically, but was ultimately only a
transitional strategy in the search for a method which would uncover
reality in artistic terms.
In Blast 1 and Blast 2, Lewis proposes three intimately connected
variations of the concept, 'life'. The first two describe the 	 -
commonly-conceived relationship between 'life' and 'art'. 'Life' in
this sense adheres to the flux; nothing profounder than a 'good
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dinner, good sleep, roll-in-the-grass category' 67 , the animal life of
the senses, the constant bane and companion of the intellect. The
artistic response to this is naturalism, another kind of 'life' in
which an attempt is made to synthesize the primitive life with
creative art: it is a life of 'blessed retreat.., for those artists
whose imagination is mean and feeble, whose vocation and instinct are
unrobust' 68. The copying of nature, the 'tasteful arrangement' of
motifs by the artist, allows the flux of 'life' to dominate art; thus
even Picasso's cubic excursions are so determined.
There is also for Lewis the concept of artistic life, which lives by
plastic values, and which is central to Vorticist art. Cubism is
stable, it is static, but it is also dead in terms of plastic values.
The analogy of Cubist composition as a plastic formula for a stone or
brick house is placed beside the Vorticist adoption of the machine
motif 69. The house is still, but it has no energy, actual or implied;
the machine may be still and motionless, but its static form and
implied, not explicit, dynamic and purposive potential typifies the
complex relationship that Lewis needed to establish in Vorticism,
between plastic 'life' and 'actual' life - that which is
representative of the flux. An artist must find a way to accormiodate
the demands of both, if an acceptance of a 'creative instinct' is to
be established in any way as a logically coherent proposition.
Artists who, like Cezanne and Picasso, depend closely on 'dead' nature
for their child-like 'copyist' exercises produce a passive, imitative
and flux-directed art that even in its most highly inventive phases
succeeds only in re-creating itself70.
258
Lewis argues with particular relish his case that Nature, if
worshipped slavishly, is a particularly sterile kind of 'Tyrant', that
could make an 'idiot' of Cezanne, an 'amateurish carpenter' and
boot-maker of Picasso 71 and which dangerously insists on the
subordination of the artist's eye to 'shadows' and the ever-changing
vicissitudes of appearances. The central place of Picasso, his
predecessors and imitators, and the adherence to a literal or even a
72
'conceptual' or 'profound' naturalism , is unmistakeably identified
by Lewis as timeist; 'With Picasso's revolution in the plastic arts'
Lewis wrote in Blast 1, 'the figure of the Artist becomes still more
blurred and uncertain. Engineer or artist might conceivably become
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transposable terms...' . The idea of a merging of the artist's
profession with that of others was firmly resisted by Lewis throughout
his writing career, but it was in the first issue of Blast, and in
relation to what he saw as a threat to his profession as an artist
that he had begun to draw the connecting links of Bergsonism and art
theory and practice together. Thus, Cubism came to represent a kind
of congealed dynamism; their static was passive, not active, and it
was made up of dead elements, natures-mortes (still lifes), and the art
for art's sake romanticism typified in Victorian aestheticism,
primitivism and the child-cult, latterly embraced by fry, Stein 	 and
Bloomsbury.
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Had Marinetti chosen the term, 'Dynamism' instead of Futurism , the
problems of definition and explanation that Lewis and his fellows
faced may have been somewhat diminished. We know that Lewis was
reasonably content, at various times, to accept the title of 'English
Cubist' or 'English Futurist', until events demanded clarification.
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Even in Blast 1, he was ready to accept such a description if it was
designed to characterize rebellion, or renovation in art, but reacted
in the strongest possible terms to any element which was directly or
indirectly derived from Bergson's world-view. Dynamism was the
metaphysical concept which underlay the superficialities of
'Automobilism', the attempt to render in rather literal terms, the
'whirling life of speed' which Marinetti and the Futurist painters
placed at the artistic and philosophical centre of 'modern life'.
This was clearly articulated in the first Technical Manifesto of
Futurist painting of 1910:
The gesture which we would reproduce on canvas shall no longer
be a fixed moment in universal dynamism. It shall simply be the
dynamic sensation itself.
Indeed, all things move, all things run, all things are rapidly
changing. A profile is never motionless before our eyes, but it
constantly appears and disappears. On account of the persistency
of an image upon the retina, moving objects constantly multiply
themselves; their form changes like rapid vibrations, in their
mad career. Thus a running horse has not four legs, but twenty,
and their movements are triangular. 76
By March 1912, the first exhibition of Futurist painting in London,
the catalogue statement re-affirmed the painters' loyalties to these
principles 77. This document, which would have certainly been
carefully read and discussed by avant-garde artists and critics in
England, is a typical example of the copious writings and manifestoes
produced in defence of Futurist art. It provides a useful summary of
the ideas against which Lewis reacted so strongly in Blast, and
demonstrates the influence of Bergsonism in the formulation of
Futurist aesthetics 78•
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The characteristic call, prefaced energetically by Marinetti 79
 for a
renunciation of 'past' or academic art is echoed here; an attachment
to past art is equated with the 'motionless', 'frozen', 'static
aspects of Nature' - the dislike of 'petrification' in art is linked
with academicism, to be supplanted, as never before by a 'style of
motion'. To start afresh, to constantly extol individual intuition,
and to begin from an 'absolutely modern sensation' that accepts the
terms 'painting' and 'sensation' as inseparable, is the Futurist's
intoxicating aim. A repudiation of Impressionism is accompanied by a
desire to surpass it through development and adaptation; divisionism,
'innate complementariness' is 'essential and necessary' to this
process 80 . 'What must be rendered' in Futurist painting 'is the
dynamic sensation' or its interior force:
In painting a person on a balcony, seen from inside the room, we
do not limit the scene to what the square frame of the window
renders visible; but we try to render the sum total of visual
sensations which the person on the balcony has experienced;...
This implies the simultaneousness of the ambient, and, therefore,
the dislocation and dismemberment of objects, the scattering and
fusion of details, freed from accepted logic, and independent
from one another.., the picture must be the synthesis of what
one remembers and of what one sees. 81
Placing the spectator in the 'centre of the picture', making him
'live' in that centre, in a participatory role, is a recurring motif
in Futurist theory; the wish to merge spectator with the work itself,
via the means of depicted force-lines, which must 'encircle and
involve the spectator so that he will.., be forced to struggle himself
with the persons in the picture'. The continuity of such force-lines
is measured and ensured by intuitional means, but most importantly,
the Futurist painters stress the necessity of subordinating 'one's
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intellectual culture', to deliver oneself up, 'heart and soul' to the
work of art; to lose one's 'self' in the experience of entering into
the work. Declaring themselves accordingly as the 'primitives of a
completely renovated sensitiveness', they seek to unite, through the
operations of instinct and intuition, what is exterior and concrete
with what is interior - the 'abstract', spiritual, emotional and
mystical. The new conceptions of painting which are thus claimed by
the Futurists attempt to invoke a collectivity or synthesis of states
of mind in excited communion with objects, emotions and experience,
aspiring to re-write the activity of aesthetic contemplation in a new,
dynamic, and violent mode. It is evident enough from the paintings
and drawings produced by Lewis at this time that a profound critique
of the art of Futurism was under way in practice, to be supported by a
sustained attack on its theoretical and philosophical implications.
The 'blasting' of Bergson himself in Blast 1 82 was accompanied by
opening statements about the 'romantic' and 'sentimental' gush of the
Italian artists, and the boring 'AUTOMOBILISM' of Marinetti.
Immediately the familiar parameters of the time-cultist debate are
established: the Futurist, in his nai've enthusiasm for machinery and
the 'modern', parodies Wilde and Gissing, 'a sensational and
sentimental mixture of the aesthete of 1890 and the realist of 1870'.
Lewis's terms are not always used entirely consistently83, but it is
unequivocally intended that, as with Cubism, the implications of an
uncritical, or passive Impressionism and naturalism should be raised
in pursuit of the artistic 'credentials' of Futurism. The rejection
of Impressionism that the Italian painters were anxious to stress held
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no weight for Lewis, for he saw little fundamental difference in the
naturalist aims and methods of 1870's Impressionism and the
arbitrarily named Post-Impressionist movement, of which Divisionism
was a variety, and which was claimed as an essential element of
Futurist aesthetics.
In the essay, 'The Melodrama of Modernity', Lewis explicitly
identified Marinetti's Futurism as 'largely Impressionism up-to-date'
to which is added 'his Automobilism and Nietzsche stunt' 84. No less
is Bergson the philosopher of Impressionism in 'Futurism, Magic and
Life'. He is the chief culprit in the popularizing of 'this new
prescience in France', the 'merging' of 'life' and 'art' in a
synthesis which must favour the former, and devour the latter. Of the
three 'levels' or meanings of the term 'life' already outlined, the
problem is clearly an artistic one, for as Lewis explains in
'Futurism, Magic and Life', what he means by 'Life' here is not the
dark, primitive, unconscious life of the senses, but concerns the
succeeding stage of consciousness which is most affected by the
primeval state, and which finds its form of artistic expression in the
kind of passive naturalism encouraged by Impressionism and Futurism.
The outcome of a Bergsonian coupling of the artistic impulse with this
level, or synthesis of life/art (i.e., naturalism) is in no doubt for
Lewis: 'There is rather only room for ONE Life, in Existence, and Art
has to behave itself and struggle' 85 . The balance is, however, very
fine indeed, as Lewis recognizes, for 'The finest Art is not pure
Abstraction, nor is it unorganized life':
The Artist, like Narcissus, gets his nose nearer and nearer the
surface of Life.
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He will get it nipped off if he is not careful, by some
Pecksniff-shark sunning it's [sic] lean belly near the surface,
or other lurker beneath his image, who has been feeding on
it's [sic] radiance.
Reality is in the artist, the image only in life, and he should only
approach so near as is necessary for a good view. 86
However the artist approaches 'life', Lewis is insistent that this
should be primarily determined by plastic values rather than the
'illustrative' and 'copyist' aims of the 'pedantic' naturalist. Only
in this way might the terms of the Bergsonian impact on aesthetics -
'Everywhere LIFE is said instead of ART' - be reversed.
For Lewis, the Futurists' theoretical glorification of Heraclitean
flux was accompanied by inevitable mechanical formulae and cheapness
in art. Their stress on 'simultaneity', 'innate complementariness'
and the 'dynamic sensation' itself, and their attempts to reproduce in
a static spatial medium the effects of time and movement, were
inappropriate at best. The worst excesses of 'Automobilism' were
encapsulated in the idea that a running horse has 'not four legs but
twenty...' and the literal way in which the painters tried to realize
this in practice. By the time Blast 2 was published, Lewis had
refined further his theoretical response to Futurism. The 'Romance
about Science' and criticism of the formulaic products of Futurism
that found a prominent place in Blast 1 was shaped into a more
coherent argument in Lewis's 'Review'. By comparing the Futurist
doctrine of maximum fluidity and interpenetration with other
contemporary tendencies in art, Lewis observes the links between
modern science and artistic expression, in direct anticipation of his
critique of space-tinieists in Time and Western Man. The Futurists
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were, he felt, too 'observant, impressionistic and scientific', and
too 'banally logical in their exclusions'; instead of the artist
dominating his subject matter, Futurist art allows the content
('life') to direct the art.
Contrasted with Cubism, which for Lewis had at least some semblance of
'plastic' (artistic) 'life', for Lewis, Futurist work had nothing but
life in their compositions; not of an artistic kind, but of the
animal, contingent life which, related to Bergson's notion of the alan
vital and Schopenhauer's will, in excess, destroys the art. Vorticism
was pledged to reject the 'deadness' of academic art that informed
most contemporary work in England, and the nature-mortes of Cubism,
but equally, in the process of investing art with the qualities of
'flashing and eager flesh, or shining metal' as the Italian Futurists
wished to do, Lewis wanted to make it understood that art itself would
undoubtedly be ousted as a consequence 87. This was the essence of
Lewis's case against Futurism; for him, it was revealed as Bergson's
anti-art campaign bottled up in an ostensibly artistic form, and this
deception had to be identified and refuted.
The opening statement in Blast 1, 'Long Live the Vortex!' outlines the
aesthetic parameters of the debate:
We do not want to change the appearance of the world,
because we are not Naturalists, Impressionists or
Futurists (the latest form of Impressionism), and do not
depend on the appearance of the world for our art. 88
Lewis wants to re-define and explain the Vorticist position with
regard to art-historical labels such as 'naturalism', 'Impressionism',
'Cubism', 'Futurism', and 'Expressionism'. We can note with interest
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how aesthetic and philosophical assumptions are explicitly related:
89
reality is to the artist what truth is to the philosopher ; that is,
the artist's 'OBJECTIVE' is reality, whilst the philosopher's is
truth 90. Thus Lewis was able to appropriate the label, 'realism' for
Vorticism, distinct from a perjorative use of 'naturalism' for those
forms of art against which Vorticism had reacted. These forms and
tendencies, and the ways in which they had potentially ranged
themselves against Lewis's own ideas on aesthetics were crucially
important to meditations on the philosophical implications of claiming
the objective of 'reality' for art.
It would be difficult not to recognize in these first writings on
aesthetics the beginnings of a consistent case against Bergson and
chronologism. In view of the basic objections to Cubism and Futurist
art and theory, and in conjunction with a reading of the two editions
of Blast in the context of Lewis's background and education, including
his relations with various sections of the English avant-garde, the
art establishment and Hulme, the outline of an aesthetics such as that
underwritten by Lewis had established its terms in a wider cultural
and intellectual field of reference.
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II.6.iv A Logic of Contradictions and the Primary Pigment: Aspects of
Theory and Practice
Retrospective views by artists of earlier work and enthusiasms are
obviously 'interested', and should be handled with care. In this
case, however, it would be a myopic analysis that did not take into
account coninents central to an enquiry which seeks to elucidate
matters relevant to an entire career. Lewis, in an article entitled
'The Vorticists' for Vogue in 1956, gives a 'potted' version of what
all the 'fuss' was about; it benefits from hindsight, but issuing from
the pen of a painter who could no longer see to work, is devoid of the
more blatant elements of self-aggrandizement found in Blast. In this
context, some remarks deserve particular attention, for they stress
with vigour and clarity, at the end of Lewis's career, the main
characteristics of Vorticism that, I would argue, had contributed most
positively to the formation, development and expression of his mature
philosophy. Indeed, as Lewis describes it, Vorticism was a 'new
philosophy', a visual one, which had to be essentially regarded and
understood in visual terms: it was
an intellectual eruption, productive of a closely-packed,
brightly-coloured alphabet of objects with a logic of its own.
The doctrine which is implicit in this eruption is to be looked
for in the shapes for which it was responsible. 9]
What I hope to make explicit in the course of this discussion, is the
relation between the emphasis on intellectualism, which has been named
as a guiding factor in Lewis's thought from the outset, and the formal
means available to Lewis the artist that could be construed in terms
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of a specific 'logic'. In Lewis's Yorticist works, the required
Intensity of expression is powerfully achieved by the manipulation of
form in terms of colour effects and contrasts. Philosophical and
mystical debates In art, about the nature and symbolic value of colour
had drawn upon the influential 'romantic' views of Goethe and
Schopenhauer and these had acted as a backdrop to Lewis's art
practice. Largely unsuccessful experiments with fashionable ideas
about 'correspondences' In the arts and an Increasing distaste for
emotionalism, coupled with a philosophical uneasiness about the
process of merging 'art' with 'life', or even 'art' with 'the' arts,
had led Lewis inevitably towards the affirmation of at least a
relative autonomy for the plastic arts. He had begun to recognize
fundamental differences between his own yearning for a conceptual,
intellectual approach to art and its means, and the particular
emotionalist and vitalist indulgences that he discerned in others.
His support for an art which could approach 'a visual language as
abstract as music' 92 depended on the attributing of analogies between
the arts, rather than an endorsement of a process of merging, with
music as the supreme arbiter.
Ezra Pound's Vorticism had laid greater emphasis on the dynamic and
time-specific than was suited to Lewis's 'static', 'spatial'
93
version , and this was to become a profound division between them -
at least in so much as Lewis was concerned. Clear links, therefore,
which began to bind Lewis's aesthetics and developing philosophical
views are readily discernible in the differences which emerged in
Lewis's and Pound's attitude towards the issue of colour symbolism in
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the visual arts. Pound, with his 'sentimental' archaism, and clear
endorsement In Blast of the emotionalist theories of colour in art put
forward by writers like Kandinsky, was to become irmuortalized by Lewis
as the archetypal 'time-mind' in 'The Revolutionary Simpleton'. The
ramifications of this are highly significant. As is the case with
Lewis's anti-romanticism, what I show is the extent to which important
factors in the early revolt against what was to be identified as
chronologism in Time and Western Man were already clearly implicated
in his attitude towards debates which centre around artistic or
art-specific matters. These had arisen and had been worked upon in
practice, and were articulated by means of the Vorticist aesthetic in
Blast. The point is underlined by reference to the distinctions made
In theory and practice between an 'emotlonalist', or 'inner' approach
to colour and form and the 'conceptual', or 'outer' attitude
characteristic of Lewis. It is thus a necessary task to initiate an
examination of matters which had informed and determined vital aspects
of both the intellectual and practical dimensions of Lewis's
aesthetic, in order that the particular visual and philosophical logic
of Vorticism to which Lewis refers may be disclosed.
It will be evident from earlier sections of this chapter that the
specific terms, principles and meanings of Vorticism that Lewis put
forward in Blast do not emerge with sufficient clarity as a sole
consequence of examining the assumptions and the forms of art and
philosophy that are critically censured. The 'sum' of Vorticism is
not a negative position between dynamism and dead nature; it does not
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tamely mediate between Cubism and Futurism, nor does it simply provide
a convenient 'synthesis' between the two, a position often drawn upon
In general art histories, although influences may be detected and
freely acknowledged. If the most positive and complex character of
the aesthetic which Lewis somewhat Idiosyncratically Introduced In the
two issues of the magazine, was already essentially worked out in
visual terms, its theoretical significance may not thus be understood
fully In isolation from art practice. The 'theory' attempts to
'explain' the art, however, and must therefore be outlined in its
general application before an approach to relevant aspects of practice
can be usefully formulated.
Vorticism is not, principally, defined or explained in the pages of
Blast In a conventional sense; 'conventional', that is, for example,
by the Futurist artists' standards whereby clearly related principles
and strategies to be adopted are signposted for the reader. In a
sense, such 'logic' anticipates In theory a temperamental
contradiction to the kind of 'emotional' practice that was envisaged
for Futurism. In Lewis's case, I would suggest that a far more
appropriate, powerful, and essentially intellectual process of
exegesis is put to work that Is able to characterize and exemplify the
Vorticist 'attitude', aesthetics and philosophical principles, and
which Is equally relevant to practice and appropriate methods of
interpretation. The areas of application and operation of Vorticism
are marked out according to what Lewis calls the 'logic of
contradictions' that explicitly attempts to exploit the explanatory
power of oppositional propositions. By proposing an intellectual
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concept of the vortex Lewis was thus able to develop a sophisticated
aesthetic theory which could allow the operations of time - the flux,
emotionalism, sensationalism - to be rehearsed and acknowledged, as
Indeed they must, in the interests of artistic creation, but were at
the same time firmly subjected to the controlling organization of
spatial parameters.
The relationship between vortex and flux as defined by Lewis has to be
described in terms that favour the former concept for clarity, and as
a recognition of his ultimate priorities, but as these are expressed
in Blast, the balance Is an extremely delicate one, and often, in the
juxtaposition of contradictory statements, may appear to undermine the
central thesis. Some propositions just are provocative, like the
conspicuous blasting and blessing of notions associated with
'England', 'France', and 'Humour', but the fabric of Lewis's strategy
achieves deeper significance than this. The notion of a zeitgeist,
for example, was particularly associated by Lewis with the attitude
later associated with the typical time-mind, and which was evoked to
characterize a passive, unthinking subservience to the fashions and
fancies of the day - whether in clothing, art, music, dance, science,
behaviour or philosophy. Yet in both Blast 1 and Blast 2, art is
exhorted to become 'organic with its Time' 	 and the call for a
'renewed conception of aesthetics in sympathy with our time'	 appears
to lend no obvious logical support to an anti-Bergsonian,
anti-Futurist and anti-Spenglerian thesis. The logic, however, is
found in the balance between opposing ideas, although it is not always
articulated as explicitly as this:
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the best art Is always the nearest to Its time, as surely
as It Is the most Independent of It. It does not condescend
to lead. But often, an artist, simpiy because he takes hold
of his time impassively, impartially, without fuss, appears
to be a confirmed protester... 96
The difference that Lewis requires, between his own attitude towards
his 'time' and that of timeists is essentially that between the
pragmatic observer and the besotted worshipper, but it Is a difference
which may be revealed more profoundly If allowed to emerge from a
position which acknowledges, with Insight, mutually dependent
characteristics and assumptions. In this case, the effects of his
'time', his 'age' and the flux of 'life' on the artist and his work
are accepted as Inevitable, but not overwhelmingly so. • Art' may be
'time-ful', but the stillness, deadness and 'timelessness' which
characterizes its essential nature sets it apart from the flux.
It is precisely at the heart of contradictions like this that the
concept of the vortex is applied by Lewis, and functions most
effectively. Contrasts and oppositions continually fascinated him
because he implicitly understood the paradoxical character of
dualities; that the one stands in opposition to the other, cancelling
out the other, but may not operate in the other's absence: each
requires the presence - and absence - of the other in order both to
reveal and negate the contradiction. This 'harmonious and sane
duality' was to be made possible only through intense, unremitting
intellectual effort:
You must talk with two tongues, if you do not wish to cause
confusion...
You must give the impression of two persuaders... with four
eyes vacillating concentrically at different angles upon the
subject chosen for subjugation.
There is nothing so impressive as the number TWO.
You must be a duet in everything...
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No clear outlines, except on condition of being dual and
prolonged.
You must catch the clearness and logic in the midst of
contradictions: not settle down and snooze on an acquired,
easily possessecliiid mastered, satisfying shape. 97
This interdependence implies duality and entity: the conceptual arena
of dualities was therefore to be defined in relation to mutually
shared characteristics whereby each entity, or proposition, would
achieve extremity from the other at precisely the same point where the
always-present, but suppressed elements of cohesion have maximum
applicability. Such a strategy is perfectly understandable - and
justifiable if the object of the exercise is to attempt to exist
beyond contingencies, at the logical 'edge', or the 'space between'
sense and non-sense in order to avoid over-simplification and crass
emotionalism.
The recognition of this purpose is an essential adjunct to the reading
of both volumes of Blast, where Lewis attempts to illustrate by using
words as visual deeds more often than the practice of adopting the
sanitized methods of intellectual discourse; the 'MANIFESTO' of Blast
! Is characteristic in both style and content:
MANIFESTO.
I.
1. Beyond Action and Reaction we would establish ourselves.
2. We start from opposite statements of a chosen world. Set
up violent structure of adolescent clearness between two
extremes.
3. We discharge ourselves on both sides.
4. We fight first on one side, then on the other, but always
for the SANE cause, which is neither side or both sides and
ours... 98
For Lewis, this characteristic of contradictory elements - where
dualities must be opposing and complementary at the same time - was an
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ininensely attractive form of 'logic' which had, in the pages of Blast,
posed provocatively as its own opposite. Under the aegis of the
'logic of contradictions', Lewis had pursued to the very limits an
apparent ambivalence with regard to key ideas. 	 These include the
frequently rehearsed and interdependent dualities of 'art' and 'life';
'action' and 'thought'; 'Imagination' or 'abstraction' and
'nature/imitation'; 'energy' and 'stillness', both properties of the
machine and the mechanical; and properties of the 'plastic' (art, the
visual, anti-human), and the 'poetic' (literary, human). Throughout,
we can read statements which at the same time tend to encourage, and
yet work against the setting up of simple, contrasting dualities upon
which we can hang our neat definitions of 'Vorticism'. In true
dualistic fashion, complexity was advertized by Lewis as a
necessarily explicit concomitant of simplicity in the theorization of
an art which could be sophisticated enough to provide a complete
world-view within its compass - art, metaphysics, physical and mental
life, reality, truth.
The coherence of Lewis's art practice and his theoretical
justification is remarkable, given that rival movements such as
Futurism had to try to 'catch up' with their ideals, and that the
'official' Cubism of Picasso and Braque left such matters to others.
Analyses of the works which survive often tend to focus on the degree
of abstraction which had been pressed to unprecedented limits in
English art, and consequently cite the 'inconsistency' of Lewis in
repudiating such 'extremism' in later work and critical texts. The
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issue of abstraction and Its relation to 'primitivism' and 'extremism'
is taken up more fully in the following chapter, but In this context
it will suffice to outline the attitude adopted in Blast. Lewis had
explicitly affirmed that he recognized the representational
functioning of all art, no matter how 'abstract' its appearance.
Accordingly, from the outset, an account which attempts to foreground
the issue of non-representation in relation to Vorticism is considered
unfruitful here, not least in terms of Lewis's expressed aesthetic and
philosophical beliefs.
In his discussion of Lewis's Red Duet (PLATE VI), Richard Cork rightly
pinpoints the visual operations of Lewis's dualistic logic, and
realizes the conceptual and ordered basis of the work. He writes:
Red Duet may appear to be the most extreme abstraction Lewis
ever executed, but its implacable emotional impact sums up
his underlying aesthetic philosophy as well. 99
Cork's overall judgement, that paintings like Red Duet are capable of
schematizing in visual form Lewis's 'underlying aesthetic philosophy'
is fully accepted here, but I would suggest that the supporting terms
offered are either inappropriate or misleading in the context of
Lewis's intellectualism. Firstly, it will be taken that a discussion
of the interdependent elements of Lewis's visual 'logic' - form and
colour - would have greater value in this context than a close concern
with the subject-specific implications that attend the issue of
'abstraction'. 'I had at all times' Lewis wrote in 1956, 'the desire
to project a race of visually logical beings' 100, and even at his most
'abstract', the paintings and drawings are adamantly figurative, but
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not in accepted naturalist terms. In addition, attention needs to be
paid to the terms which purport to describe the 'emotional impact' of
Lewis's work, and which, in accordance with his developing attitude
towards chronologism at this time, must be distanced from any
overwhelming emphasis on non-rational or sensual lndulgence°1.
Ezra Pound's notion of the 'primary pigment', introduced in Blast 1,
was, despite its obvious connotations, intended to apply to any
art form which could hope to aspire to the criteria envisaged for
Vorticism: economy of means, energy, intensity, emphasis. Nothing
other than a distilled essence of expression, one Vorticist work would
encompass in its sparse medium the concentrated efforts of many works:
It is the picture that means a hundred poems, the music that
means a hundred pictures, the most highly energized
statement, the statement that has not yet SPENT Itself it
[sic] expression, but which is the most capable of
expressing. 102
As a description of what he was trying to do as an artist, Lewis would
have heartily concurred with this, and there was no reason why he
should not equally have been ready to accept Pound's Identification of
103
colour as the 'primary pigment' of painting . There can be no doubt
that, from his earliest paintings and drawings, up to and including
specifically 'Vorticist' works and beyond, colour effects and
contrasts were of 'primary' concern to Lewis: the literal significance
of this tera is deliberately Invoked, since the Newtonian colour
system which recognized three primaries - red, yellow and blue - and
therefore enabled a systemization of contrasting values and
complementary tones - was expertly handled and exploited by Lewis,
technically and symbolically 104. At a basic external level, without
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plumbing the depths of the 'soul' in the way that Kandinsky's notion
of synaesthesia demanded, Lewis appears to put into practice, without
fuss, a colour system of his own. It Is, however, rather less
Idiosyncratic than might be expected, in the context of Blast, for It
is indebted to the conviction propounded by Goethe, accepted in
principle by Pound, and taken to its limits by Kandinsky, that a
coianonly understood 'language' of form and colour may be identified
and used to convey meaning In visual art.
An early example of this in Lewis's art is provided by The Celibate
(PLATE VII). The warm background and earthy' tones of the painting
are challenged by the cool blues of the figure's flesh, and thus Lewis
Is able to simply and effectively balance the duality of hot 'life
and materiality, associated with varying tones of red and yellow, and
the contest with the opposite values suggested In the cool (blue),
restrained operations of Intellect, the war of flesh and mind which
was the familiar battleground for the creative artist. The obvious
parallel between the opposing chromatic values of the primaries red
and blue, and the symptoms of flux and rationality, or of time and
space, was not likely to be missed by an artist who claimed contrasts
as the 'principle of creation'. Yellow, with its associations of
light and sunlight as the giver and sustainer of physical and material
life, may be ambivalently 'cool' or 'warm', depending on strength or
weakness of density and tone, and may alternatively act as the 'space'
between will and thought, the arena of materiality which enables and
limits human activity105.
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Pound had rightly identified the source of the power of Lewis's visual
art in his own Blast piece, but did not fully acknowledge the
essential difference between Kandinsky's 'inner', 'emotional' emphasis
in the tradition of Goethe and Schopenhauer, and Lewis's 'outer',
conceptual and philosophical approach to visual art, which had to
reaffirm elements unique to the medium in extricating it from what he
regarded as the essentially 'timeist' yen for 'correspondences'.
Whilst Lewis was perhaps willing to draw upon loosely understood
symbolizations that were characteristic of an emotional 'language' of
colour, it was still evident to him at the time Blast was published
that the visual arts would appear to function according to a
particular 'logic' of their own; the 'primary pigment' for Pound could
indeed describe the unique qualities peculiar to each art form, and
yet, whilst affirming these qualities, would insist on the notion of
brotherhood, of profound correspondences between the arts as sought by
Kandinsky, following Pater's dictum that 'all arts approach the
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conditions of music'	 . Lewis's own experiments with the idea of
'transposition' between the visual and literary arts are conspicuously
evident In the visual form, lettering and arrangement of the magazine
itself, culminating in the self-conscious play-synopsis 'Enemy of the
Stars', an attempt to match the 'Ideal' in the manner of Pater107.
But the failure of such experiments had the effect of focusing Lewis's
attention on the essential differences between literary and plastic
modes of expression, and the ways in which language, like music, is
time-specific and time-governed whereas the plastic adheres to the
spatial and the static.
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As a result, although Lewis had agreed to the inclusion in Blast 1 of
Wadsworth's 'Review' of Kandinsky's book, 'Inner Necessity, he
expressed grave doubts in the second issue about the desirability of
'spiritual values and musical analogies', 'feasible' though they might
seem 108. Pound, in support of Kandinsky, had affirmed the possibility
of an emotional language of form and colour 109 , and had denied any
suggestion of a simplistic allegorical or symbolical application, but
it was still too 'literary' and introspective for Lewis, who had
discovered that musical and literary analogies could not be tolerated
if the purity and independence of the plastic arts was to be
maintained. So Kandinsky's 'feasible' colour-theory system was
attractive and of use to Vorticism if it could be purged of sentiment,
mysticism and 'too-hot emotion'. Lewis preferred the necessary
duality of art and physical life rather than art and the psychological
-supernatural, as Kandinsky envisaged. Wadsworth's analysis of
Kandinsky's thesis, which stressed the profound 'emotional
significance of form and colour as such'° was purposefully
challenged by Lewis in order to reaffirm the values and oppositional
tensions which motivated him as an artist:
My soul has gone to live in my eyes, and like a bold young lady
It lolls in those sunny windows. Colours and forms can therefore
have no DIRECT effect on it. That, I consider, is why I am a
painter, and not anything else so much as that. 111
From the early 1920s, Lewis had readily acknowledged Schopenhauer's
influence on the ways in which the general aesthetic of Vorticism was
formulated	 and there are strong indications that the German
philosopher's views on light and colour as pure, will-less perceptions
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were found to be of equal relevance to the movement. Schopenhauer's
insistence that the pleasure of colour is 'won for knowledge without
any excitement of our will' 113 and that thus we enter 'into the state
of pure knowing', - freed from the operations of will/flux - is indeed
relevant to an interpretation of Lewis's somewhat cryptic remarks•
here. Based on an understanding of the active nature of sight, and
the passivity of hearing, Schopenhauer's judgement, that 'the thinking
mind lives in eternal peace with the eye, and at eternal war with the
eariH4 lends more support to Lewis's case against the primacy of
music-dominated theories than it does to his own thesis.
The characterization by Lewis of the eye as a 'superficial' organ,
dealing in 'externals', dependent on physical significance rather than
internal, psychological stimuli is indirectly anticipated and
justified in Schopenhauer. If the ultimate domain of colour
perception is the route to 'pure knowledge', offering a respite from
passive, animal nature and the operations of the flux, then the
avoidance of 'inner', will-dominated and governed activities is amply
supported. It is important for Lewis, however, to recognize that the
eye 'alone' is like an optical instrument, and would depend on the
organizing power of the intellect before it might contemplate a role
in furnishing 'pure knowledge':
an
The eyes are animals,and bask inAabsurd contentment everywhere...
They will never forget that red is the colour of blood, though it
may besides that have a special property of exasperation. 115
So for Lewis, the 'superficiality' of the eye does not rule out the
identification of a system of simplistic, universal symbolization to
which 'animal nature' might conceivably respond. Indeed, on the
contrary, such a system is required. The exact alternative to the
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(time-dominated) 'inner' emphasis was to insist on the importance of
the external and physical reception of visual stimuli, shaped and
re-organized by the intellect.
The basis of Lewis's working hypothesis was as follows: white and
black were the fundamentals from which all other colours sprang, and
into which they were absorbed. The vortex symbol itself
testifies directly to this principle, and its meaning reverberates in
both aesthetic and philosophical spheres of discourse: in a 'Note' on
German Woodcuts in Blast 1, Lewis outlines the implications:
White and Black are two elements. Their possible proportions
and relations to each other are fixed. - All the subtleties
of the Universe are driven into these two pens, one of which
is black, the other white, with their multitude. 116
An understanding of the philosophical function of colour, light and
shade can be enlightening in the encounter with Lewis's Vorticist
works, and is indeed of continued relevance in the analysis of art
produced throughout his career. In this connection, it is important
to recognize that, for Lewis, the hierarchy of 'colours' and
'non-co1ours' 17 had little significance when a pencil drawing could
furnish as forceful an example of opposing visual relationships as any
painting. Red, which Is the colour of blood, and which, as Lewis
indicates, symbolizes on a simple level associated concepts of life,
and by extension the flux itself, is absorbed in the black/white
vortex, the logical resolution of the relation between the individual
and the universal, art and life, and the infinite variety of dualistic
pairings that may be conceptualized.
It is necessary to stress the complexity and subtlety of the
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possibilities that emerge, for it is not too implausible to arrange a
set of symbolic attributions or equivalents against which Lewis's
paintings might be read: as I have noted, and in the spirit of Pound's
'primary pigment', the literal primaries of red, yellow and blue can
be duly matched with relevant philosophical concepts. Thus red and
its derivatives are symbolic of the operations of flux; yellow shades,
the material world; and blue (the complement of red) recalls through
direct opposition the operations of intellect, thought, stillness and
contemplation. An infinite variety of shades and tones, from orange
to green, purple, pink, brown and so on, can be aligned with the
primary which dominates them, and yet allow speculation about other
meanings and values which, in accordance with the dualism of Lewis's
contradictory logic, will be both fluid and fixed. Black and white,
the values which amalgamate all colour variations, and all possible
oppositions, and which contain the vortex Itself, are fixed, and held
fast in the most extreme of relations. Yet complexity co-exists and
depends on simplicity, as Lewis would be keen to reaffirm, and it
would be the fundamental intellectual principle of oppositions that
could conceivably prevent a degeneration of such a theory into crude
allegorical symbolism. This principle Itself militates against rigid
or non-relational categorizations, encouraging, if appropriate,
interpretations which allow for the interchangeability of elements:
red, blue, yellow, white, black, do not irrevocably and permanently
'stand for' the kinds of states and ideas I have outlined, but it is
the individual, specific relation determined uniquely within each
example of visual art that dictates the possible range of ideas
evoked.
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A detailed analysis is inappropriate here, but if paintings such as
The Crowd (PLATE VIII) and Workshop (PLATE IX), which are central to
the Vorticist canon, are reconsidered in terms of the colour
relationships and values I have noted, an added dimension of meaning
may be uncovered. These two works are dominated by contrasts between
warm colours on a white background. In The Crowd, the theme is made
explicit by the title/s given, and the suggestion of figuration is
retained. Deep oranges, golds and browns, defined intimately by
elements of red, are barely contained by black outlines; the vortex is
implied, but does not overcome the vision of physical mass,
materiality and corporate will 8. In Workshop, the mood is cooler
and less intense, achieved by more broken, ordered areas of warmth,
and is almost controlled by the sharp, black lines, but the striking
difference between this and the previous painting is the piercing area
of blue which anchors and dominates the surrounding elements, the
power of which has little to do with volume or quantity. If it is
rash to imply that the vortex is made fully visual here, it is at
least clear that the tone and balance of each work is powerfully
directed by colour relationships and how contrasting elements are
organized in each case.
Composition in Blue (PLATE X) is an example of repose, not stridency,
and functions in a very different sphere of colour values: it is hard
not to associate pictures of this type with the values of thought,
contemplation and stillness, but the areas of contrast ensure that the
notion of still energy is not excluded, and the eye is drawn
irrevocably towards the central receding axis. Again, on a
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superficial level, in Lewis's Portrait of an Englishwoman (PLATE XI),
we are able to note that warm, earth-bound colours are not dignified
with blues of any description: Lewis's much-publicized view of women
as frivolous, sensual, non-intellectual creatures, preoccupied with
the physical, material details of life dovetails rather neatly with
the tones which dominate the picture. If caricature was intended by
Lewis, this would in no way limit its more serious - philosophical -
implications, and might serve a purpose in both Instances.
An examination of other works could yield further interesting
speculation; but I am concerned to indicate generally the subtlety and
depth of Lewis's ideas in this area. The characterization, for
example, of 'sinister' black as a 'sort of red' in the article 'Fang
Shui and Contemporary Form' 119 makes implicit use of the paradox that
marries the 'stolid', 'stupid' eye with the flexible, virtuoso
operations of intellect. In Red Duet (PLATE VI), we see the
contrasting forms of black, red, white, pink, grey, and these are
visually fixed elements. Further, we might understand these elements
in simple symbolic terms - for example, that red symbolizes blood,
life, or more abstractly, the flux - and that black traditionally
ushers in thoughts of death, stillness, immobilization, annihilation.
Noting the Chinese custom of associating white with death, Lewis
brings into play the notion of opposing cultural interpretations of
colour-concepts and testifies to the ways in which the intellect is
able to assimilate the idea of radically opposed significations
without necessarily requiring the elimination of one or the other set
of values. If, in Red Duet, sinister black may also be a sort of red
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- then death and annihiliation is implicated In the 'sort of red'
which is the flux. This is a formulaic reading of the work, but it is
by no means 'closed' if It Is placed in conjunction with the
proposition that Lewis is intent to exercise our intellect by inviting
us to consider the kinds of data perceived by the eye and how the
intellect Is capable of balancing contradictory physical and
conceptual evidence. In this case, red, and its 'customary' symbolic
connotations may be similarly interchanged with those 'normally'
associated with black. The eye functions to literally separate the
disparate elements it recognizes, whilst the intellect, in full
possession of the stimuli offered, is nevertheless exercised by the
possibility of interchangeability in the face of conflicting visual or
perceptual evidence.
Written and visual sources declare openly the operation by Lewis of
some kind of implicit theory attached to colour symbolization, which
might be more aptly characterized, in contradistinction to
'emotionalist' views, as 'colour conceptualization'. The particular
values outlined in the article 'Fang Shui and Contemporary Form' are
given priority, albeit perhaps tongue-in-cheek priority, over major
scientific advances like Newton's discovery of gravitation. Indeed,
both editions of Blast abound in the celebration of colour, visually
and verbally; the puce cover of Blast 1, thereby inevitably associated
with flux, life, will, emotion, is radically cut through and
challenged by the black lettering connon to the text itself and the
vortex symbol. The white and black of the contents proclaim loudly
the anchoring thesis of the vortex as the space between contingencies,
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the sum of mutually contradictory and interdependent elements. It is
significant, perhaps, that the text which suggests most strongly that
some kind of colour-theory is relevant to Vorticism is 'The Enemy of
the Stars', with its sustained reliance on vocabulary intended to
evoke as explicitly as possible the 'red universe' which directs the
tragedy of Arghol and Hanp, the 'red walls' which literally and
metaphorically enclose the action. It is indeed a 'red' play, the
colour of blood, evocative of madness and the hollow triumph of the
flux, of animal nature (Harip) over thought (Arghol).
The concept of the vortex provided an intellectual rallying point, and
an appropriate visual symbol, able to stand-for and encompass the
entire range of Lewis's Blast strategies, some of which I have
outlined. These are governed by a structural, yet highly flexible
ordering of human thought and experience which meets at the point
described as the 'clearness between extremes', the still centre of
implied energy which exists at the heart of the flux, at maximum force
when 'stillest', the 'clearness and logic in the midst of
contradictions' 
120 
In view of the schematic rendering of Lewis's
philosophical principles outlined in Part I of this thesis 121
 , it
would require little adjustment to formulate a development of this
model on lines which are der ived from Lewis's Vorticist aesthetic.
The vortex symbol
	 could be substituted for the projected system
of superimposed, concentric circles, or layers, with the additional
value that comes from the way in which this symbol easily adapts
itself in the representation of the necessary dimensions of movement
and energy in the equation, and in its stark black-and-whiteness
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absorbs possible contingencies in the symbolic shape of colour-values.
A more accurate, complete model is therefore available. The lower
circle, which was envisaged and named as time/flux and the
constituents of chronologism, corresponds aptly to the black outer
shell of the vortex symbol, whilst its white centre, represented by
the second band of the concentric philosophical structure, claims
conscious thought, space and intellect as its contrasting sphere of
reference. The core of the vortex which, in the philosophical
context, was superimposed upon the 'layers' of time and space, and was
seen to represent the 'real', now becomes interchangeable with 'art',
the rod which cuts through flux and materiality. The whirling,
spinning cone that is time and space revolves around a still, rod-like
core that absorbs energy in the process of creation, is surrounded by
the flux and the physical world, and is intimately, irrevocably
connected to 'life', but is not itself governed by its dynamics,
belonging to the inhuman realm of the 'plastic'.
If such a schematization Is able to Illustrate with some clarity the
relationship between Lewis's philosophy and aesthetics, it is useful
enough, but the implications, as indicated, run deeper than this. The
first - philosophical - model, I would argue, depends on the aesthetic
precursor for its terms and inspiration; that, in turn, was formulated
as an adjunct to practice. Here the theoretical principles which
Inform Lewis's 'logic of contradictions' first achieved visual form,
conspicuously pre-dating the pronouncements in Blast. The heart of
the matter is controlled by an artist's devotion to the basic elements
of his profession: form, line, colour, composition. But this devotion
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for Lewis was characterized by the tension generated between
contrasting elements that was seen as ultimately the supreme arbiter
and principle, not only of artistic creation or philosophy, but was
relevant to a discussion of any sphere of human activity. The
recognition and exploitation of this principle was thereby hailed as a
function of Vorticism, obliged to operate in a modern, less-than-idea1
physical and social world, faced with motifs and subjects that did not
lend themselves to traditional ideas about 'beauty' and 'harmony' in
art. Yet, as Lewis recognized, the concept of harmony depends on
discord, that of beauty upon ugliness, and modern art, no less,
depended on these dualities. Contemporary artists, however, had to
redistribute these values in order to respond positively to the motifs
of discord and ugliness around them: the beauty would reside, not in
the subject, in naturalist terms, but in the art itself122.
The modern revolution in painting, of which Vorticism was a part was
to be therefore, for Lewis, a make-or-break affair, survival
signifying renewed strength and potency, 'suppleness' and 'extension',
an art which would be capable of 'containing all the elements of
discord and "ugliness" consequent on the attack against traditional
harmony' 123• In his view, the 'modern' was necessarily concerned with
the discordant, and should therefore fasten itself to the
possibilities offered to the artist in the elements of 'colour,
exploitation of discords, odious combinations'. Lewis's own analyses
and judgements of fellow artists' work in Blast are dominated by a
keen sense of colour values, contrasts and effects. 	 In his review,
'The London Group', aspects of the paintings shown by Wadsworth,
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Roberts, Nevinson, Adeney and Kramer are noted and considered. Of
Wadsworth's Blackpool, 'one of the finest paintings he has done',
Lewis writes:
It's [sic] striped ascending blocks are the elements of a
seaside scene, condensed into the simplest form possible for the
retaining of it's [sici vivacity... The striped awnings of Cafés
and shops, the stripes of bathing tents, the stripes of
bathing-machines, of toy trumpets, of dresses, are marshalled
into a dense essence of the scene. The harsh jarring and
sunny yellows, yellow-greens and reds are especially well
used, with the series of comercial blues. 124
In William Roberts' Boatmen, Lewis notes how the limbs and heads have
become in the composition a 'conglomeration of cold and vivid springs
bent together in one organized bunch':
The line of colour exploited is the cold, effective,
between-colours of modern Advertising art... The wide scale
of colour and certain juxtapositions... suggests flowers, as
well.
A work by Kramer similarly shows 'fine passages of colour, and many
possibilities as a future luminary. Several yellows and reds alone,
and some of it's [sic] more homogenous inhabitants, would make a fine
painting', and Adeney's landscapes are described as 'pale green
meditations in form'.
Thus the 'exploitation of discords' and contradictions were vital
factors for Lewis in the struggle to differentiate between Vorticist
aspirations and those of other modern artists and movements. In
particular, this principle was also closely linked, in Lewis's theory
and practice, to contemporary debates on the symbolic value, nature
and use of colour and colour contrasts in art, in the way that
discords were conceived and articulated. Spurning the deep pessimism
of Schopenhauer, and the psychological solipsism of Kandinsky, Lewis's
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art was directed outwards, in order to provide 'blueprints' for a 'new
civilization': 'at the time' he recalled in Rude Assignment,
I was unaware of the full implications of my work, but that was
what I was doing... It was more than just picture-making: one was
manufacturing fresh eyes for people, and fresh souls to go with
the eyes... A necessary part of this work was of course
propaganda... 125
If Lewis considered his work as a set of 'blueprints' that would be
capable of indicating the way forward in the task of a profound
renewal of civilization and culture, the painter's means will be
symbolic, not in Kandinsky's psychological sense, but as functioning
in a similar way to a plan of architecture 126. The emphasis for
Lewis, as always, would be on the intellectual organization of ideas
whereby colours in an abstract environment may be representative of,
but not necessarily imitative of, physical phenomena. This enables
freedom from the physical world too, for art might function at its
most profound level, as indicative of ideas.
	 If 'art' (creative
organization) is known conceptually through form, and 'life' is to be
transposed in plastic terms as colour and tone, these elements in a
work operate in different ways and are yet interdependent to the
extent of existing in a non-separable relation, but without merging:
thus the logic of contradictions demanded by Lewis Is fully
perpetuated. Colour, in Lewis's most 'abstract' Vorticist works is
one of the chief means by which he might introduce 'life' into the
painting, thus stripped of contingencies and imbued with sufficient
plastic significance in order to complete and perpetuate the duality
of 'art' and 'life' in the most profound terms available to the
artist.
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'emotional' in such terms, without an equally strong emphasis on
rationality, would have been unacceptable to Lewis.
102. 'Vortex. Pound, 81, p.153.
103. See Pound's discussion in Vorticism', Fortnightly Review, op
cit., p.466.
104. Newton's theory of colour, and his characterization of red, blue
and yellow as the 'primary' colours persists, despite challenges
from others - notably in this context, Goethe (Theory of Colours,
1810) and Schopenhauer (On Vision and Colours, 1816).
105. A fra9ment found amongst Lewis's papers meditates on Van Gogh's
L'Arlesienne: '...Here is this human being, who has been a young
girl... - Now she sits huddled up, with a face like a fish: with
eyes moist with a melancholy emotion, staring into the terrible
mystery in front [sic] her... A blank yellow glare behind her is
symbolic of the feverish emptiness upon which her meditations are
unrolled. - Or it is the cruel honey in which this human fish is
embalmed' (WLOA, p.459).
106. Pound directly quotes Pater in 'Vortex. Pound.', 81, p.154.
107. Lewis describes in Rude Assignment the 'failure' of such
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experiments, and the reasons why: '...it became evident to me...
that words and syntax were not susceptible of transformation into
abstract terms, to which process the visual arts lent themselves
quite readily' (p.139).
108. 'A Review of Contemporary Art', B2, p.44.
109. Pound, 'Vorticism', The Fortnightly Review op cit., p.470.
110. 'Inner Necessity', Bl, p.122.
ill. 'A Review of Contemporary Art', B2, p.44.
112. My discussion in Part 1.2.1 of this thesis refers to this: see in
particular, Lewis's 'Essay on the Objective of Plastic Art in Our
Time' (EOAT) in The Tyro no. 2, for a specific acknowledgement of
Schopenhauer's influence.
113. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, op cit., II,
p.375.
114. Schopenhauer, op cit., II, p.28.
115. 'A Review of Contemporary Art', B2, p.44.
116. Bl, p.136.
117. Or 'chromatic' and 'achromatic' colours - the latter including
white, grey and black (which form the extremes and middle of the
achromatic scale). See A. Macmorland, Colour. Theory and
Practice, second edition (London, 1934) pp.19 ff.
118. Pound had realised the extreme difficulty of what he, Lewis and
the Vorticists had set out to do, but stressed that some works
would attain expression as '"criticism of life" or of art' and
that 'no artist can possibly get a vortex into every poem or
picture he does. One would like to do so, but it is beyond
one...' ('Vorticism', Fortnightly Review, op cit., p.471, note.)
119. Bl, p.138.
120. 'Wyndham Lewis Vortex No. 1', B2, p.91.
121. See Chapter 4.iii, pp.164-166.
122. Lewis declares 'fields of discord untouched' in 'Orchestra of
Media', Bi, p.142, and in 'The Exploitation of Vulgarity', he
notes that 'A man could make just as fine an art in discords, and
with nothing but 'ugly' trivial and terrible materials, as any
classic artist did with only 'beautiful' and pleasant means' (81,
p.145).
123. 'Orchestra of Media', Bl, p.142.
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124. 'The London Group', 82, p.77. Both Blackpool and Boatmen are now
lost: the former painting, reproduced in theDai1y Mirror (11
June, 1915) is illustrated in Cork, op cit., II, p.372.
125. RA, p.135.
126. See Cork's discussion of Lewis's work in conjunction with the
ideas of the Futurist architect, Sant'Elia, op cit., II,
p.338 ff.
299
CHAPTER 7
FROM THE VORTEX TO THE GREAT BLANK: LEWIS AND MODERNISM
Lewis knew the war would effectively 'kill off' Vorticism as a
collective art movement, but the body of his art criticism and
aesthetics produced later testify to the importance of the ideas,
strategies and visual images conceived pre-war in the context of his
work as a whole. This was recognized by Lewis himself in the
reprinting of many key Blast documents in the important collection
Wyndham Lewis the Artist in 1939, the copious discussion of Vorticism
and its implications throughout his writings on art. On a deeper
level, Vorticism, Lewis acknowledged later, had been years ahead of
its time - at least as far as English art was concerned. But in
pushing visual expression closer to the edge of sense and meaning, it
was also in a very profound historical sense a child of its 'time' and
the prevailing zeitgeist, and open to exploitation by the Bergsonian
evolutionary god of progress that made no distinction between the arts
or women's fashions: all is contingent, temporary, to be swept aside
by the next phase of development. The reaction against Bergsonism
that was inherent in the theory and practice of Vorticism could never
be total, as the statement it offered was corrupt, too. In accepting
the modernist brief which coniiiitted itself to abstraction, radicalism,
'extremism', and the 'progressive' in art, Vorticism was tainted with
the time-cultist sensationalist aesthetics and philosophical values
that it had sought to avoid.
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A distinction between the contingent historical aspects of the
art movement Itself and the enduring aesthetic and philosophical
implications is necessary. Historically, Vorticism existed as a brief
but explosive enabling force, known to us via Blast and the paintings
which survived, such as Workshop, Red Duet, and Composition in Blue
(PLATES IX, VI, X). But the concept of the vortex, as I have already
claimed in Part I of this thesis, is central to an understanding of
Lewis's philosophical position in Time and Western Man, and may also
be understood as the ultimate driving force of Lewis's art practice
post-Vorticism, whether 'abstract', 'figurative', 'expressionist', or
'naturalist' 1 . 'I can think of dozens of drawings', Lewis wrote in
1956,
which would not be the original things they are if it had not
been for their 'Vorticist' ancestry. Evenaloil portrait like the
Hedwig (PLATE XII)... coming as it does quite near to another
convention, is nevertheless, in its massive design, a creature of
the Vortex. 2
The distinction between the specific and wider ramifications of the
movement would seem to parallel Lewis's own attitude towards Vorticism
in later years in terms of his devastating critique of modernism in
the visual arts. Once an 'extremist' himself, to his detractors, he
was at best considered hopelessly inconsistent, and to the less
charitable, a veritable traitor to the modern movement. But
characteristically, those elements which were explicitly associated
with timeisru were those Lewis singled out for condemnation. These
were expressed in forebodings about the demise of art in following a
headlong path dictated by the dictum of 'progress for progress's
sake': the 'zero' or the 'Great Blank' described so graphically in The
Demon of Progress in the Arts in 1954. Cries of 'reactionary' are
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clearly unjust if Lewis's writings on art are read in conjunction with
his analysis of Time.
Thus, in this chapter, I examine the terms and implications of Lewis's
anti-modernism as it developed in the years after the war, and
consider how some of his important essays on art and aesthetics
inform, continue and deepen the general critique of Bergsonism after
the appearance of Time and Western Man.
II. 7.i The 'Abstract' and the 'Primitive': 1915-1920
Lewis in 1915 had seen Vorticism as one of the means by which English
art, in particular, could be liberated from the 'load of sugary,
cheap, anecdotal and in every way pitiable muck', the 'refuse that has
accumulated for the last century or 	 The revolt against
Victorian legacies needed to be stark and extreme in order to
extricate art from the mire, but two years - and a war later - caused
Lewis to reflect carefully on the open trap that loomed before
innovators, including himself. 'The Bee in the, Bonnet about
Modernity' he wrote to John Quinn early in 1917, 'seems to me an
imbecility' 4 . Although the 'Nature Mortes, Dialectics and Delicacies'
must be infinitely preferable to Rossetti's Grail or Blake's 'Hell
World', Lewis's objections to specific manifestations in modern art
had been reflected in his own work and in thoughts about how this
should develop post-Vorticism. The emergent doctrine of 'progress for
progress's sake', outlined against the backdrop of bloody war in
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Europe, had a particularly ominous ring for Lewis. In an essay
published in The Eng1ish Review of April 1919, entitled 'What Art
Now?', his fears are most clearly articulated. Art is not
'improvement', or 'progress', subject to vulgar fashion or irrational
whim: you cannot improve upon a Corot, an Ingres, a Gauguin, and
neither can you hope to reach the heights of profound creativity by
means of radicalism or innovation alone. It must involve more than
the motions of empty 'formalism', and if the revolution was necessary,
there must be a time for consolidation:
The innovations in painting, pressed everywhere before the war,
have by their violence and completeness exhausted the scope of
progress on that point. That America may be considered as not
only discovered, but crossed and cross-hatched from side to side,
with the surveys and trekkings of its invaders. Expressionism,
Cubism, Vorticism, all these movements now have to set about
construction and development, and evolve a new world of art out
of the continent their enterprise has acquired. 5
'Abstraction' was a key term which for Lewis had been wildly
misunderstood and promoted in the debate. The notion of abstraction
as 'superior' or 'preferable' to other modes of visual expression, as
an end in itself, rather than a means, was categorically refuted by
Lewis in his Note on Wadsworth's exhibition of woodcuts in 19196.
Stressing the value of multiple modes of working, Including naturalism
and abstraction, he sets out to publicly repudiate the basis of views
- such as Clive Bell's - which appear to encourage the setting up of
oppositional relations between what to Lewis, were essentially
different types of technical method, chosen to best express certain
ideas in visual form. In outlining his position, Lewis notes that
there are 'things you cannot do in one, things not in the other' and
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that the value of working in the 'abstract' must be understood in
order to live in peace with the 'monster', a 'sincere' but 'pacific'
beast. Abstract art, as Lewis noted in the Foreword to his
exhibition, 'Guns', might be a 'fanatic' interest, but is nevertheless
a 'perfectly sincere insistence on the fundamentals of design or
colour' 8. This degree of emphasis on the importance of form and
technique is made clear, and is fundamental to Lewis the artist, but
the 'fanatic', egged on by bandwagon critics, must be checked in his
enthusiasms lest art itself be irreparably damaged. So immediately
after the war, Lewis had decisively called for a halt to the kind of
formalism, supported by such as Bell and Fry, that declares subject
matter of little or no importance, and which elevates 'significant
form' above all other considerations. This provided a basis for
disagreement and controversy between Lewis and modernist critics for
over three decades, when to openly advocate 'literary' values in
painting was 'unpopular' and 'unfashionable'. But as Lewis's argument
insists, taking the 'popular' and 'fashionable' path had philosophical
as well as aesthetic consequences, and if modern art was to survive
and prosper, it had to rid itself of the outward manifestations of
'bad' philosophy.
The immediate post war period to the middle and late 1920s was a
crucial time of discovery, definition and consolidation, particularly
in respect of the relation between Lewis's aesthetic and philosophical
beliefs, and the kind of visual art he wanted to produce. The
pamphlet The Caliph's Design, first published in 1919, and
characterized later by its author as 'another Blast' 9 , carried the
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rousing sub-title, Architects! Where is your Vortex?, and illustrates
aptly the difficult theoretical position Lewis was attempting to
develop and sustain. The text develops and operates according to an
explicit categorization of the 'rationalist' and 'primitivist' strains
present in the modernist enterprise and upon the distinction between
them which Lewis's case will rest In the future. It is typical of
Lewis that he anticipates the rationalist modernism of the
architecture of the l920s and 1930s led by Le Corbusier, and presents
the central parable of the Caliph as a modernist salvo directed
towards the backward' and 'indolent' architects and town planners
charged with redevelopment of the post-war urban environment. The
case which characterizes architecture as the weakest of the arts is
clearly anti-Bergsonist; it is the art which is 'most dependent on the
collective sensibility of its period' 10. The example of Vorticist
painting, which has far greater autonomy, could provide the key to a
renewed, vibrant environment - that is, for Lewis, a more rationalist,
individualistic arena - if only the liberation of one medium could be
allied to that of another. The potential, Lewis argues, is
staggeri ng.
The bulk of the pamphlet, however, is concerned, not with the
outlining of a vision, but an examination of present circumstances in
art and culture. 'Primitive' modernism, like the term 'classical' is
understood by Lewis in both its narrow sense and in a broader,
philosophical definition. Explicit modernist borrowings from
so-called primitive art forms and styles, such as tribal masks and
figures, the emulation of the art of children and the insane, the
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constant repetition of the 'trivial' compositional device of the
still-life that focuses intense interest on form and method, and the
attendant encouragement of amateurism, are all attempts to compromise
the integrity and originality of art, an impoverishment which, pushed
to its inevitable conclusions, can only end in zero. This
death-impulse is initiated in the basically timeist precepts which
direct cultural operations, and is blindly running in the peculiar
outlets which affect the production, reception and consumption of
work. The problem stems from the fusion - and confusion - of vitality
in art with vitalism:
The spirit that pervades a large block - cube, if you like - of
the art of painting to-day is an almost purely Art-for-Art's sake
dilettantism. Yet you find vigour and conviction... Picasso,
Matisse, Derain, Balla... are very considerable artists... So you
get this contradiction of what is really a very great vitality in
the visual arts, and at the same time a very serious scepticism
and discouragement in the use of that vitality.11
The vitality which is so obviously present to Lewis in the work of the
painters he admires here is blighted at its roots by bad philosophy
which is by definition dedicated to the extinction of the visual arts.
Nothing of permanent interest can follow from a fashionable obsession
with formal values cut loose from ideas, from 'nature-mortes', mock
'child' or 'na'if' and amateurist art, for these are the outward
manifestations of the deeper cultural malaise.
The chief culprit in this essentially philosophical scenario is the
unlikely figure of the dilettante, or art-critic, an offshoot of
Victorian aestheticism who - perhaps unwittingly - compounds the
damage. Lewis's direct and uncompromising attitude towards Roger Fry
and Clive Bell combines personal invective with serious theoretical
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aims in pursuing his analysis. As outlined in my Chapter 5, the basic
terms of the critique of aesthetics are at root philosophical. In the
piece, 'We Fell in Love with the Beautiful Tiles in the South
Museum
KensingtonRefreshment Room' the satirical intent and attack on Fry
via Picasso is rudely provocative, but aims right at the heart of an
aestheticism divorced from artistic practice which trivializes the
contribution of the artist himself. If a man's head, in Fry's and
Bell's version of modernism, is seen 'simply' and trivialized as no
more and no less important than a pumpkin, and the product of
'despised' periods allowed to set aesthetic standards at the behest of
a 'cultured' few, then art as a creative activity and intellectual
discipline faces a lean time indeed. 'Should art connoisseurs and
dilettantes all turn painters' Lewis observes,
the sort of art movement they would like to find themselves in
the midst of (we are supposing them fashionably-minded, as many
are) would be such a giant amateurism and carnival of the
eclectic sensibility as we are in for, if the dealers' riot in
Paris succeeds, and if the votaries of Nature-mortism and the
champions of the eclectic sensibility here, are to be believed. 12
'Primitivist' modernism is thus characterized in Bergsonian terms for
Lewis. The artist-type image which prevails with the public is
'formally identified with the savage or the school-boy to a
disobliging extent' 13, and is a difficult view to dislodge when so
firmly rooted in popular belief. The sometimes 'festive' philosopher,
he reasons, in the essay, 'The Artist Older than the Fish' might even
be 'a bit of an TM artist" of that sort himself' from which 'regions and
hobnobbings', firm convictions on the nature of 'artists' and their
'abode in time' is derived. The evolutionist cycle is perpetuated
whilst those anxious and adventurous enough to challenge this
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'sententious belt of savage life' become renewed in conscious
isolation from the 'dense herds of a manifestly different and falsely
labelled species'14.
Lewis concludes his pamphlet in a spirit of sincere and unwavering
support for the modernist enterprise in its widest sense but equally,
he is concerned to identify and expose the representative signs of the
pervasive flux within. In view of these already highly developed
beliefs about art and society, and the role of philosophical influence
on aesthetics, it is a qualified formalism which emerges from The
Caliph's Design as the result of an analysis of contemporary art and
criticism as he sees it ininediately after the war. In visual art, if
a man's head is no more and no less important than a pumpkin - and
Lewis concedes the indication of a 'considerable truth', - he is also
anxious to underwrite the limits and context of that truth 15. Any
enterprise, however well-meaning or initially beneficial, is for Lewis
highly compromised when it professes to exist solely for 'its own
sake', taking little or no cognizance of contextual elements on which
its own character depends. This is In effect just as damaging as, for
example, the view which would theoretically consign all the arts to an
amorphous mass of irrationalist or mystical 'creativity', with
separate elements indistinguishable from one another. Thus Lewis
opens his account on the varied manifestations of 'extremism'.
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11.7.11 Some Tyros, Apes and Enemies: the 1920s
The first edition of The Tyro which appeared in April 1921 coincided
with the Leicester Galleries exhibition of paintings and drawings by
Lewis. The visual Tyros (PLATE I), which as Lewis explains in the
'Foreword' to the catalogue 16 , have many equivalents, and are
will-dominated elementals, abominable 'natures' with the undeveloped
self-ish intellect of children, and the cunning of mature hobgoblins;
puppets with screaming voices underneath. These creatures are
conjured in the hope that the spectre of Victorian romanticism and
'art for art's sake' that would have art degenerate into a snobbish
game, might be frightened away once and for all. The self-portrait as
a Tyro (PLATE XIII) which was shown at this exhibition, illustrates
Lewis's point that the Tyros are also indicative of fundamental
philosophical generalizations 17. The need to 'wake art up' is strong,
but the depiction of the artist-philosopher as Tyro draws graphic
attention to the dualism of intellect and will, or the metaphysical
not-self and the elemental self 18. Lewis hopes to fight his enemies
on all fronts by constructing a visual weapon which is capable of
functioning on the same basic level of the opponent.
If the Tyro is essentially a polemical, satirical tool, but which at
its deepest level is replete with philosophical ramifications, the
'naturalism' which Lewis avidly pursued at the time of this exhibition
represented a practical way forward, out of the modernist cul-de-sac
that critics like Bell and Fry were leading artists towards.
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Realising that, as a hitherto 'extremist' artist, this departure might
be problematic, he explains:
Most of the drawings are drawings from nature. It is important
for an experimental artist... to demonstrate that these
activities are not the consequence of incompetence, as the
enemies of those experiments so frequently assure the public... 19
The utilization of 'working from nature' as a self-conscious
justification of skill in this way does not do much to dispel the
popularist (and modernist) separation of 'representational' and
'non-representational', nor do the remarks on abstraction, 'at its
best when its divorce from natural form of environment is complete' as
in Kandinsky or Vorticism, approach the far more complex and subtle
arguments in Blast that question the whole notion of
'non-representation' 20. In the fully-blown strategy of a 'return to
nature' in the 1930s, Lewis was to draw heavily upon the ideas
expressed in Blast for the basis 'of a mature art theory. The Tyro was
thus dedicated to the renewal of English art, a liberation from
Victorianism, with critical reference to the European modernist
movement as an intellectual and technical inspiration. The article
which argues against Roger Fry as a 'Continental Mediator' in this
enterprise, is based on the point that if new developments are
selectively filtered through the elegant sensibilities of a latter-day
descendant of Morris, the statements provided will be corrupt, and
perpetuated in English art. This was Lewis's main fear, and he saw
the fruits of stagnation all around him.
General support from both T.S. Eliot and Herbert Read is evident in
this first issue of the journal, and it is the kind of sufficiently
like-minded support which almost redeems Lewis from his increasing
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position of isolation. Eliot on 'The Romantic Englishman, the Comic
Spirit, and the Function of Criticism' subjects John Bull and Charlie
Chaplin to a brief drubbing that declares itself as a possible point
of reference or inspiration for the more detailed analysis of 'The
Revolutionary Simpleton' and The Mysterious Mr. Bull. Read, who was
later to be revealed, as far as Lewis was concerned, as an archetypal
disciple of fashion and 'progress' in modern art, became an prominent
art-critical adversary in the battle against chronologism; but in his
piece for Tyro 1, 'Critics in Arabia', he accurately characterizes the
specific philosophical worries that motivated Lewis. Read begins:
The symptoms of the mental torpor from which we suffer to-day
are so numerous that only by recording them as they appear can
the intelligence comprehend them. All rational categories vanish
in this state, and are replaced by emotional 'blurs.' The
general blur of thought evident, for example, in the neo-mystical
philosophies of 'intuition' and is there a well demarcated
symptom to which a good deal of treatment has already been
accorded. But the blur extends over every action and expression
of modern life, and it is no less essential to remove it from the
imagery of art than from the concepts of philosophy. 21
'We live', Read concludes, in an 'intuitional age' when the 'torpor'
of the comon mind is at its zenith, and calls for the restoration of
a rational critical assessment to cut through the emotionalist 'blur'.
One of the most fully worked out statements of Lewis's aesthetics and
philosophical views of the early l920s is printed in Tyro 2. This is
the lengthy 'Essay on the Objective of Plastic Art in our Time', which
takes up Read's challenge by attempting to set some ground rules for
the debate, in the way that art relates to other disciplines such as
philosophy, science and psychology. The unbridled emotional element of
life which Read draws attention to, is, as Lewis admits with Bergson,
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essential to art, but as this element is essential and necessary to
artistic functioning, it may be the discipline most fully equipped to
effect control. Art, of course, as the 'ultimate necessity of life'
thereby finds itself at the point where it may be said to transcend
philosophy to the extent that 'it is what the philosopher comes to out
of the discomforture of his system'22.
That this essay has the relation of aesthetics to philosophy at its
base is evident: Lewis's analysis of art and games, the function of
the artist, conditions of perception, and standards in art is
conducted with reference to the fundamental critique of Bergson's
Impressionist philosophy, whereby life supersedes art, and to his own
endorsement of Schopenhauer's 'cold and immobile' idea of artistic
creation. The statement offered here is supplemented by 'The
Credentials of the Painter' which appeared in The English Review early
in 1922, which attempts to outline in more detail the technical and
methodological implications resulting from a commitment to
anti-Bergsonism and the attendant critique of aspects of modernist
painting. The 'abstract' picture is thus destined to take its place
'side by side with other forms of pictorial expression on which it
23
will heroically react, but with which it will not interfere' . The
tendency of modernist art, which leads to the implication that the
'latest' movement is thereby 'better' than the previous one is an
insidious falsehood for Lewis and is occasioned by an 'unconscious
leaning on the ideas released by relativity and other theories of our
24
time'
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Lewis's profound interest in portraiture which emerges very strongly
in this period is emphatically revealed as not merely a means of
demonstrating the possession of traditional skills, but as a medium
which holds out to man the means of a 'peculiar immortality', a
strategy adopted to defeat the effects of time and flux, the human
equivalent of the vortex:
There is not one immortality, evidently, but several types, and
this one is the painter's; a sort of death and silence in the
middle of life. This death-like rigidity of the painting or
statue, when a living being is represented, this silence and
re pose, is one of the assets of the painter or sculptor. If
pictures made a noise.., the unique character of the destiny of
plastic art would be impaired. 25
Lewis argues, accordingly, that the fundamental claim of the visual
artist is that he alone is able to render the visual fact of
existence, that it is the 'coldest', the most 'intellectual' and
direct of the arts. It is a strategy more immediately accessible to
any ordinary human, and is fully and instantly understood by those to
whom the complex metaphysical implications of the vortex, for example,
would always be obscured. The 'direct' nature of art is such that any
philosopher who attempts to 'decorate' his system of thought with a
veneer of aesthetics will not penetrate to the essential nature of
visual art: thus Lewis's own priorities - vis	 vis philosophy - are
firmly established.
Lewis's identification of the 'primitive' character of modernism is a
preoccupation which recurs in almost all of the important critical
writings in the l920s. The short article, 'The Apes of God'which
appeared in The Criterion in October 1923, preceded by several years
the publication of the massive satirical novel of the same name, the
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scourge of Bloomsbury and self-styled 'romantic', 'bohemian'
populations. It is a particularly crucial piece of writing in
relation to the equation that singles out aspects of contemporary life
and culture, modernist art and criticism, and seeks to demonstrate
their philosophical and theoretical underpinnings. The essay does
much to initialize the intense character of much of the criticism
produced in the 1920s, including the major books, The Art of Being
Ruled and Time and Western Man, culminating in the publication of the
novel itself.
Lewis introduces us to a class of puppets far superior to the simple
Tyros, who were indeed their (the massed public's) masters and
intellectual leaders, an active collective minority who 'ape' - play
the role of - the 'artist'. As 'moneyed descendents of Victorian
literary splendour' they make a cult of the amateur, the child artist
and any 'imperfectly equipped person'. This group of parasitic
'geniuses' were for Lewis modelled perfectly in all particulars by Fry
and the Bloomsbury circle, and represented a seriously damaging
influence on the idea of art in the minds of the public, being
naturally identified by them as an intellectual elite, to whom
admiring heads might turn: the pseudo-high-brow and minority 'crowd'
cavorting and performing for its mass audience, obscuring the
possibility of truly original or creative thought. The
characterization of the 'Apes of God' deepens and crystallizes in
vivid form the particular elements Lewis identified as timeist in
contemporary art and criticism, and provides a devastating,
caricatured portrait of the primitive 'modern'.
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The writings which followed, including in particular an 'Art
Chronicle' 26, and 'The Dithyrambic Spectator' 27, pursue in various
directions the original themes and problems that the 'Apes of God'
raised, in view of Lewis's conviction that the burgeoning of
collectives and a mass audience for art would lead to further
corruption of the quality of work produced. Public 'participation'
via amateurism is inevitably for Lewis a devastating levelling down
process, but ironically, the future of art, its continuation and
consumption, rests upon the shoulders of the apes and their puppets.
Lewis wryly concludes that the public might render the greatest
service to art'by not encouraging any art at all' 28. By this, he
intends to advocate a particular kind of specialism whereby the
'professionals' should be left in peace to do their work.
In 'The Dithyrambic Spectator. An Essay on the Origins and Survivals
of Art', Lewis concentrates on the construction of a two-phase
examination of aspects of vitalism in art, linked closely to the views
on the 'public' and collective coteries characterized in the 'Apes'
piece. The relation of 'life' (or death) and 'art' and ritual are
central preoccupations of the two texts - one by a doctor and
anatomist, the other an anthropologist - that are analysed. Both
viewpoints owe allegiance to scientific or social scientific pursuits
rather than to aesthetics, and the consequences are revealing. In
each case the different 'scientific' theoretical frameworks are
obliged to subordinate the idea and practice of art in the service of
each discipline, and thus invariably arrive at an essentially vitalist
interpretation of its character and function that has direct
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philosophical implications:
We hear that our art to-day, under the impulsion of science,
is an art of the background: and that the individual no
longer exists. 29
It was not only the artistic disciplines which were being strangled in
this way, for Lewis was convinced of the pervasiveness of the
propaganda of collectivism: philosophy too, is thus 'obediently
harnessed to physics and psychology, circumscribed to a fashionable
and purely political role'30.
The absorption of one activity by another has a familiar Bergsonian
ring about it, and one needs no reminder of a Spenglerian
world-as-history to project the consequences for those interested in
the survival and prosperity of contemporary art:
But to-day none of the pictorial and plastic arts, at least, are
any more than an adjunct to the critical and historic faculty.
The contemporary audience is essentially an audience of critics,
that is to say, they are as active as the performer, who, indeed,
exists chiefly in order that the critic may act - as a Critic.
The only rationale of the professional artistTo-day is to
provide the critic with material for criticism; it is no longer
to give delight or to serve any useful end. And were it not for
this, the whole elaborate pretence that the fine arts are still
an effective part of our life would be innediately abandoned.
There is, of course, the other motive for clinging to this
pretence; the motive of respectability; it is felt that the
public demise en masse of every art would be the crowning scandal
of all. The fThe arts are the last rags of a by now hardly even
laughable respectability. 31
It was a bleak picture that Lewis saw, and it is one which he felt was
already heavily entrenched in the portals of modernism, with the rise
of the critic or 'art-expert', ready to interpret for mass consumption
the incomprehensible meanderings of the 'extremist' artist.
The 'religion of impermanence' which had imposed itself on thought,
316
culture and society required analysis on all fronts: The Art of Being
Ruled, the companion volume to Time and Western Man, outlined the
influence of chronologism in respect of social and political
perspectives. As Lewis notes with a grim humour, it is difficult to
treat of anything permanent - like art - where the flux reigns, and
suggests that in this 'fluid world' we would be more appropriately
engaged in building boats than houses. The significance of the
diverse strands of Lewis's analyses is here clearly outlined. The
'Trinity' - of God, Subject and Object is pronounced at an end, and
its collapse heralds the 'evolution of the subject into the object or
of the child back into the womb from which it came', the 'ideology of
childhood' which pervades the mature 'bourgeois' world32.
The first edition of The Enemy journal, a 'review of art and
literature' appeared in January 1927. Numbers two and three followed
in September of that year and in January 1929. In refusing to claim
the customary and, by definition, temporary modernist status of a
'movement', Lewis declares his independence as a 'solitary outlaw and
not a gang', as a necessary strategy if the effects of the time-cult
are to be identified and analysed in the arts. 'Time' is
unequivocally taken to be the principle of the machine and the
unthinking mechanism: this philosophical idea governs each stage of
Lewis's analysis, whatever subject or discipline is under scrutiny.
Together, the three numbers of the journal present the case for the
identification of a literary and critical chronologism, which was for
Lewis so rife that a wealth of supporting evidence could be easily
accumulated.
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The bulk of the first issue prints 'The Revolutionary Simpleton' ahead
of the combined volume of Time and Western Man, with its in-depth
analysis of the time-cult on literature, history and popular culture.
The sole contribution dedicated to the visual arts is not from Lewis,
but its discussion of crucial issues confronting modern artists and
critics would have found ample editorial support. Writing on the
artist's 'horror of abstraction', Gibson's essay 'Giorgio dl Chirico'
describes a mind and a version of art practice that is not unfamiliar.
We should, Gibson notes, ask ourselves why, given Chirico's
metaphysical sphere of reference, he should refer to the 'material' or
the 'concrete' at all. The reason for this, he concludes, is a quirk
of psychology:
Chirico has a horror of the purely abstract as of something
terrifying in its emptiness, from which he can only be rescued by
a contact with concrete things... And yet he is a metaphysician,
interested in the reactions and processes of the mind; and to him
material forms are valueless for their own sakes, deprived of an
ulterior metaphysical significance. Consequently in his art he
attempts to make use of material forms to express the
non-material, to the end that by that means he may avoid the
horror of pure abstraction and yet express something outside of
the material world. 33
That there are certain parallels in this characterization with Lewis's
beliefs and art practice is evident enough, although a dependence on
the terms of 'inner' psychology would be unacceptable. But in
relation to the major concerns which occupied Lewis during the late
1920s and beyond, two specific issues are highlighted. In the context
of Lewis's critique of a modernism which insists on extolling the
virtues of zero, Gibson's article is an interesting point of
reference. It is also suggestive of the terms which dictate the very
limited extent of Lewis's sympathy with elements of Dadaism and
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Surrealism (or super-realism). De Chirico, cast as the metaphysician,
would approach Lewisian appreciation: but in respect of the collective
Surrealist enterprise of which he was a precursor, and the practice of
investing art with the functions and imagery of dream-psychology, he
and others of the same ilk must for Lewis attract censure in the name
of art's survival. Thus the artistic context for the second and third
numbers of The Enemy is established, and shows its comprehensive roots
in literature, philosophy, ethics and politics. The 'critical system'
which Lewis had set in motion in the first issue with 'The
Revolutionary Simpleton' had found an ideal target in Dada and its
metamorphosis into Surrealism, which had inherited the artistic
timeist mantle in the wake of Futurism. The critique of the literary
review, transition 34, which had, significantly for Lewis, published
material by James Joyce and Gertrude Stein in the company of
Dadaists' and 'post-Dadas', is a focus for both these issues of The
Enemy.
In issue two, Lewis defines the essentially political, specifically
communist character of Dada and Surrealism, and argues that any
artistic pretensions are thus irrevocably compromised as a result.
He shows how the terms which are typically associated with modernism,
such as 'radical', 'extremist', 'revolutionary', 'communist',
'progressive' - are now revealed in relation to 'super-realism', the
kind of generalized, anti-individualist and 'convulsive tendency' that
proves itself to be the equivalent enemy of art, the outcome of a
'dogmatic sensationalism, and not of the vital qualities that make the
artist' 35. That a political dogma of this kind will not hesitate to
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use art to further its ends is to be expected:
Joyce, or Picasso or Chirico, are called in to advertise
something that is not primarily art, just in the same way as the
Soviet leaders very sensibly iiT6'advanced' artists to
advertise their regime... or as the Medicis used artists to
advertise their munificence... 36
Surrealism, for Lewis, typified the impulse which had initiated a
headlong move towards what he called the 'new romanticism', linked to
the old cult of Dionys us, but with Its equivalent Nietzschean
characterization as the 'new nihilism'. 'The Diabolical Principle',
the major essay published in The Enemy No.3 is devoted to an analysis
of the theoretical implications which follow from a collective
devotion to the most extreme manifestations of timeist dogma. The
merging of dream-states and concrete realities in order to posit a
kind of 'absolute' or 'super-reality' that would transcend both states
has but one consequence for Lewis, and must result in
a logical emulsion of the forms and perspectives of life as we
know them, and, translated into an art-expression, will
approximate most closely to the art of the child. That is, of
course, what has everywhere occurred with the theorists of that
persuasion. 37
The infantile in art is thus the link which heralds a submerging of
the 'normal, conscious, real' in a celebration of the 'Great
Unconscious'. For Lewis, the doctrine of Surrealism is indeed the
Faustian, diabolical principle related by Spengler, the 'dark night of
38	 ,	 .
the soul'	 settling on the arts of formal expression', which owes
its overall allegiance, not to art itself nor aesthetics, but to fluid
'life', mechanistic will, and the politics of the flux. Lewis, in the
late 1920s, saw the dilemma clearly enough, and identified the
essential elements of the task ahead: the 'revolutionary impulse'
which inspired Vorticism had to be sustained, but must not fall victim
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to the extremist subjectivism of 'sur-reality'.
His call for a 'new, and if necessary shattering' criticism of
modernity and the modern, in the article 'The Values Behind the
Doctrine of "Subjective" Art' of July 1927, had been made according to
the view that linked bad art to bad philosophy, and in a challenge to
the 'mental world of the subconscious, in which we naturally sink back
to a more primitive level' 	 The necessity of scrutinizing the
intellectual principles which lay behind a work of art was fully
acknowledged. Ironically enough, having fully worked out his own
philosophical beliefs in relation to art in Time and Western Man and
other key writings of this period, Lewis found himself In a position
similar to that of the pre-war Futurists who had the task of aligning
practice with theory. The vital difference between them and Lewis, as
I have already suggested, stems from a cast of mind which had already
put painting first.
II.7.iii	 Art Criticism and the Time Factory in the Thirties
The early l930s were for Lewis dominated by his articles on politics
collected in his ill-fated book Hitler 4° and the controversy
surrounding the publication of The Apes of God. Lewis was to recant
the position taken in these earlier Hitler articles 4 , and by the end
of the decade had leisure to reflect on the undoubted damage the
expression of unpopular political views had on his career as a whole.
The Apes of God was a very different proposition, a literary blast
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aimed towards Bloomsbury and Its satellite amoebae, with the purpose
of exposing and holding up to ridicule the 'pseudo' artists,
'intellectuals' and 'hangers-on' who passed themselves off as genuine.
But reaction to the book, by those who claimed to recognize themselves
as characters, was just as explosive, provoking much anger, libellous
noises and even death threats 42. Despite an unwavering conwnitment to
its underlying theoretical principles, the furore surrounding the
novel itself probably did Lewis's career as much harm as the Hitler
book if success is measured by degrees of mainstream acceptance. As
far as art and aesthetics were concerned, the reputation ofthese
books, as Lewis became aware, would negatively colour audience
response to what he had to say, and his normally abrasive writing
style becomes markedly and self-consciously defensive during the
1930s.
The continuing influence and importance of the issues arising from
Vorticism dominates the critical essays written in 1934 and 1935.
However, 'Art in a Machine Age' 43
 takes a wider political and
philosophical brief than specialized aesthetic quarrels about subject
matter and abstraction 44
. For Lewis, the 'Machine Age' is the result
of the 'general intellectual paralysis' of the politics and philosophy
of fusion. His interest proceeds from its malign influence on art:
...what is quite certain, I think, is this: that if art, along
with the mind of man, goes to live in the heart of the Machine -
goes, as it were, to live over the shop - then the arts will
ultimately cease to exist as we have known them up to now... By
the substitution of a quantitative for a qualitative norm, the
very meaning of art indeed must become lost. 45
The effects of the 'Chronologic Philosophy' which in Lewis's view had
beset art and its cultural base for well over twenty years must be
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firmly resisted by the independent mind, aggressively if necessary,
lest one becomes a passive, unthinking follower:
...the best manner to keep Time in his place is to take Time by
the forelock - not to allow Time to drive you along like a flock
of sheep with a pack of ideologies barking at your heels.46
The link between Vorticism and the renewal of architecture that was
raised in The Caliph's Design fifteen years previously is reaffirmed
in l934. But the modern architect, Lewis argues, having finally
'got his Vortex at last' by courtesy of the painter, is in the process
of excluding pictures altogether from his 'dogmatic or cubist walls'.
The 'bitter pill' of modernism having been swallowed and thoroughly
digested by the new architects now works against those pioneers who
fashioned it. Yet Vorticism itself takes a share of the blame,
infested and corrupted by its own extremism. This Lewis accepts, but
points the finger also in the direction of a modernism which had
pursued regression in the guise of 'progress' in its embracing of
child-like art and the 'worship of the Fool'.
By the time the collection of essays, Wyndham Lewis the Artist, from
'Blast' to Burlington House was published in 1939, the fears that
Lewis had voiced about modernism during the previous ten years had, in
his view, been realised. 'Pure formalism' and Surrealism in English
art by the late 1930s had been paraded as 'new' and 'revolutionary'
methods when in effect both were seen as merely re-dressed revivals in
terms of the Vorticist 'cul-de-sac' or the highly literary
48
dream-worlds of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood . 'The Brave New
World', Lewis writes in 'The Skeleton in the Cupboard Speaks', 'was a
mirage - a snare and a delusion' 49. Lewis may not have foreseen some
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of the more positive implications of some minimalist and conceptualist
art as it developed during the decades after his death, but was
nevertheless prophetically fearful for art's survival if it had to
depend on the example of extremist abstractionists or the Surrealists
for development and inspiration: art was being propelled towards
literal and physical extinction. The 'primitive modernist' was
engineering his own demise by pressing on towards nothingness and
meaninglessness, aided and abetted by the fashion-crazed art critic.
In declaring 'highly experimental modern art' at an end, Lewis
discounts the rearguard action of the abstract extremists who affect
to be advancing, but who are actually in retreat 50. Surrealism,
despite protestations and advertisements, was a reinstatement of the
old, and was anti-modern with its feverish roots in academicism and
the libidinous unconscious uncovered by Freud. A world without the
kind of art Lewis envisaged would be lightened only by the scribblings
of children, accompanied by an appropriately vitalist theoretical,
religious and aesthetic framework dedicated to the furtherance of an
'organized savagery' 51•
The purpose of Wyndharn Lewis on Art is centrally dedicated to
proposing a solution to this alarming situation, demonstrating
paradoxically the volte-face that led to the labelling of Lewis's
views and practice as 'reactionary'. This was particularly ironic in
view of the rejection in the previous year by Burlington House of
Lewis's 'modern' portrait of T.S. Eliot. The resignation of Sickert
and Augustus John over the affair, and the controversy which raged in
the press could not have been about a 'reactionary' artist. For
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Lewis, the action of the Royal Academy was ample proof, if needed, of
the 'dead order' which stifled creative and living art, the 'ignoblest
mechanical travesty of nature' that went hand-in-hand with
philosophical and cultural conformity. For himself, Lewis accepted
that a charge of dogmatism might be conceded, as an indication of
strength of belief, but 'chronological parochialism', the 'merely
fashionable', or 'absolutism that has not its roots in some creative
necessity', as demonstrated by the 'potboiling orthodoxy of Burlington
House', is outlawed52.
The new essays, 'Super-nature versus Super-real' and 'The Skeleton in
the Cupboard Speaks' are important in the context of art theory and
practice at the end of the 1930s 53 , with Lewis providing also an
interesting critical review of his artistic career and interests to
date. The 'abstract extremist' of Blast becomes as heated about a
'return to nature' campaign as he was in attempting to throw off the
limiting shackles of imitative or naturalist art. Inconsistent and
contradictory this seemed, but it was nevertheless a philosophically
defined development which did not seek to chain the artist to the
mimesis of visual appearance, as Lewis's objections to both
Impressionism and Surrealism make clear, but to free him in order to
bring new insights to bear on the visual world. Lewis knew that art
needed the public to survive, but had to make itself directly
accessible. For painting to be popular with the majority, Lewis
argued, it must approach popularity 54. If this meant consorting with
types of imitation, and natural appearances, then it must be so.
Lewis had always claimed, from his Blast days, that his own art was
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never fully divorced from nature. The position, being desperate,
calls for desperate measures, but there is a crucial difference
between this strategy and the profound critique of 'popular culture'
in 'The Revolutionary Simpleton', and it depends on an understanding
of the conjunction of the 'concrete' and the 'abstract' in both
aesthetic and philosophical terms:
...I never deserted the concrete for the abstract... To-day I am
a super-naturalist... I am... never unconscious of those
underlying conceptual truths that are inherent in all
appearances. But I leave them now where I find them, instead of
isolating them in conceptual arabesques. 55
The mechanical passivity of time-cult popularism does emphatically not
apply: Lewis feared that if extremism of the kind described was
allowed to flourish, it would provide a haven for 'inferior' or
unskilled artists, with reflected suspicion on the 'genuine'
experimental artists.
The only way out, therefore, would be to work in a manner which would
immediately expose the amateurs and charlatans. The return-to-nature
that Lewis advocates is not a surrender to the automatic or the
irrational, to vicarious 'realism' and psychological sensationalism
devoid of intellectual understanding, but must stress conceptual, not
perceptual observation. Nature alone 'is not enough', and can be
'just as dead as academicism' 56 . Surrealism, Lewis argued, was closer
to photography than painting, and the statements it made offered the
observer vicarious psychological emotion, an 'eternal world of sense',
which must be enjoyed on that level, rather than an objective, formal,
aesthetic, or pictorial involvement that has potential to function
outside the temporal order altogether, isolated from the flux57.
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Hence the 'popularity' of this 'movement' (an especially meaningful
term for Lewis in this context) with the public, and Its status In the
philosophical debate. Lewis had no illusions about the limited extent
of 'the public's' capacity to fully enjoy and appreciate works of art,
and did not believe his function was best served by attempting to
dilute his ideas for mass consumption. Wyndham Lewis the Artist was
primarily aimed at the 'intelligentsia', the controllers of the
apes-and-tyros system whereby art-critics, standing to art and the
masses as priests to God and his flock, act as intermediaries and
'experts'. Professing a superfluity of inside knowledge and
understanding in cases of artistic 'extremism', Lewis argued that a
stranglehold on modern art and its reception was effected.
In 'The Skeleton in the Cupboard Speaks', Lewis provides a list of
'fundamental' questions and issues which must be asked and answered by
artists, irrespective of period, style, attitude or philosophy. His
analysis here is abstracted from the specific context of Vorticism,
but these are defined as general artistic problems, and are familiar
in the context of the time-debate: they include
Cl) the non-identity of life and art; (2) the certain 'deadness'
and lack of inventive imagination that is inclined to dog the
French School; (3) the place of literary imagination in pictorial
art; (4) the r6le of subject-matter in the art of the painter;
(5) how far nationality must influence the painter; (6) what is
the value and meaning of 'originality'; (7) whether the Machine
Age is incompatible with the visual arts - all these and many
more considerations belong to the permanent material of critical
investigation. 58
What Lewis pinpoints here are problems which are raised and debated in
respect of a specifically modern consciousness, and it is also clear
to him that the way these are approached determine an artist's or
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critic's overall theoretical orientation, and thus the kind of art
which is encouraged and produced. The 'stranglehold' of the critic in
contemporary terms is crucially important in the attitude taken
towards these problems. The influence of Fry and Bell has been
discussed, but after Fry's death in 1934, it was Herbert Read who
emerged as the champion of 'extremism', an active promoter of a
'utopia of the imature' engaged in 'making the world safe for the
Child' 59. Read's position as 'extremist art-critic 1
 is as hollow to
Lewis, if not more so, than the art it purports to describe and
interpret, for it entails 'writing about something that does not
exist, except for a handful of monied dilettantes, amusing themselves
by being childish in public' 60. Child art, though, has its uses,
observes Lewis, being reminded of 'Mr. Fry... the great apostle of
British amateurism', for then the 'limited, the immature, majority-person
should be compelled to paint primitive' 61, leaving the 'professionals'
to their serious work.
Herbert Read's 'profession' as the spokesman of the current
'intellectual circus' is thus empty, non-existent: and no amount of
'sincerity' on his part may compensate. So Lewis notes, with regret,
Read's gravitation towards the 'sensational and sentimental quarter of
the philosophic compass', and in taking the authority of the
historian-philosopher Vico 62, and in rejecting art as a 'rational
ideal' but 'conceived as a stage in the ideal history of mankind', is
thereby caught fast in the vitalist, Spenglerian world-as-history
camp 63. Such a conception, observes Lewis, typifies his own
prediction of the apotheosis of the child as artist. Despite a
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genuine personal attachment and a strong measure of respect for Read,
Lewis is merciless in his judgement of the critic who could speak of
the aesthetically impaired, 'negative and destructive' aspects of
Surrealist art, and yet within the space of a year could become its
enthusiastic spokesman in England 64. For Lewis, this was theoretical
opportunism of the worst kind:
Mr. Herbert Read has an unenviable knack of providing, at a
week's notice, almost any movement, or sub-movement, in the
visual arts, with a neatly-cut party-suit - with which it can
appear, appropriately caparisoned, at the cocktail-party thrown
by the capitalist who has made its birth possible...65
So devoted had Read become to the 'progressist' cause that Vorticism
had become a profound embarrassment to him, occurring long before its
'time': he would, Lewis claims, 'far rather have had nothing happen in
1914', so that 'abstraction' could have been 'discovered' at the
'right' time in the 1930s 66. But it is also clear to Lewis that the
function of the 'abstract' at the time of writing appeared to have a
very different emphasis than in 1914. Vorticism, in aiming to be
'cheerfully and dogmatically external', did not prostrate itself
before machines and the mechanical in the manner of Italian Futurism,
nor did it turn away from the mechanical world, but accepted it as
such. Read's emphasis on the 'inner world of the imagination' as an
appropriate means of inspiration for the modern artist, attempts to
provide 'an asylum from the brutality of mechanical life', an
escapist, self-delusory doctrine that on the contrary achieves the
opposite effect, becoming identified with that brutality. Clearly
enough, given Lewis's understanding of the Schopenhauerian will and
the Bergsonian view of life and the flux, Read's notion of the
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'abstract' as a panacea for the sordidness and flatness of 'everyday
life', taking refuge in 'inner imagination' and the 'unconscious' is
seen to be highly suspect. Lewis saw Read's abstract artist, the
'primitive' modernist, in flight from the very same demon of progress
he clasps in an incestuous embrace.
Lewis's views as expressed in his earlier writings, and confirmed in
the two new essays here, are evidently based on a belief in the
heightened and profound perceptual powers of the artist, who is able
to transform visual and cognitive 'actual life' experiences into
meaningful works of art which are essentially different in kind from
the stimuli which may have spawned those creative ideas in the first
place: hence the concept of the artist's 'super-nature' rather than
the passively imitative 'super-real':
The super-naturalist... is aiming - at the opposite to the
super-realist. The emphasis would be upon nature, not upon the
real... Art.., involves a banishing of that kind of reality.The
spectator is offered sensations, as if on the switchback at a
fair, among the scenes of nature, by the super-realist. The
sensations provided for him by the super-naturalist would be of a
quite different order. Nature would be predigested for him...
transformed by all her latent geometries into someThing outside
'the real' - outside the temporal order - altogether. 67
The 'real' of Surrealist art thus connects with the space-timeists'
philosophical 'real'; it merely offers a sensationalist, temporal and
psychological subject matter, utilizing the techniques of trompe
l'oeil and illusion 68, and cannot hope to approach genuine 'pictorial
interest'. The choice for the artist, according to Lewis, is quite a
simple one, and follows clearly from the acceptance of certain
philosophical principles: he can choose to interpret the material
world, or to create it. Invention is undoubtedly the key concept, and
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is one which he found too Infrequently in artistic practice and
theory69.
This conviction, that where true invention is identified, significance
cannot be denied, was the driving force behind the very explicit
condemnation of abstraction' in the 1940s that was to characterize
Lewis's aesthetics to the end of his career 70. But his objections
have to be read in conjunction with his theoretical views, for he
found much to praise in the particular work of many artists who
persisted along that road, and continued to produce such work himself.
This is only puzzling or inconsistent if a parallel study of Lewis's
philosophical views is not made. In a letter to Lord Carlow early in
1939, Lewis voices his fear that the 'theoretic basis' of the
time-philosophy had been lost sight of, and 'has now everywhere passed
into action'. Since the writing of Time and Western Man in 1927,
Lewis explained that he had been trying to 'translate this analysis
into more popular forms'. This aim clearly includes his many general
commentaries and specific critical articles on artists, art and
aesthetics, and in particular underpins his convictions about the
mis-use of abstraction and regressionist tendencies associated with
aspects of modernism that would elevate 'empty' abstraction to the
place reserved for truly inventive work. This necessitated a strong
rejection of any move towards absolutism in formal terms. Lewis was
fully aware, however, that the 'popularization' of such matters was
rather a vain hope, and that the philosophies in question at the
bottom of timeism must be examined 'to master the structure of the
contemporary mechanical Juggernaut'71.
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II.7.iv	 Absolute Zero: The Demon of Progress in the Arts
Lewis's short book, The Demon of Progress in the Arts, published in
1954, is more of a summation of theory and belief than a significant
addition to it, but it confidently re-affirms the substance of earlier
work. Lewis sets out the terms and effects of the cultural disease of
extremism affecting the arts from the point of view of the 'prime
mover' Vorticist. Enthusiasms which attempt a transmutation of the
visual arts into something akin to musical expression - the exchanging
of the concrete for the abstract - are unceremoniously jettisoned once
and for all. Thankful for a personal - and narrow - escape from an
unthinking acceptance of Bergsonist cultural ideology, Lewis sets out
to reiterate and explain his basic objections to what had already
become a dogma: institutionalized modernism and 'everywhere the
beginnings of nothing'. In support of his case, Lewis cites examples
of 'extremist' pictures from a Ralits Nouvelles exhibition in
Paris 72. The 'deadly monotony' about such canvases, Lewis notes,
makes further citations superfluous.
Lewis's 1946 appointment as art critic for the Listener was probably
as near to the 'mainstream' as he was ever likely to become. As
Jeffrey Meyers comments, despite his 'ogrish' reputation, he was to be
a most 'benign' critic who lavished generous praise on younger
artists, whichever mode of working - 'abstract' or 'naturalist' they
preferred 73. In The Demon of Progress, the work of Francis Bacon,
Michael Ayrton, Robert Colquhoun and John Minton is singled out for
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illustration and approbation. What mattered to Lewis was the quality,
originality and inventiveness of the art itself, not a set of rigid
categorizations according to either 'modernist' or 'non-modernist'
terminologies, although most of the works and artists praised by Lewis
fitted unquestionably into the former, rather than the latter
categorization. I-us detractors tended to discount the evidence where
it interfered with preconceptions of 'reactionaryism'. In these
matters Lewis showed a far more open and tolerant attitude than some
of his critics and those who had become influential apologists for the
modern movement, the ideological descendants of Roger Fry and
Bloomsbury.
One of these, Lewis's old friend Herbert Read, led the field against
Lewis's position with an article criticizing 'negative', 'reactionary'
doctrines in art and politics called 'The Lost Leader, or the
Psychopathology of Reaction in the Arts'. lie would not openly name
Lewis in the article itself, but in case the connection is not made by
the reader, he adds a note on the title:
It may be no accident that these thoughts came to me after
reading The Demon of Progress in the Arts, an attack on the
contemporary movement in art by Wyndham Lewis. It should be
obvious, however, for reasons given in the course of my essay,
that my observations have no application to Mr. Lewis himself. 74
Even without such an express - and self-conscious - qualification,
this essay is indeed a thinly disguised criticism of Lewis's book.
Read's characterization of the 'pioneer', the 'born schizoid', who
deserts the brave front of exploration, and who would brand and revile
former collaborators with the label of 'extremist', is supported,
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surprisingly, by the example of Wordsworth, not Lewis. Read is
denied, by his own subterfuge, the opportunity to mount a direct
examination of Lewis's case in detail, and instead has to fall back on
a general defence of vitalisru that is based on crude and
over-simplified interpretations of the opposing arguments.
'Reactionaries', Read announces, 'are always anxious to deny the
existence of progress' 75. 'Progress' is initially equated with
standards of living and material benefits for our comfort, and then
becomes identified with change itself, and the inevitability of
repetitive, 'cyclical change'. Lewis neither denied the 'existence of
progress', nor the inevitability of change in his philosophy and
writings on art. His task would have been simpler if that denial was
possible, but as he was fully convinced of the pervasiveness of the
flux, time and change, Read's protestations invalidate themselves
before they are launched. Lewis would certainly not disagree with the
view of the fundamental principle contained in an 'aesthetic
consciousness', but would profoundly challenge its alleged basis in a
vitalistic schema. Similarly, Read's discussion of the nature and
application of man's powers of reason demonstrates an emphasis on
passivity which Lewis could not have accepted, whilst he may well have
concurred with the characterization of the intellectual relationship
with the flux. Read writes:
...reason is fed, as from an underground source, by metaphors
and symbols grasped in their sensuous actuality by a sensitive
organism. 76
For Lewis, reason does not passively 'feed' on, but on the contrary,
organizes and shapes 'sensuous actuality'. A critique which purports
to be unspecific, but which nevertheless attempts to counter a case
which it cannot cite, is' inadequately furnished with debating power.
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In the short and brutally dismissive review of The Demon of Progress
in the Arts 77, Clement Greenberg, the new guru of Modernism78,
launched an attack on Lewis's 'antimodernism' that rivalled Read's in
its superficial treatment of the terms of his argument. At least
Read's position stemed from a reasonably well-informed aquaintance
with the particular theoretical and philosophical background of
Lewis's views, but Greenberg's obvious dislike of Lewis's style and
aversion to his argument - 'nothing, whether on the place of reason or
that of imagination, gets developed in his writing' - suggests a
sketchy knowledge of Lewis's work. Indeed, from judgements made on
the basis of the Listener articles, and in comparison with the
'incompetence' of Herbert Read, Greenberg's concession that Lewis 'has
taste' and is a 'superb critic when confining himself to the past' -
i.e., Michelangelo - is a very small one, given the modern orientation
of Lewis's writing. Greenberg complains, inappropriately, therefore,
that none of Lewis's 'usual keenness as a critic enters into his
polemic against abstract art'. Leaving aside the charge of
'incoherence' which is, as Greenberg is aware, a matter of 'taste',
the complaint about Lewis's own 'amateurism', in matters of art and
criticism, reveals an amusing irony in discussion of a professional
artist and critic of over forty years' standing. Greenberg either
ignores - or is unaware - of the ways in which the concept of
'amateurism' links closely to Lewis's aesthetic theory and philosophy.
If Lewis 'dishonestly' states the point that extremism may be a hiding
ground for the incompetent, it is not deemed an objection of such
importance that it requires further comentary or exegesis.
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It is evident that Greenberg must field fundamental objections to
Lewis's book in order to defend his own formalist critical position,
at once related to Clive Bell's cruder formulations, but at the same
time, infinitely more sophisticated and theorized. This was seen to
be effected by appropriating the idea of an explicitly Kantian
'specialism' in the service of an art criticism which insisted on the
overwhelming importance of medium, materials and technique over
subject matter, ideas and 'literary' significance. Thus Lewis is seen
as only one of many crabby detractors of 'extremism', who insist on
the attribution of 'a priori' and 'categorical' judgements before a
work is even created. This is perhaps a deliberate misunderstanding
of Lewis's position, which, as I have noted, depends on the
distinction between abstraction as a method of working, and 'empty'
abstraction - extremism - as a non-original and potentially damaging
indulgence. For Lewis, lurking not too far behind the extremist's
claim to 'individualism' and 'creative freedom', is the 'small
well-disciplined group' to which the individual personality is
surrendered. The 'obligation to be free' which is imposed in this way
is no freedom at all:
It will be obvious from this that the individuality of the
artist is the last thing you are likely to find. Each artist
conforms to one or other of the violent orthodoxies of the
moment. Women are obedient to the annual fiats of fashion from
Paris, and an artist has no more individuality than has a woman,
whose only desire is to conform to the fashion. So when I speak
of the freedom of the artist.., it cannot mean that the artist is
personally, or individually, free. That is not a thing that
could possibly happen anywhere today. 79
On the basic issue of autonomy, the difference between Greenberg and
Lewis is wide, and concerns the head-on clash of respective beliefs
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about the fundamental functions of art: put simply, for Lewis, art
must be a vehicle for conceptualization and ideas, and for Greenberg
and Bell, 'form' - perceived sensuously and emotionally as the
'aesthetic' - comes first. The philosophical duality of the
intelligence and the senses conspicuously applies in the context of
chronologism. When Greenberg says that 'results are all that count',
there would be no argument from Lewis, but the 'results' may be very
differently interpreted and understood. Both positions depend on a
kind of a priori categorization that will determine approaches to a
new work before it is brought into existence: Lewis, at least, openly
acknowledges the determining role of theoretical predilection in his
own criticism. It is predictable, he observes, that those deeply
concerned with art should favour the claims of the artist as a 'law
unto himself': in many ways, it is how he defines his own position,
but the step towards 'absolute autonomy' implied in the defence of
extremism is a very different matter. Thus he re-affirms the
conviction that some kind of relative autonomy for art should be
envisaged, a position which is fully compatible with a philosophical
emphasis on thought and rationality:
the painter and the sculptor think.., they read books... And
all artists of this century have been catered for by an
unflagging stream of books about themselves... The modern artist
may be said to find the literary atmosphere as necessary as is
oxygen for the mountaineer engaged in high-altitude climbing. 80
The review by Greenberg is revealing in the ways in which it
demonstrates, in 1955, the hold of formalist modernism - and the links
with Lewis's analysis of philosophy - upon art and culture. When the
image comes to mean nothing, for Lewis, it is a sign of the influence
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of chronological dogma. It also explains in some measure the attitude
of influential mainstream critics and coninentators towards Lewis that
was perpetuated long after his death in 1957. Because Lewis did not
live to see the enshrinement of the concept that a work of art's
reference to itself as a work of art may constitute a particular kind
of meaning, and the later socio-materialist challenge to Greenberg's
formalist critical principles in the form of a 'new art history' 81 , he
could only see a pessimistic ending to the situation in the 1950s,
lightened only by too few young, creative artists. Despite the
obvious relevance of Lewis's views to 'Post-Modernist' critical
perspectives, his writings on art, aesthetics and philosophy are still
marginalized. There is little hint, either in Read's oblique and
superficial critique, nor Greenberg's dismissive account, of any
attempt to acknowledge the complexity of Lewis's relationship with
modernism and its theoretical underpinnings. From the basis of such
hostile and even indifferent representations are reputations won and
lost. Lewis could never be anything but an enemy to those who, as he
saw it, consciously or unconsciously gravitated towards the
sensationalist or emotionalist end of the philosophical spectrum.
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POSTSCRI PT
In this thesis, I have drawn attention to the interdependency of
Lewiss philosophy and aesthetics in the face of intimately related
tendencies in thought, art and action with repercussions in every
detail of life and in the deepest metaphysical speculations. A study
which foregrounds the function of the visual image in an account of
theory is necessarily confined to analysis in generalized terms, lest
it deviate from the chosen course. It is clear to me that in the
light of the findings of this thesis, a close parallel examination of
the, visual art that Lewis produced would be highly desirable in order
to fully outline the relationship between practice and theory.
As one example of the possibilities of such a study, in addition to
those already discussed, I cite the 1942 work, The Mind of the Artist
about to make a Picture (FRONTISPIECE). The head of the artist on the
left is closely aligned with the book image, which is well known in
iconographical studies as a symbol of learning. The central
importance of intellect in the act of creation is quite openly
declared here. The images which proceed from this process are shown
in varying stages of abstraction, and appear to be other-worldly. I
would suggest that this kind of creation-myth drawing, of which Lewis
made many, comes as near to a direct visual exposition of
philosophical belief as it is possible to envisage. Through the
intellectual means of selection and organization of visual data from
life, the artist creates a unique world of plastic images. The
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complex mutual dependence of image and idea may thus be described as a
fundamental and structural characteristic of Lewis's unique working
methods.
Two months prior	 to the publication of Time and Western Man,
Lewis had published his pamphlet, 'The Values of the Doctrine behind
TM Subjective" Art'. In this article, Lewis examines the notion of a
'subjective' art which follows the principles of the philosophical
positions he was concerned to attack In Time and Western Man. He
argues strongly that art is intensely and irrevocably a philosophical
activity: more attention, he urges,
should be given to the intellectual principles that are behind
the work of art: that to sustain the pretensions of a
considerable innovation a work must be surer than it usually is
to-day of Its formal parentage: that nothing that is
unsatisfactory in the result should be passed over, but should be
asked to account for itself In the abstract terms that are behind
Its phenomenal face. 1
In the course of identifying and eradicating what he sees as 'bad' or
subjective art, the underlying philosophical principles and
'Intellectual shoddiness' must first be rooted out and held up for
examination. The bad art, for Lewis, is the phenomenal face of the
time-philosophy, and it is what first draws our attention. The
initial impetus and purpose of Time and Western Man is nowhere more
clearly stated:
And I have suggested that many subjective fashions, not
plastically or formally very satisfactory, would become
completely discredited if it were clearly explained upon what
flimsy theories they are in fact built: what bad philosophy, in
short, has almost everywhere been responsible for the bad art. 2
Lewis must write as an artist in defence of his work and his
profession, which necessitates a re-statement of the philosophy which
he sees as the principal factor heralding art's decline into
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subjectivity, the 'telling-from-the-inside, fashionable method', the
'dark night of the soul' familiar from Bergson, Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche.
As a work of philosophy, Time and Western Man may be criticized as
unsystematic and idiosyncratic in terms of received notions of what a
philosophical text could or should be, but as E.W.F. Tomlin has
observed, it returns
to the great metaphysical tradition: a tradition preserved in
the oriental wisdoms and transmitted to the western world through
Aristotle (who speaks of the 'divine intellect'), and present in
the scholastic thinkers, only to be driven underground during the
last few centuries. 3
That tradition is certainly integral to Lewis's thinking, but in Time
and Western Man, a systematic metaphysics is not on offer: it is at
once much broader and narrower than this. It is broader in the sense
that it does not confine itself to perennial questions of existence,
the meaning and nature of the universe, and man's experience of
reality, but considers, with pragmatic vigour, the practical effects
and nature of the modern world and Its philosophical predilections, in
addition delving further into microcosmic and 'trivial' areas of life
that would not be traditional fare for the metaphysician to explore in
detail. Here, its narrowness also lies, if there can be nothing more
extensive than a metaphysics, and if Lewis's area of concern does not
attempt to construct a systematic account of a metaphysics. What
Lewis does attempt to construct, however, is a critical system, which
is designed to seriously challenge and refute the time philosophy at
its metaphysical roots and its more superficial manifestations from a
standpoint developed from, and according to, an aesthetics derived
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from the practice and theory of a visual artist. In its attempt to
expose the philosophy of Bergsonian origins, it also meditates
unfavourably on apparent alternatives that would exclude the creative
power of the artist from the primary metaphysical equation. Thus the
philosophical content and attendant polemic is developed centrally
towards the analysis of popular cultural and intellectual trends that,
to Lewis, threatened the survival of the arts.
At the heart of Lewis's aesthetics and philosophy stands the symbolic
concept of the vortex: the inevitability of flux is always locked into
its terms of reference (compare FRONTISPIECE), constantly ready to
re-assert a malign influence if not subject to control. With
increasing intensity, Lewis's writings on art after the war up to the
writing of Time and Western Man were to form the vanguard of a
resistance to those timeist aspects of modernism which threatened
art's very existence. Lewis, we know, emphatically did not abandon
'abstraction' as a mode of working at any time, but made clear his
objections when form ostensibly claimed to supplant meaning or
significance in art. Originality and 'progress' for Lewis were
distinct terms, and characterized the different artistic priorities
arising from his own philosophical values and those connected to
chronologism. Both the philosophical and aesthetic implications of
'empty abstraction' coincide. The 'mentalism' or 'abstract' nature of
Samuel Alexander's system 'underlines the emptiness of its terms'4,
just as the impoverishment of art proceeds from empty abstraction, or
extremism, which is anchored, accordingly, to timeist philosophy.
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Time and Western Man, in my view, does nothing less than offer the
reader a means by which to disembarrass art of its 'cheap and
adhesive' satellite matter by constructing a philosophical cleaver
without which this could not be attempted.
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NOTES TO POSTSCRIPT
1. From 'The Values of the Doctrine behind "Subjective" Art',
published in The Monthly Criterion, VI, no.1 (July, 1927), 4-13
(pp.12-13).
2. 'The Values of the Doctrine behind "Subjective" Art', p.13.
3. E.W.F. Tomlin, Wyndham Lewis (1955), op cit., pp.15-16.
4. See my Part I, Chapter 3.11, p.101.
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